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Summary  
 
Although not a clear cut question of treaty compliance, this project takes as its theoretical point 
of departure two potentially opposing explanations for state compliance with international 
agreements, and asks whether investor-state disputes are better explained by shifting state 
preferences toward FDI (or a particular investment), or the lack of state capacity to maintain an 
investment-friendly environment.    
The project is structured around three sub-research questions: 1) which domestic institutions are 
taking the measures that are subsequently challenged by investors? What is the content of these 
measures? Against investors in which industries are these measures being taken? 2) Under what 
economic and political conditions are investor-state arbitration cases most  likely to occur?3) Are 
these changes in policy toward investment the outcome of a shift in preferences on the part of 
state actors toward investment, or are they instead the result of a lack of institutional capacity to 
respect IIAs? This project adopts a mixed-methods approach to the research question, with 
empirical chapters based on the qualitative coding of an original dataset of investor-state 
disputes; a regression analysis, and three case studies of specific disputes in Canada, El Salvador, 
and Hungary. Therefore, this project paints a general picture of investor-state disputes not as the 
result of a failure of bureaucratic capacity, but as incidences in which (private) transnational 
actor preferences truly conflict with those of domestic actors, and in which the state chooses its 
obligation to the latter rather than the former.   
If we accept that investor-state arbitration has the potential to impose significant costs on states, 
it is important when either justifying or criticising the regime to have an understanding of for 
which policy measures, and at whose behest, states are incurring these costs. These findings in 
turn have relevance for those who wish to improve investor-state relations and avoid investor-
state disputes, as well as attempts to reform the investment arbitration system.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In 2009, the president of the Republic of El Salvador announced the suspension of all mining 
activity in the country for the remainder of his tenure. In 2006-2007, the Hungarian government 
briefly reintroduced administrative pricing of electricity as part of its step toward the 
liberalization of its domestic energy market, and subsequently cancelled the long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) it had signed in the mid-1990s with foreign-owned electricity 
generators. Also in 2006, both the federal government of Canada and the provincial government 
of Nova Scotia opted to heed the advice of an expert panel and deny a permit to an American 
company which planned to construct and operate a gravel quarry in the Bay of Fundy. What do 
these three very different government decisions have in common? They, along with many others, 
have subsequently been challenged by the foreign investors they affect, as alleged breaches of 
international investment agreements (IIAs) signed between these states and the home countries 
of the investors. These challenges take the form of legal proceedings before arbitral tribunals. 
 A variety of different investment and trade agreements allow investors to sue the 
governments of the states in which they invest. The most common are the over 3,000 bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) – traditionally signed between a developed, capital exporting (home) 
state, and a developing, capital importing (host) state. These agreements contain a number of 
similar (although not identically worded) provisions on investment protection, and allow 
investors access to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the form of binding investor-state 
arbitration. Regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) also contain ISDS provisions, 
as does the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and a number of other bilateral free trade agreements. 
 The classic explanation for IIAs is that these agreements are meant to solve the time 
inconsistency problem that potentially plagues investors. While states may extend favourable 
terms to investors in order to attract investment,  
[o]nce the investment is made, the host country no longer needs to offer benefits sufficient to 
attract the investment, it only has to treat the investor well enough to keep the investment. The 
difference between the two time periods, (before and after investment) comes about because the 
host and the investor know that once the firm has made its investment, it typically cannot 
disinvest fully (Guzman, 1997, p. 661). 
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In theory then, IIAs therefore offer a way for host states to make a credible commitment to 
maintaining the conditions it has promised to investors upon entry and respecting investors’ 
rights generally, by means of the enforcement mechanism of ISDS. This supra-national dispute 
settlement mechanism is additionally appealing to foreign investors who may be less likely to be 
treated fairly by, or have more difficulty navigating, the host state’s judicial system. IIAs should 
therefore reassure investors who might otherwise be wary of investing in less stable developing 
states, and lead to greater investment flows into these countries. In this way, IIAs are meant to 
benefit both capital exporting states (by way of their investors) and capital importing states. 
Indeed, although recent work casts doubt on whether IIA signings were the result of rational 
cost-benefit calculations on the part of capital importing states, they were presented as important 
tools to attract investment by Western policymakers and international organizations (Poulsen, 
2015) 
  However, since the early 2000s, criticism of these agreements has been mounting, 
especially in light of contradictory evidence regarding whether IIAs in fact increase investment 
flows to developing countries. As will be discussed at greater length below, critics of IIAs claim 
that these agreements unduly limit domestic policy space and may lead to a situation of 
“regulatory chill” in which host states are dissuaded from passing new regulation for fear of an 
investor challenging the measure via ISDS (Tienhaara, 2009; Van Harten, 2007; Yazbek, 2010).  
 As these criticisms suggest, the international legal framework which supports economic 
globalization can place significant demands on host states, which may come into conflict with 
the preferences of domestic actors – whether these are special interest groups representing 
domestic industries, specific communities affected by the investment, or larger groups of voters. 
Exploring these tensions, as highlighted by IIAs and investor-state arbitration, is the broad aim of 
this project.  
1.1 Research Question and Motivation  
 
Proponents of the regulatory chill hypothesis can point to a number of instances in which the 
threat of arbitration has successfully warded off new regulatory measures. For example, a New 
York Times article from 2013 uncovered that tobacco companies have threatened Canada, as well 
as a number of African nations, ahead of planned anti-smoking legislation, and these countries 
have subsequently abandoned plans to pursue these policies (New York Times, 2013). However, 
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proving the regulatory chill hypothesis requires a reliance on counterfactuals – it is necessary to 
demonstrate that in the absence of a threat of investment arbitration, the state would have taken 
the measure in question. This is quite difficult given the sensitivity of the topic to both 
policymakers and investors, and necessarily limits an investigation to a handful of case studies. 
Moreover, for the concept of regulatory chill to hold water, we must assume that state actors are 
formulating policy with knowledge of the investment protection regime and the possible 
consequences of the planned measure (Côté, 2014). 
 An understanding of how IIAs and ISDS may have an impact on domestic policy space is 
nonetheless important, particularly in the face of mounting pressure to reform the regime 
(UNCTAD, 2013). However, despite the ongoing debate over the impact of the investment 
protection regime on policy space, there is a lack of data on the relationship between investor-
state arbitration and domestic institutions and actors – the relationship at the heart of the 
regulatory chill hypothesis. Therefore, instead of trying to prove the causal effect of an IIA (or 
the threat of arbitration) in instances in which the state did not take a policy measure, this project 
examines cases in which a policy is enacted and subsequently challenged by investors, in order 
to better understand when and where the preferences of domestic actors and foreign investors 
come into conflict; in other words, I examine instances in which the state chooses to side with 
domestic demands over those of international actors. Specifically, I ask the following research 
question: What role do domestic actors and institutions play in investor-state disputes that 
culminate in arbitration?
1
  
 Investor-state arbitration cases are, with some exceptions, triggered by policy changes 
toward FDI in general or toward a specific sector or investment project, promulgated by 
domestic institutions. Therefore, in order to assess the role of domestic actors and institutions in 
investor-state disputes, this project poses a number of sub-questions, answered by the empirical 
chapters of this project. These include: 
1) Which domestic institutions are taking the measures that are subsequently challenged 
by investors? What is the content of these measures? Against investors in which 
industries are these measures being taken? 
                                                 
1
 At this stage, I do not want to assume a causal direction for domestic actors and institutions on the outcome 
variable, and indeed, the variety of independent variables discussed below are not uniform in their relationship with 
the dependent variable.  
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 2) Under what economic and political conditions are investor-state arbitration cases most 
 likely to occur? 
 3) Are these policy changes toward investment the outcome of a shift in preferences on 
 the part of state actors toward investment, or are they instead the result of a lack of 
 institutional capacity to respect IIAs? 
 What is the relevance of an examination of which domestic actors, represented by which 
domestic institutions, come into conflict with investors? As mentioned above, trying to prove the 
counterfactual of the regulatory chill hypothesis beyond a few individual case studies is 
challenging, made more so by the reluctance of key actors to discuss the issue. Therefore, the 
primary research question and sub-questions take a different approach to the relationship 
between domestic policymaking and investor-state disputes, focusing on the underlying causes of 
investor-state disputes. If we accept that, as will be discussed below, ISDS has the potential to 
impose significant costs on states, it is important for proponents and opponents of the regime to 
understand for which policy measures, and at whose behest, states are incurring these costs.  
 As is discussed at greater length below, the first sub- question is answered via the 
construction of a dataset of investor-state arbitration cases. From this data, it is possible to 
inductively identify patterns in investor-state disputes which can help guide further examination 
of the causes of these conflicts. This question focuses on broad patterns in investor-state 
disputes – the actors involved (both domestic institutions and investors) and the measures taken 
– which can go some way toward gaining an overview of which domestic interests are at the 
heart of these disputes. 
 The second question, “under what political and economic conditions are investor-state 
disputes likely to occur?” encompasses a wide range of relevant variables by means of a 
statistical analysis. The hypotheses related to this analysis are developed from a reading of the 
literature on political risk and the determinants of expropriation. The variables include 
(relatively) time invariant factors such as the GDP per capita, corruption and democracy levels 
of the states that have signed at least one IIA. This analysis further includes the effect that 
temporally delimited events, such as financial crises or elections, may have on states’ 
propensity to take measures which are challenged by investors in arbitration.  
 This analysis can again help us determine which factors contribute to the likelihood of a 
dispute, which may hint at an answer to the final question – namely, whether investor-state 
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disputes are the outcome of cost-benefit decision-making on the part of state actors, or instead 
the result of a lack of institutional capacity to respect IIAs. This final question is addressed both 
by the large-N study and the case studies of specific disputes, and has implications for our 
normative assessment of the regime. If most investor-state disputes are caused by a lack of 
bureaucratic capacity or awareness of their obligations, IIAs cannot be said to impose too great 
a cost on using domestic policy space, as these disputes do not arise from the pursuit of specific 
policy goals of the host state, but rather an inability to respect previously made commitments. 
This further implies that investor-state relationships can be quite easily ameliorated with 
increased technical or bureaucratic capacity. However, if investor-state disputes are instead 
caused by changes in state preferences toward investment, we may conclude that investor-state 
dispute settlement can impose costs on states for being responsive to domestic interests. While 
all international cooperation requires some constraint of domestic behaviour, when the 
beneficiaries of this are foreign, private actors, and those that bear the costs are domestic 
groups, criticisms of IIAs on the grounds that they overly constrain domestic policy space and 
harm domestic interests will be more convincing.  
 Of course, investor-state arbitration, while usually triggered by a state measure, will not 
occur unless an investor makes the choice to use this tool to settle the dispute and different 
investors may be more or less inclined to do so–they may not wish to jeopardize their 
relationship with the host state or outlay the significant financial resources required in the 
arbitration process. This project does not attempt to include both the investor and the state 
“sides of the equation”. Instead I hold the interests of investor constant, and look only at the 
factors that increase or decrease the likelihood that a state will take a measure that is challenged 
by investors. 
 One final word is necessary on the choice of the dependent variable of the study as a 
whole, i.e. investor-state disputes that culminate in investment arbitration. While at first glance 
this may appear to be a fairly straightforward phenomenon, it is at once a very broad and very 
specific object of study. On the one hand, cases of investor-state arbitration are only a subset of 
investor-state disputes (Wellhausen, 2015). More generally, we can understand investor-state 
disputes as the incidence of an alleged breach by (an entity associated with) the host state of a 
contract, domestic investment law, or IIA, claimed by an investor. For various reasons, investor-
state disputes may not end up before an arbitral tribunal and states may, as the regulatory chill 
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hypothesis suggests, repeal the measure in question when threatened with arbitration by the 
investor, or instead choose to settle with the investor out of arbitration. However, unlike studies 
that focus on one type of investor-state dispute, most often expropriation, this project seeks to 
explain disputes that are instead caused by a very wide range of policy measures.  Therefore, the 
dependent variable of this study is ultimately a snapshot of the investment protection regime in 
action – comprising both the measures which investors see fit to challenge in arbitration, and 
which policies states are willing to risk arbitration losses to defend.  
1.2 Theoretical Framework  
 
This project falls within the tradition of rational liberal international relations (IR) theory and 
international political economy (IPE) scholarship, which examines the connection between 
preferences and interests of domestic actors, and a state’s foreign policy choices. Much of this 
literature discusses the reasons for which states may or may not choose to engage in international 
cooperation efforts (Moravcsik, 1997, 2012; Simmons, 2010), and in particular with regard to the 
IPE literature, domestic sources of trade policy (Brewster & Chilton, 2012; Mansfield & Mutz, 
2009; Milner, Rosendorff, & Mansfield, 2003; Rosendorff & Smith, 2014). As the research 
questions stated above make clear, this project focuses on the role that domestic actors and 
institutions play in investor-state disputes, and I therefore adopt the underlying assumptions in 
the aforementioned literature – namely that domestic actors are able to act collectively and 
influence national-level decision-making to the extent that the state may adopt as national 
preferences those of sub- or non-state actors (Moravscik, 1997, 2012). It is through domestic 
institutions that these interests are aggregated and policy is enacted (Frieden and Martin, 2003). 
In analyzing this causal relationship, it is necessary to first identify the relevant actors and 
interests, and subsequently, how they are able to organize and impact state level preferences 
regarding foreign policy. Frieden and Martin (2003) elaborate a framework for analyzing this 
type of domestic-international interaction, and I draw heavily on this work in the analysis of the 
case studies presented in Chapters 6-8.  
 In addition, I employ concepts found in the international relations literature on 
compliance with international agreements. As I discuss in Chapter 3, which expands on my 
theoretical framework, the concept of compliance is potentially problematic when applied to 
investor-state disputes, in part due to inconsistencies in arbitral findings, an issue highlighted 
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later in this chapter. However, the two main approaches to compliance from which I draw – the 
enforcement approach and the managerial approach – suggest useful starting points to answer 
more general questions about why states may find themselves in conflict with foreign investors 
(and possibly in violation of an IIA). Moreover, both of these approaches imply an important 
role for domestic actors in state compliance with international agreements. On the one hand, the 
enforcement approach to compliance argues that states only sign and subsequently comply with 
international agreements when it is in their interest to do so. Therefore, when faced with 
agreements which require substantial behavioural change, compliance can only be guaranteed if 
the agreement contains an enforcement mechanism which can impose costs on the state for non-
compliance which outweigh the benefits it may receive from not complying (Downs, Rocke, & 
Barsoom, 1996). This suggests that state preferences are derived from cost-benefit calculations, 
with the costs of non-compliance provided by the international regime, and costs of compliance 
most likely supplied by domestic sub- or non-state interest groups, thus highlighting the 
importance of domestic actors in international cooperation. 
 The managerial approach suggests very different sources of (non)compliance, which 
nonetheless derive at least in part from the domestic level. As Chayes and Chayes (1998) argue, 
noncompliance with international agreements is due in large part to a lack of capacity of states to 
comply, whether because of unclear treaty obligations, lack of sufficient time to bring domestic 
regulatory processes and institutions into compliance, or more generally, a lack of domestic 
capacity to act in a treaty-compliant manner. Thus while (non)compliance is not the result of 
domestic preferences, it does depend on the strength of domestic institutions.  
 These two contrasting explanations for treaty compliance can be understood as possible 
broad “causes” of investor state disputes at the domestic level, although as will become clear, in 
the case of investor-state disputes these are not mutually exclusive.  However, as discussed 
below, due to the primary role played by private actors (investors) in this regime, with their own 
motivations to enter into disputes with states, the “causes” of investor-state disputes cannot be 
found solely within the host state. Therefore, exposure to opportunities to be sued – in the form 
of the number of IIAs ratified, the amount of FDI hosted in the state and the passage of time 
(which accounts for increased investor awareness of ISDS) – must at the very least be controlled 
for, if not understood as an outright cause of these disputes.  
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 At the outset of this project, there was very little political science work on investor-state 
arbitration. Therefore, in Chapter 4, in which I develop the specific hypotheses related to the two 
broader explanations for investor-state disputes discussed above, I look at thematically adjacent 
literature including the work on political risk and large-N studies of expropriation events. 
Expropriation – when the state forcibly divests an investor of its interest in an investment project 
– is the most obvious, and dramatic manifestation of an investor-state dispute, and there is a 
significant body of work that looks at the conditions under which expropriations are most likely 
to occur. This literature comes to fairly clear conclusions about the role of domestic institutions 
in causing expropriations – in short that democracies are less likely to expropriate, given their 
greater respect of rule of law, property rights, and higher numbers of veto players, which 
increase policy stability (Albornoz, Galiani, & Heymann, 2011; Graham, Johnston, & Kingsley, 
2012; Jensen, Johnston, & Lee, 2013; Li, 2005). However, as I show in Chapter 2, investor-state 
disputes which end up in arbitration are caused by a much wider range of measures than 
expropriation alone. Therefore, some of the earlier work on political risk (Kobrin, 1979, 1984), 
which argues that a range of state measures and policies can contribute to political risk for 
investors, also provides a useful starting point for the development of my hypotheses (see 
Chapter 4). As will be discussed throughout the book, the issue then becomes one of policy 
stability, as much as democracy itself, and the importance of the causes of policy instability – 
changes in the preferences of domestic actors – in causing investor-state disputes. 
 The domestic interests and actors involved in investor-state disputes, as well as the 
broader causes of these conflicts, are particularly relevant at a time when the international 
investment community is considering various options for reform of the ISDS system, as well as 
the development of domestic level institutions to monitor investor-state relationships and avoid 
disputes.
2
 If we conclude that investor-state disputes are caused by a lack of capacity of state 
bureaucracy to maintain investment-friendly regulatory environments or confusion over the 
significance of IIA provisions, then efforts to improve bureaucratic effectiveness and 
understanding of IIAs at the domestic level, and perhaps efforts to increase the consistency of 
arbitral awards to reduce uncertainty, should be beneficial reforms to the overall system. On the 
other hand, if investor-state disputes are primarily caused by changes in preference toward 
investment, or conflicts between regulatory goals and earlier commitments made to investors, 
                                                 
2
 For example, Peru’s Coordination and Response System for International Investment Disputes.  
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then alternative dispute settlement mechanisms may help to avoid recourse to costly arbitration if 
investor and state positions are not completely irreconcilable. Finally, however, if domestic 
actors and investors are both consistently placing pressure on states to comply with 
irreconcilable demands, disputes will be difficult to avoid. In this case, the most beneficial 
reforms of the ISDS system, from the perspective of increasing the democratic legitimacy of the 
regime, will involve ensuring that ISDS does not systemically privilege the interests of one party 
over the other, and in particular, that arbitrators and investment lawyers do not face serious 
conflicts of interest that may render illegitimate or biased awards. Different possibilities for 
reforming the ISDS currently put forward are discussed in the conclusion.  
1.3 Main Findings  
 
As already mentioned, the dependent variable of interest is a quite heterogeneous collection of 
state measures taken regarding investment projects. How can we understand these measures as a 
single phenomenon? What almost all investor-state arbitration cases have in common is a change 
in state behaviour
3
 toward (an) investment. Therefore, policy stability is central to any 
explanation of the causes of investor-state disputes – while at one time the state committed itself 
to protecting foreign investment by means of an IIA, and subsequently welcomed specific 
investment projects, a policy change occurs that the investor perceives to be disadvantageous. As 
stated above, I identify two potential explanations for this shift in policy toward foreign 
investment – a change in domestic preferences toward investment, or a lack of institutional 
capacity to maintain policy stability. Below, I discuss specific findings regarding the role that 
domestic preferences and institutions play in investor-state disputes, as they relate to the sub-
questions stated above.   
1) Which domestic institutions are taking the measures that are subsequently challenged by 
investors? What is the content of these measures? Against investors in which industries are 
these measures being taken? 
 Most investor-state disputes relate to measures taken by an administrative institution, 
and a host state’s relationship with a specific investor or project. However, a significant 
number of disputes are related to regulatory change. 
                                                 
3
 Defining this shift as a purposive policy change toward investment does not adequately capture the possibility that 
a lack of capacity, for example to control the corruption of low level officials, is driving investor-state disputes. In 
these cases, official policy toward an investment would remain the same, and only the actual fulfillment of this 
stated policy objective would be in question. 
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Administrative measures have caused the majority of investor-state arbitration cases, and two-
thirds of all measures taken related to specific investors, rather than an industry or the private 
sector as a whole. Indeed, when taken together, the cancellation of, or refusal to grant, a licence 
or permit make up the largest category of state measures. The prominence of administrative 
decision-making in causing investor-state disputes may suggest a lack of bureaucratic capacity 
contributes to investor-state disputes, and indeed, both control of corruption and government 
effectiveness are negatively correlated with the likelihood of a dispute (see Chapter 5). On the 
other hand, the national legislature is the single institution most frequently implicated in these 
disputes (legislative measures have triggered one third of all cases), and regulatory change is the 
third most frequent trigger of disputes. However, it is difficult, as an in-depth look at specific 
cases demonstrates, to infer much from the label of legislative or administrative measure; while 
we might assume that non-legislative measures are removed from direct public pressure, this 
ignores the reality that domestic interest groups may pressure the state through non-electoral 
means, and that administrative measures may be taken in reaction to that pressure. Moreover, 
while it might be tempting to assign a higher normative value to legislative rather than 
administrative measures, as the case studies demonstrate, administrative measures can be “social 
regarding” in their aims, while  legislative measures can be of a questionable nature, as Hugo 
Chavez’s legislatively approved expropriations suggest.  
 Investor-state arbitration affects a wide array of stakeholders, beyond the official parties 
to the dispute (i.e. the national state government and the investor), in part due to the 
industries in which it is concentrated. 
 
Disputes are concentrated in what are known as “strategic” industries, such as oil, mining and 
gas (extractive industries), energy utilities (electricity and heat); construction and transportation.  
That it is investors from these industries that are most frequently involved in these disputes 
speaks to the degree to which investor-state arbitration has the potential to impact a wide range 
of stakeholders. For example, the regulation of and energy utilities involve a variety of state-
based institutions, and also have a significant effect on energy consumers – a fairly broad 
category. This underscores the public policy dimension to many investor-state disputes, and 
suggests that the preferences of a wide range of non-state actors, such as energy consumers or 
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communities in the vicinity of extractive projects can have a role in state decision-making that 
leads to a dispute with an investor.   
2) Under what economic and political conditions are investor-state arbitration cases most 
likely to occur? 
 
 The structure4 of the investment protection regime and states’ exposure to it have a 
significant impact on which states act as respondents. 
  
This project finds that the investment protection regime itself has a significant influence on the 
distribution of arbitration cases. As mentioned above, the original rationale for international 
investment agreements and ISDS was the protection of foreign investors in developing states 
with poorly functioning domestic institutions, and leaders with a high propensity to expropriate. 
Given that most states acting as respondents in arbitration cases are developing countries, this 
rationale seems to reflect the reality of investor-state disputes; although developed and 
developing states have signed similar numbers of IIAs, it is mostly developing states that are 
sued by investors, which suggests that weak institutions are important drivers of these disputes. 
However, this likely has as much to do with the flow of investment that is covered by an IIA as 
with the development status of the state. Indeed, as the experience of the signatories to NAFTA 
clearly demonstrates and the results of the statistical analysis reinforce, when highly developed 
liberal democracies act as hosts to investment that is covered by an IIA, they are frequently sued 
by investors. This undermines an explanation for investor-state disputes that privileges a lack of 
capacity of domestic institutions to maintain policy stability for investors. Moreover, the results 
of the statistical analysis suggest that a state’s exposure to the IIA regime, and in particular, what 
appears to be growing awareness of ISDS on the part of investors (and likely, their lawyers) 
plays a significant role in increasing the numbers of investor-state disputes.  
 Investor-state arbitration is frequent in countries we would expect to be undergoing 
policy change.  
 
 Investor-state arbitration cases are clearly concentrated in middle income and transition 
(formerly state-planned economy) countries. The concentration of disputes in these states is in 
part due to these states’ role as traditional “host” states for investment covered by an IIA, thus 
making them likely respondents in a dispute. However, these states may also be more likely to 
                                                 
4
 By structure, I mean the traditional role of states as either hosts or homes of investment and the subsequent flows 
of FDI that are covered by an IIA. 
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face challenges in their relationships with investors, both due to capacity issues, and a greater 
impetus for regulatory change – whether in the form of raising environmental standards or 
privatizing and liberalizing formerly state-owned enterprises. Indeed, the case studies on disputes 
between El Salvador and Pacific Rim, and Hungary and AES Summit and Electrabel highlight 
that investor-state disputes can be triggered by shifting domestic preferences toward specific 
industrial activity that is part of a much broader policy change (see Chapters 7 and 8).   
 Democratic domestic institutions do not appear to lower the likelihood of an investor-
state dispute. 
 
As discussed at greater length in Chapter 3, there is much debate about the role of democratic 
institutions in state compliance with international agreements. However, the majority of the 
literature on the relationship between democracy and expropriation concludes that democracy 
level is negatively correlated with the likelihood of expropriations. The results of the statistical 
analysis in this study show the positive correlations between democracy level and the likelihood 
of a dispute, suggesting that disputes may stem in part from governments responding to public 
pressure. As will be discussed at greater length in Chapters 3 and 4, this goes against 
expectations regarding the role of democracy in ensuring respect for international commitments 
and domestic property rights. Instead, it again underscores the public policy dimension, and wide 
reach of, investor-state disputes.  
3)  Are these changes in policy toward investment the outcome of a shift in preferences on 
the part of state actors toward investment, or are they instead the result of a lack of 
institutional capacity to respect IIAs? 
 
 Low levels of institutional capacity (indirectly) contribute to investor-state disputes.  
 
In the statistical analysis, the variables related to state capacity – particularly economic capacity, 
in terms of both economic crisis, GDP per capita and economic growth – have the weakest 
relationship with the likelihood of a dispute. However, higher levels of government effectiveness 
and better control of corruption, which can serve as indicators of bureaucratic capacity, are 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of a dispute, suggesting that lack of capacity does 
contribute to investor-state disputes. The role of government capacity also emerged in the case 
studies, though in a more nuanced way.  In the case of El Salvador, recognition that the 
government did not have the technical capacity or experience to regulate the extractive sector, 
contributed to a change in preferences toward the mining industry (see Chapter 6). In Hungary, 
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the demands of an emerging market economy in the early 1990s led to a push for agreements 
with investors that would later need to be re-evaluated to meet EU accession requirements (see 
Chapter 8). Finally, even in Canada, a country with significant ISDS experience, government 
experts were unable to predict whether a specific measure would both incite arbitration and lead 
to a negative ruling by the tribunal (see Chapter 7). Ultimately, this project concludes that 
domestic bureaucratic capacity issues do have a role to play in investor-state disputes.  
 Changes in the preferences of domestic actors toward investment are clearly linked to 
investor-state disputes. 
 
On the other hand, domestic preferences toward investment are also found to contribute to state 
decision-making which led to a dispute with an investor. The variables hypothesized to indicate 
both negative domestic preference toward investors and the receptiveness of domestic 
institutions to anti-investment/investor pressure consistently increase the likelihood of a dispute 
in the large-N study, including as mentioned above, democracy levels, as well as the incidence of 
an election, presidential system and the dummy for transition countries. 
 Moreover, in the three case studies, there are clear links between domestic actor 
preferences, and subsequent changes in policy toward the investment in question. In the cases of 
Canada and El Salvador, the key non-state actors were broad interest groups – in both cases local 
communities and environmental groups concerned about the impact of extractive projects – 
supported by key state agencies. In the case of Hungary, the most influential sub-state actor was 
the state owned electricity company, although external pressure from the European Union also 
had a significant impact on the state decision-making which led to the dispute. This case 
therefore exemplifies both the role that powerful special interests can play in investor-state 
disputes, and the transnational dimension to the issue. 
 Therefore, a clear picture emerges regarding the role of changes in domestic preferences 
toward the investment in question in triggering investor-state disputes. It appears that many 
investor-state arbitration cases indicate instances in which the state has had to choose between 
the demands placed on it by domestic actors, and its international commitments enshrined in 
treaties and agreements, and sides with the former.   
 
 Policy instability or reversal can be attributed to weak domestic institutions. As the 
literature on veto players and political constraints suggests, higher numbers of independent 
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institutions or individuals whose consent is needed to pass a policy measure increase the ability 
of states to make credible commitments, to, for example, foreign investors (Henisz & Mansfield, 
2006; Henisz & Zelner, 2002; Tsebelis, 2000). However, the line between weak domestic 
institutions that encourage policy reversal and institutions that are responsive to changing 
domestic conditions can be difficult to identify. Because the reach of IIAs is so wide, and 
investors are incentivized to use the system to challenge measures they object to, maintaining 
policy stability for investors in order to avoid arbitration may come at the expense of responsive 
domestic institutions. As this project demonstrates, states are still choosing to defend their 
actions in investment arbitration at the behest of domestic interests, and thus the regulatory chill 
hypothesis does not hold across the board. However, ISDS does appear to put a cost on states 
responding to domestic pressure, and at a certain point, an assessment of the causes of investor-
state disputes and the effect of the ISDS system becomes a normative rather than empirical 
question.  
1.4 Criticism of the Investment Protection Regime  
 
Investment protection agreements have come under increased scrutiny in recent years, and face 
strong criticism on a number of fronts. These range from criticisms of fundamental aspects of the 
regime, such as its professed undue constraining of state sovereignty, to more mutable facets of 
the regime, such as the incentives facing arbitrators and lawyers to promote its use. This section 
discusses some of these criticisms, which suggest possible paths to reform, discussed in the 
conclusion.  
 Perhaps the most fundamental criticisms of the investment protection regime are those 
that relate to domestic policy space and regulatory chill – and ultimately questions of state 
sovereignty – that come from the regime’s fundamental blending of public and private interests. 
At its heart, the regime allows an international tribunal to rule on the legality of policy choices, 
based on standards which aim primarily to create an environment conducive to the success of the 
private sector  (Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2006; Montt, 2009). Considering that many IIAs 
do not require the exhaustion of local remedies, it can be argued that “international investment 
law today is in charge of controlling the regulatory state” (Montt, 2009, p. 19). While all 
international agreements aim to constrain the sovereignty of contracting states to some degree, 
most tend to do so in the pursuit of (international) public goods – whether environmental or 
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labour protection or standard setting for the transportation of hazardous waste or farm products. 
What sets the investment protection regime apart is the manner in which it combines both public 
and private law and interests. Unlike commercial arbitration which may involve the state as a 
private actor, investment arbitration allows private actors to challenge the state in its role as a 
public actor. Van Harten (2007) clarifies the distinction in the following way: “the passage of 
legislation is a quintessentially sovereign act... Alternatively, when the Government contracts 
with a company to tend the lawn in front of Parliament, the Government’s conclusion of the 
contract is a commercial act of the State, one that a private party could carry out” (p. 373). As we 
will see in Chapter 2, investors routinely challenge legislation and other policies that are, if not 
always in the “public interest” then certainly acts which private parties could not carry out. 
Therefore, ISDS allows private, foreign actors to challenge policies and measures which may 
affect stakeholders far beyond the parties to the dispute (Schill, 2010). This is potentially 
problematic from a democratic perspective if investors are able to challenge legislation passed by 
elected officials. As mentioned above, the arbitral tribunal cannot force the state to overturn 
measures it has already taken if found to be in contravention of the IIA. However, as a recent 
study has found, respondent states suffer negative reputational effects, which may be 
accompanied by financial consequences in the form of declining investment inflows, solely by 
being involved in an arbitration,  regardless of whether the tribunal rules that it has violated the 
IIA  (Allee & Peinhardt, 2011). If a state loses the arbitration, it may be forced to pay a 
significant monetary award to investors. Therefore, while the state is not forced to repeal a 
democratically enacted policy, it may be punished for taking it.  
 The conflict between public and private goals is compounded by the conflicting goals of 
the state (and its constituents) and investors. For example, the regulatory goals of energy policy 
include “assuring universal and affordable access... and aligning energy production and 
consumption with the objectives of sustainability and environmental protection” (Krajewski, 
2012, p.3). However, these priorities, particularly ensuring universal access for energy 
consumers, may conflict with the profit-maximization goals of investors in the energy sector who 
may use ISDS as a tool to challenge policies. Public services more generally are also quite likely 
to be at the heart of conflicts between public and private interests when it comes to arbitration, in 
particular as IIAs “lock in” policies that are in place at the time an investment is established. This 
makes it quite difficult for a state to update policies governing public services in the case of 
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changing public preferences. For example, “if regulatory frameworks are not developed or fully 
implemented before private companies begin supplying a particular service, it may become 
difficult to introduce regulations and activity controls once private actors have started on the 
market” (Krajewski, 2013, p. 5). More generally, the fact that IIAs constrain the ability of the 
host state to change policies may be particularly problematic for developing countries which 
liberalize certain sectors such as public services or extractive industries when regulatory 
standards are fairly low, and are subsequently unable to raise these standards for fear of 
provoking arbitration. Finally, at least under most IIAs today, the arbitral tribunal is not required 
to consider the goals of the state measures in question – most importantly to this discussion, 
whether or not a measure was taken in the “public interest”. For example a finding of indirect 
expropriation   
depends predominantly on the degree of interference and the effects of the measure, but not on its 
purpose or intent. Hence, measures taken for regulatory purposes in public services can amount to 
indirect or regulatory expropriations if they adversely affect the investor’s assets in such a way 
that it deprives the investor of the value of the investment (Krajewski, 2013, p. 10)  
 
In this way, investors’ rights are likely to be given priority over public interest goals, if these are 
found to be in conflict.  
 This privileging of private over public interest may give rise to a situation of “regulatory 
chill” if policy makers consider the possible costs imposed by ISDS and refrain from enacting 
new policies or legislation (Tienhaara, 2009). Skeptics of the regulatory chill hypothesis point to 
the lack of awareness among policymakers regarding IIAs, arguing that if government actors do 
not know about the regime their policy choices necessarily cannot be inhibited by it (Côté, 
2014). However, as Tienhaara (2009) rightly argues, and anecdotal evidence from other studies, 
and interviews done as part of this project suggest, investors can make states aware of the 
potential costs of certain policies by threatening to go to arbitration, and thus ward off regulation 
which may adversely affect their interests. Moreover, not just the threat of being found liable in 
arbitration, but the high costs of the arbitration process itself, no matter the outcome, has been 
cited by state actors as a factor which may encourage states to negotiate with investors rather 
than defend their policies in arbitration (Gaukrodger & Gordon, 2012). As mentioned above, it is 
difficult to prove the regulatory chill hypothesis, but it nonetheless is supported by anecdotal 
evidence and deserves consideration.  
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 Other less fundamental, but still important criticisms are leveled at more specific aspects 
of the investment protection regime. Connected to the regulatory chill hypothesis is the 
uncertainty facing states in the arbitration process due to a lack of consistency in arbitral awards 
– meaning that arbitral tribunals are coming to different conclusions in similar cases 
(Gaukrodger & Gordon, 2012). One frequently cited inconsistency is the decisions reached by 
the panels in the Metalclad v. Mexico and Methanex v. United States NAFTA awards, both ruling 
on the issue of regulatory takings (indirect expropriation) (Mann, 2007). In the Metalclad case, a 
Mexican municipality revoked the licence to operate of a waste disposal operation, and Mexico 
subsequently lost the case on the grounds that they had indirectly expropriated the development. 
In contrast, in the Methanex case California banned a key chemical component of methanol, and 
was challenged by a Canadian-owned methanol production on the grounds that this measure was 
tantamount to expropriation (Mann, 2005). However, in this case, the tribunal ruled that a non-
discriminatory regulatory measure could not be deemed to violate NAFTA. As Mann (2007) 
concludes, “Methanex and Metalclad are irreconcilable decisions. Yet both stand as binding 
awards, and both have adherents in the literature in other arbitral decisions” (p. 5). This was cited 
as a concern in a survey of governments conducted by the OECD. A lack of consistency may 
detract from the “legitimacy and perceived fairness” of ISDS, as well as reducing its cost 
effectiveness and ability of parties to avoid disputes (Gaukrodger & Gordon 2012, p. 16). This 
lack of consistency likely stems in part from the design of the regime – over 3,000 non-identical 
IIAs – as well as the ad hoc nature of the investment tribunals themselves (Gaukrodger & 
Gordon, 2012). As will be discussed below, recognition of this uncertainty and lack of 
consistency in the arbitration process has spurred calls for reform of the system.  
 Concern has also been raised regarding the incentives for arbitrators and investment 
lawyers to increase the use of the regime, as well as possible conflicts of interest related to the 
multiple roles played by these actors (Van Harten, 2013). In the first instance, both arbitrators 
and investment lawyers are very highly paid, and thus have an interest in both more and longer 
cases, and thus may discourage settlement, or be less likely to rule negatively on jurisdictional 
questions (Gaukrodger & Gordon 2012). It may also be that party-appointed arbitrators are not 
able to act as neutral judges when they hope to be appointed in subsequent cases, and thus have 
an interest in appearing to be friendly to either state or investor interests (Gaukrodger & Gordon 
2012). 
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 This section has not presented an exhaustive list of the criticisms levied at IIAs and the 
ISDS mechanism. However,  the problems highlighted here correspond to both areas of possible 
reform as well as themes that recur throughout this project – changing preferences and the time 
inconsistency problem (right to regulate), lack of capacity or understanding of the investment 
protection regime, increased by lack of consistency in arbitral awards, uncertainty, and the 
increased use of the ISDS mechanism by investors.  
1.5 Methodology and Case Selection 
 
In examining contribution of domestic actors, preferences and institutions to investor-state 
arbitration cases, this project examines the empirics of these disputes at a number of levels.  As 
the three sub-research questions suggest, I am interested in both broad patterns underpinning 
investor-state disputes, and micro-level causal relationships. Following Lieberman (2005), I 
assume that combining these levels of analysis can afford us greater insight into the relationships 
in question, and thus employ both a large-N statistical analysis, in which the incidence of an 
investor-state dispute in a given country-year serves as the dependent variable, and in-depth case 
studies of specific investor-state disputes.  In so doing, I carry out an analysis, which  
assumes an interest in both the exploration of general relationships and explanations and the 
specific explanations of individual cases... For example, a nested research design implies that 
scholars will pose questions in forms such as ‘what causes social revolutions,’ while 
simultaneously asking questions such as ‘what was the cause of social revolution in France?’ 
(Lieberman, 2005, p. 436).  
 
I do just this, posing the general question of what domestic causes can be found for investor-state 
disputes broadly to a dataset of 583 investor-state disputes. I then turn to the case studies and ask 
“what caused investor-state disputes in El Salvador, Canada and Hungary?” These case studies 
are able to provide much more micro-level data on the processes which link the relevant 
independent variables, first identified in the statistical analysis, to the outcome – investor-state 
arbitration.  
 However, before performing either the statistical analysis or the case studies, I present the 
results of a data collection effort in which I code 583 investment arbitration cases according to 
various qualitative criteria. Given the relatively recent interest of political science scholars in 
investment arbitration the rationale behind this first empirical exercise was primarily one of self-
edification – it allowed me to get a sense of the “who, what, where, why and when” of investor-
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state disputes. Moreover, it allowed for the inductive development of some hypotheses which 
were subsequently assessed by the statistical analysis. Both the specifics of this coding, and a 
discussion of the model choice used in the statistical analysis appear in their respective chapters. 
Thus, I will turn now to a description of the case studies.  
1.5.1 The Case Studies: Canada, El Salvador and Hungary  
 
The overall aim of this project is exploratory – to better understand the causes of investor-state 
disputes under the investment protection regime using the tools afforded to political scientists. 
Given the preliminary nature of the work on this topic, I have aimed for a “diverse” case 
selection which “has as its primary objective the achievement of maximum variance along 
relevant dimensions” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 301). Given some practical considerations 
which will be discussed in detail below, these cases do not present variation on all indicators of 
interest – for example all three are democracies according to the Polity definition. However, this 
is not a comparative case design; instead I opt for within-case analysis, and hope primarily to 
examine some of the correlations observed in the statistical analysis, and explore the validity of 
the expectations proposed by the theoretical framework explained in Chapter 3.  
Given the broad explanations for investor-state disputes based on cost-benefit 
calculations and/or a lack of bureaucratic capacity, the case selection accounts for varying levels 
of capacity, in this case indicated by GDP per capita and aggregate measures of government 
effectiveness and control of corruption in order to investigate the role this plays in the 
development of disputes. However, the results of the statistical analysis presented in Chapter 5 
provide further criteria for case selection. The case selection is presented in the following table:  
Table 1.1Case Studies 
 Pacific Rim v. El 
Salvador 
Bilcon Ltd. v. 
Canada 
AES Summit 
Generation & Electrabel 
v. Hungary  
 
Industry 
 
 
Mining (Gold) 
 
Mining (Quarry) 
 
Electricity Generation 
Income Level  
 
Lower Middle High High  
Gov’t Effectiveness/Control 
of Corruption 
 
Low High Medium 
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Number of Previous 
Arbitration Cases 
 
1 9 3 
Relevant IIA  CAFTA & 
domestic 
investment law  
NAFTA Energy Charter Treaty 
 
Transition Economy 
 
 
No  
 
No  
 
Yes  
Government System  
 
Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary 
Measure precedes an 
Election? 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Polity Score 7 10 10 
 
 
Given the varying levels of development and government effectiveness/control of 
corruption related indicators, the case selection can address the role that capacity plays in 
investor-state disputes. While Hungary is now an OECD country with a high income level, the 
shift from a planned to a market economy presents administrative and governance challenges 
that reflect capacity in a different way, but may help explain the strong positive effect of 
transition economy status on the likelihood of an investor-state dispute. Finally, the number of 
cases faced previously gives an initial indication of the level of awareness of relevant state actors 
of the possibilities of arbitration.  
The other indicators relate primarily to the impact of changing domestic preferences, 
toward FDI on the outcome variable – an investment arbitration case. The relationships between 
these variables were hypothesized and tested on an aggregate level in the statistical analysis, and 
will be the focus of a more micro-level analysis in the case study chapters.  
More generally, these cases can be seen to represent different types which may be more 
broadly applicable and perhaps contribute to understanding the causes of investor-state disputes 
in different contexts. As mentioned throughout this introduction, the dependent variable of 
interest – an investor-state dispute – is in fact the outcome of an extremely diverse collection of 
policy measures. Given this situation of equifinality, I have not attempted to construct a causal 
mechanism which can adequately explain all investor-state disputes. However, the cases selected 
for this study are arguably representative of broader categories.  
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In many ways, Pacific Rim v. El Salvador is a typical case: a dispute between a middle 
income country with a presidential system, and an extractive company, stemming from the 
refusal to grant a permit (one of the most frequently taken measures). However, beyond this, the 
case serves to demonstrate some of the tensions between sustainable development and associated 
norms of community participation, and investment protection. Moreover, it exemplifies the ways 
in which investment arbitration can be triggered by, but also impede, the adaptation of policies to 
both shifting domestic preferences and to new technical or scientific information.  
The dispute between Bilcon and Canada is in some aspects quite similar, as it features an 
extractive project meeting opposition from communities in the vicinity. However, the case takes 
place in a very different institutional setting. As a NAFTA signatory, Canada is one of the few 
OECD countries that has frequently acted as a respondent in arbitration cases. The frequency of 
cases within NAFTA undermines the argument that investor-state disputes are caused primarily 
by a lack of bureaucratic or administrative capacity, or awareness of the investment protection 
regime. Instead, cases in Canada and the United States suggest what the future of ISDS may look 
like if, in the event that the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) are ratified, more developed states become possible respondents in 
arbitration. However, like the dispute in El Salvador, this is a case of a local population placing 
pressure on a government to deny a license or permit to an investor, based on livelihood and 
environmental concerns. While the policymaking process was quite different, it still 
demonstrates a similar mechanism at work, therefore underscoring the importance of broad 
domestic interests and popular pressure in these disputes.  
The disputes between Hungary and two foreign electricity generators are quite different 
from the previous two cases, both in terms of industry involved, and the political issues 
underpinning the case. This case (the facts of the two arbitration cases are very similar, and 
therefore I have grouped them together in one case study) demonstrates the complications that 
arise in investor-state relations in the context of very broad shifts in policy. The relevant policy 
changes include first the privatization of the electricity sector and the great efforts to attract 
investment, followed by a second restructuring of the sector to meet the liberalization 
requirements set out by the EU. Unlike the two preceding cases, here, the relevant actors whose 
policy preferences changed were powerful special interests at the domestic level, which 
corresponded with external influences in the form of a competing international regime. However, 
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on a rhetorical level, popular pressure, this time from energy consumers, was used by opposition 
parties to pressure the government to take certain measures. This case provides a counterpoint to 
the previous cases, presenting the influence of a different set of domestic interests, while also 
more broadly suggesting that investor-state disputes can be triggered by not just competing 
domestic interests, but those enshrined in other international agreements. It is therefore possible 
that this case can explain the reasons for the concentration of investor-state disputes in transition 
economies, and in particular those in process of EU accession.  
While these cases do not uncover the workings of one causal mechanism that explains 
investor-state disputes, I hope that they can instead serve to help explain the patterns in the 
distribution of investor-state disputes, as well as uncover some common causes and 
consequences of investment arbitration.  
1.5.2 Practical Considerations and Data Collection  
 
The data on which these case studies were based were drawn from a number of sources: 1) 
documents related to the arbitration proceedings where available; 2) reports on the cases from a 
subscription based investment treaty news and analysis service (IAReporter.com); 3) newspaper 
and journal articles; and 4)  in-person and phone interviews with relevant government and civil 
society actors.  
 The interviews were conducted in fieldtrips between six and eight weeks in Canada, El 
Salvador and Hungary, with some follow up interviews by phone. The interviewees included 
civil servants, elected officials, civil society members, and policy experts, depending on the case. 
As much as possible, potential interviewees were identified from an analysis of the relevant 
documents, such as decision-makers references in arbitral proceedings, as well as from further 
suggestions from contacts once in the field. Given language constraints, it was easier in the El 
Salvador and Canadian cases to read the relevant documents and identify potential interview 
partners beforehand than in Hungary, where I had to rely much more on the views of those I 
interviewed.  
 The interviews were semi-structured, with broadly the same questions posed to each case. 
Where possible, interviews were recorded and transcribed, but given the sensitive nature of the 
topic, in some instances this was not possible. For the same reason, a number of interviewees 
requested anonymity. A full list of interview partners for each case can be found in Appendix 3.  
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1.6 Outline  
 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an empirical introduction to the world of 
investor-state arbitration, explaining the basic workings of the regime, and presenting the broad 
patterns that result from a qualitative coding of investor-state disputes. Returning to theory, 
Chapter 3 presents my theoretical framework in more detail, outlining assumptions that structure 
the remainder of the analysis in the following chapters. Based on a reading of IPE and 
international relations literature related to investor-state relations, including work on the 
determinants of FDI inflows, political risk and large-N studies of expropriation, Chapter 4 
generates hypotheses regarding the institutional and economic conditions under which investor-
state arbitration is most likely. These hypotheses are then tested in Chapter 5 on a dataset of 
investor-state disputes from 1990-2013. Finally, the case studies presented in Chapters 6-8 look 
more closely at the relationships uncovered in the statistical analysis, and focus on to what extent 
the state decisions to take certain policy measures, and subsequently defend them in arbitration, 
are the result of cost-benefit decision-making, or a lack of state capacity to uphold standards of 
investment protection agreed upon in the relevant IIA. Chapter 9 concludes.  
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Chapter 2 Patterns in Investor-State Disputes 
 
 Who are the key actors in investor-state disputes? Which states are getting sued most 
frequently, and by which investors? On a sub-state level, which domestic institutions are passing 
the measures that are subsequently being challenged by investors? Despite the ongoing debate 
over the impact and legitimacy of the investment protection regime, there have been few 
attempts at data collection on the subject of investor-state arbitration’s relationship with domestic 
institutions and actors. Indeed, in 2012 as I began this project, there was very little political 
science work on investment arbitration, and (to my knowledge) no complete dataset of 
arbitration disputes that went beyond coding for the industry, claimant, respondent state, and 
final award of the case. This chapter therefore takes stock of the existing ISDS system in two 
ways – first by providing a historical overview of IIAs and ISDS, and then  presenting the first 
empirical results of this project, based on data collection and construction of an original dataset 
of known investor-state arbitration cases, and includes information on the investor and its home 
state; the respondent state; the industry; the domestic institutions involved in the dispute; and the 
measure(s) taken which were challenged by the investor. 
 An overview of the domestic institutions involved and the policies which trigger investor-
state disputes is necessary to understand the domestic causes of investor-state disputes, as well as 
the impact of the investment protection regime on host states. As discussed in the introduction, 
critics of investor-state arbitration argue that these agreements contribute to regulatory chill and 
the constraining of domestic policy space, by penalizing states for increasing regulatory 
standards. However, the bulk of research and reporting on the topic most often presents single 
case studies of high profile, controversial disputes, in order to advance claims about the negative 
impact of IIAs. While these cases give us indications of the extent to which the regime can be 
used by investors in an attempt to impede the pursuit of legitimate policy goals, these studies 
leave many questions unanswered regarding broader patterns in investor-state dispute settlement. 
Therefore, the initial motivation for this data collection project was to provide an overview of 
broad patterns in the distribution of cases across industry and type of state, as well as the policy 
measures that are challenged by investors in arbitration.  
 The specific categories I have chosen to explore shed light on the causes of investor state-
disputes. For example, the concentration of arbitration cases in middle income countries is in part 
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a reflection of the pattern of bilateral FDI flows which are covered by IIAs. Which industries are 
most frequently implicated in investor-state arbitration is also telling, as not all economic activity 
has the same impact on the host state, and some industrial activity may engender greater 
discontent among domestic actors. The institutions involved can also suggest which domestic 
interests are being taken into account when states choose to enter into conflict with an investor, 
despite the threat of losing the arbitration case. For example, legislation passed in a state 
parliament likely is taken at the behest of different actors than the actions a state-owned 
enterprise. Finally, looking at the policy measures themselves can give an indication of the 
degree to which a change in preference or lack of capacity contributed to the dispute. While at 
the macro-level we cannot uncover the extent to which policymakers were aware of their state’s 
investment protection commitments and the potential for an arbitration case, we can make some 
assumptions about whether a measure was related to the management of an economic crisis, or 
more simply represents a change in preference toward an investment. 
 Before presenting the results of this first empirical investigation, however, this chapter 
provides an overview of the history and functioning of investor-state arbitration, which I turn to 
below. 
2.1 History and Functioning of Investor-State Arbitration  
 
In this section I give an overview of the history and development of the investment protection 
regime, as well as the key provisions of IIAs and the functioning of the arbitration process itself.  
2.1.1 History of the Investment Protection Regime 
 
Unlike international trade, the governance of which is to some degree centralized by the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), investment flows are governed overwhelmingly bilaterally (Elkins, 
Guzman & Simmons, 2006). Indeed, as is underscored by the most recent debates over the 
inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP and TPP, as well as the failure of the international community to 
agree on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), efforts to increase international 
investment protection has long been controversial (Elkins, Guzman, & Simmons, 2006). This is 
perhaps due in part to the very different, and at times contradictory, interests of participants in 
the regime of international investment protection; as will be discussed in greater detail in the 
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following chapters, the preferences of capital exporting and capital importing states toward 
investment protection standards may diverge significantly. 
 Early standards for the protection of foreign investors were based on customary 
international law. However, as Montt (2009) describes in detail, as early as the 19
th
 century, 
developed and developing (in this case the newly independent Latin American republics) 
ascribed to different standards of investment protection. On the one hand, developing countries 
pushed for standards of national treatment, by which foreign investors are treated no worse than 
domestic investors, while on the other, capital exporting countries promoted international 
minimum standards of treatment, most famously enshrined in the Hull Rule which meant to 
ensure “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” in the event of an expropriation by a host 
state (Montt, 2009, p. 34). 
 IIAs emerged in the second half of the twentieth century – the oft-cited BIT between 
Germany and Pakistan, signed in 1959, launched this first wave of BITs, although many of these 
early era BITs contained only clauses for state-to-state, not investor-state, arbitration. However, 
the standards of investment protection with which we are familiar today (and will be discussed in 
greater detail below) was included in the language of these early BITs, many of which were 
signed between Western European nations and developing countries. Capital exporting, or 
“home” countries such as the US, Canada and many European countries have developed what 
are called “Model BITs” (with some key differences between them), which are then generally 
presented to developing country partners, thus ensuring that investors from one home country 
generally enjoy the same level of protection in whichever partner countries they invest. 
 This emerging regime was strengthened by the promulgation of rules governing 
investment arbitration. In 1966 the ICSID Convention, which established the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), entered into force. ICSID is an 
autonomous institution of the World Bank, and provides facilities and procedures for the 
conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between investors and governments of the 
contracting parties to the convention (ICSID Convention). In 1976, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) promulgated its own set of arbitration 
rules which have been applied to both commercial arbitration as well as investor-state dispute 
settlement (Horn, 2008).
5
 Unlike ICSID arbitration, UNCITRAL provides only the rules and 
                                                 
5
 BITs and other IIAs contain provisions directing disputing parties toward one or both of these sets of arbitral rules 
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procedures governing the arbitration itself, but does not offer facilities in which the arbitration 
may take place. Moreover, until recently, the UNCITRAL rules did not require much in the way 
of transparency for investment arbitration, unlike ICSID which at the very least discloses the 
existence of the cases it oversees. In addition, private institutions such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) had been hosting commercial investment arbitration services since 
the early 20
th
 century, and ICC arbitration has also been included as an option in some BITs. 
 During the late 1980s and through the 1990s, the speed at which these agreements were 
adopted increased substantially, with hundreds of new BITs signed. According to Poulsen 
(2015), this burst of IIA signings accompanied a new focus on the attraction of FDI following 
the debt crises of the 1980s, and the agreements were seen as a complement to internal reforms.  
It was at this time that provisions for investor-state arbitration were introduced (Montt, 2009). 
This boom in new investment agreements was encouraged not just by capital exporting states but 
by international economic institutions such as UNCTAD and the OECD, in the belief that IIAs 
contributed to the flow of investment to developing countries (Bernasconi-Osterwalder, et al, 
2012). As recent work has shown, while capital exporting nations and international organizations 
put some effort into the promotion of IIAs, the governments of host countries did not necessarily 
have a sufficient understanding of the content and consequences of these agreements (Aisbett & 
Poulsen, 2013; Poulsen, 2015). 
 ISDS provisions have also become common elements of free trade agreements, beginning 
with NAFTA in 1994, and followed by CAFTA, ASEAN, the Energy Charter Treaty, and the 
Peru-US Trade Promotion Agreement. Finally, as mentioned above, at the time of writing, large 
trade agreements between the European Union (EU) and the United States, the EU and Canada, 
and the United States and a number of Pacific Rim countries are in negotiations, in which the 
inclusion of ISDS is proving quite contentious.  
2.1.2 Treaty Provisions and Arbitration Procedure  
 
While IIAs do not contain identical wording, it is possible to give a general description of both 
the key provisions of investment protection, and the process of investment arbitration itself, 
which is what I turn to in this section.  
 Nearly all BITs and other IIAs include very similar sections, although the content may 
differ substantially on some key points. The first of these are the definitions of what constitutes 
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an investor and an investment (and is thus protected under the agreement), and clarifying the 
scope of the provisions of the BIT. Most countries have adopted an asset based definition of 
investment, which extends protection to as many forms of investment as possible, beyond just 
FDI; this definition of investment includes stocks, bonds and shares in companies, loans related 
to a specific investment, intellectual property rights, and business concessions, meaning the 
rights conferred by law or contract (UNCTAD, 2007a). On the other hand, some countries such 
as Canada in its 2004 Model BIT have adopted closed-list definitions of investment, which 
exclude from protection anything not explicitly listed in the BIT (UNCTAD, 2007). The 
definition of investor generally includes both natural and legal persons. Finally, the scope of the 
application of the BIT may determine both to which investment it applies, as well as which state 
measures. For example, the Canadian Model BIT states that the treaty is applicable to measures 
which “relate to” the investment in question. BITs which take this approach thus extend the 
scope of the agreement to any kind of measure affecting the investor or the investment 
concerned. Therefore, a broad range of regulations in the host country could potentially fall 
under the scope of the application of the BIT. The subject matter to which the measures were 
primarily directed would be irrelevant (UNCTAD, 2007, p.7). 
 IIAs subsequently include provisions which regulate the entry of an investment into a 
host country, and will either include both pre- and post-establishment rights for the investor, or 
more commonly, only the latter. The exclusion of pre-establishment rights leaves to the 
discretion of the host country which investment to allow into the country, and endows countries 
the right to refuse those investments which do not conform to its legislation (UNCTAD, 2007). 
However, some BITs, in particular the US and Canada Model BITs, aim to liberalize investment 
flows and thus extend non-discrimination provisions to the establishment of investment 
(UNCTAD, 2007).  
 More generally, these non-discrimination provisions – National Treatment (NT) and 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment – apply once the investment has been made. The 
former, NT, requires the host state to extend to the investor no worse treatment than it does to 
domestic investors. MFN, on the other hand, requires the host state to treat the investor no less 
favourably than it treats investors from any other country (UNCTAD, 2007). Although these are 
relative standards of treatment, most IIAs also include the absolute standard of Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET). The FET standard has provoked much debate, as many agreements 
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do not define the terms (UNCTAD, 2007). At the heart of the debate is whether FET should be 
interpreted as a requirement for treatment that conforms to international minimum standards set 
out in international law, or whether it is a broader and more demanding standard of treatment, 
that includes, for example, compensation in the face of financial loss not caused by expropriation 
(Mayeda, 2007). 
 Traditionally, expropriation or nationalization, in which the state seizes the property of 
the investor, has been a primary concern for foreign investors, and triggered the development of 
IIAs. Unsurprisingly, therefore, unlawful expropriation, in which the investor is not compensated 
adequately, and the measure is not taken for a public purpose, is prohibited by BITs. However, 
beyond an outright seizure of property, IIAs tend also to prohibit measures “tantamount to” or 
“having an effect equivalent to” expropriation (Kingsbury & Schill, 2009). In this case, the 
definition of expropriation under a BIT expands to include measures which “negatively affect the 
property’s substance or void the owner’s control over it” (Kingsbury & Schill, 2009, p. 31). This 
provision has therefore become controversial, as IIAs do not establish criteria to determine 
whether or not a state measure has had this effect (UNCTAD, 2007).  
 Many IIAs also include an umbrella clause which obligates the state to respect other 
agreements it has made with the investor of the contracting party. This has the effect of bringing 
contracts signed between the state and the investor under the purview of ISDS, and allowing 
parties to bring contractual disputes before an investment arbitration tribunal.  
 Finally, as mentioned above, most IIAs signed from the mid-1980s onward contain a 
provision allowing for ISDS in the event of a dispute between an investor and host government. 
These clauses may specify which arbitration rules and forums will be used, whether it be ICSID 
or UNCITRAL rules, or left up to the discretion of the parties. One key clause included in most 
BITs addresses the “exhaustion of local remedies” – in other words, if the investor must first 
attempt to resolve the dispute through the domestic judicial system. While such a clause was a 
feature of older BITs, many newer BITs do not require that the investor first attempt to address 
their conflict with the state in local courts (UNCTAD, 2007). Subsequently, an investor is 
required to present a formal notice of intent to arbitrate to the state in question, describing the 
dispute. Much of the detail regarding how the arbitration process will unfold is based on which 
rules are selected, rather than being laid out in the IIA. However, some broad patterns can be 
identified – for example, most BITs require a period of negotiation between the parties prior to 
30 
 
the initiation of the dispute, and both the state and the investor must consent to resolve the 
dispute in arbitration if it cannot be done so beforehand by negotiation. Moreover, investors are 
generally required to submit this notification within three years of the manifestation of the 
dispute between the parties (UNCTAD, 2007). Following this, the dispute will be formally 
registered at an arbitral forum – for example the ICC or ICSID – depending on the choice of 
arbitral rules included in the agreement. After the dispute is registered, both parties to the dispute 
may select their own arbitrator to sit on the arbitration tribunal, acting as judges in the case. Once 
these arbitrators are selected, a third arbitrator who will act as the President of the tribunal is 
selected, either by the first two arbitrators, the parties to the dispute, or in the case of ICSID, the 
Chairman of ICSID. The arbitration process commences, with the legal teams of the parties 
presenting arguments at each stage. The arbitrators must first make a ruling on jurisdiction – 
whether or not the case can be properly heard as an investor-state arbitration case. If the tribunal 
rules favourably at this stage, the parties then continue on to present their arguments on the 
merits of the case, disputing the factual basis of the dispute and the legality of the state 
measure(s) in question. Finally, the tribunal will rule on both liability – whether or not the state 
is in violation of the IIA – and quantum – the amount the final award, if any, that the state will 
pay. It is important to note that, while tribunals can award significant damages to the investor, 
they are not able to force the state to overturn the measure in question as part of the final 
judgement.  
 Arbitration proceedings may be discontinued at the request of either party, or due to 
either party’s failure to act (proceed to the next step of arbitration) during the process, or pay the 
required arbitration fees (Echandi & Kher, 2013). Additionally, arbitration may be discontinued 
if the parties are able to reach a settlement. The arbitral award is final and binding for both 
parties. Both the ICSID Convention and the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in New York in 1958 (and often referred to as 
the New York Convention) provide for means to enforce these awards. The ICSID Convention 
states that any contracting state must recognize the arbitral award and enforce it through its own 
federal courts (ICSID Convention, art. 54). The New York Convention similarly requires 
contracting states to enforce an award in its own courts, and for this reason many BITs require 
that the arbitration procedure takes place in a state which is a party to the Convention (Tienhaara, 
2009).  
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 Arbitral awards are by and large final, and currently no appeals mechanism exists in the 
investment arbitration system. Under ICSID, an interpretation of an award may be sought, and 
under very limited circumstances, a party may request an annulment of an arbitral decision if it 
can prove that the original tribunal was corrupt, exceeded its powers, departed from the rules of 
the arbitral procedure or did not state the grounds on which it reached the final decision and 
award (Tienhaara, 2006). Barring these rather extreme circumstances however, the losing party 
cannot overturn the award. 
2.1.3 The Benefits and Costs of IIAs for Host States 
 
As mentioned above, IIAs were promoted to developing states as means to attract greater flows 
of investment by Western states and international organizations. In “what ‘Salacuse has 
described as the ‘grand bargain’ of BITs: developing countries promised foreign investors 
extensive protections in return for the prospect of more capital.” 
 Unfortunately, the evidence for IIAs’ success in attracting investment remains mixed. 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman  (2011) find that BITs do attract foreign investment, but only in low- 
and middle-income countries with relatively attractive investment environments, thus acting as a 
complement to, not substitute for, strong domestic institutions. Moreover, they argue, as more 
countries sign these agreements, increased competition from similarly attractive countries 
decreases the marginal effect of signing a new BIT.  Kerner (2009) argues that BITs do increase 
FDI and further suggests that a signalling effect attracts investment from home countries beyond 
the parties to the treaty. On the other hand, Aisbett, (2007) argues that these studies have not 
adequately accounted for the endogeneity problems inherent to much research on international 
institutions and FDI and trade flows. Specifically, “increased FDI flows in one year may cause a 
BIT to be signed in the next, or an improvement in the investment climate of the host [state] may 
cause a simultaneous increase in both FDI and BIT participation” (p.3). Controlling for this 
endogeneity, she finds that BITs are generally signed when FDI flows are already increasing, and 
that while there is correlation between BITs and FDI, a strong argument for causation in a 
specific direction cannot be made. She further finds no evidence of a signalling effect. The lack 
of consensus among these studies and others may be due in large part to methodological 
differences and sample selection. However, it seems clear that although IIAs go hand-in-hand 
with greater FDI flows, they are not the primary drivers of FDI. 
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 While the benefits of signing an IIA in terms of increased FDI flows are unclear, the 
costs for host countries are much easier to identify. As Simmons (2013) succinctly argues, “one 
consequence of ratifying bilateral investment treaties that contain dispute settlement provisions 
seems quite clear: they have led to a burst of (possibly unanticipated) litigation, especially since 
the late 1990s” (p. 28). She finds that the likelihood of investor-state arbitration increases for a 
state with each additional treaty signed, a finding that is replicated in this study (see Chapter 5). 
Similarly, Schultz and Dupont (2014) argue that investment arbitration was initially used by 
investors, as it was designed, to substitute for weak domestic courts. However, subsequently, 
investment arbitration appears to have been used, until the mid-to-late 1990s “as a sword in the 
hands of economic interests of investors of rich countries against governments of poorer 
countries, but has since then also been used significantly by investors from rich countries against 
rich governments” (p. 1150). In other words, international investment law is increasingly being 
used to set standards for investment protection, “furthering the international rule of law” in a way 
that privileges the interests of investors over those of states (Schultz & Dupont, 2014, p. 1150) . 
 At the very least, the increasing numbers of investment arbitration cases suggests that 
IIAs have not on the whole succeeded in deterring states from what investors consider 
discriminatory treatment (Gaukrodger & Gordon, 2012; Simmons, 2013).  On the other hand, the 
surge in arbitration cases may also be due in part to an increasingly offensive use of arbitration 
by investors, encouraged by investment lawyers and arbitrators who have a vested interest in the 
use of the system, a criticism discussed at greater length in the following section. Regardless, 
whether because states choose to pursue discriminatory policies despite the costs posed by ISDS, 
or investors are misusing the system, it is clear that IIAs do impose costs on states which may 
not be adequately balanced by the questionable impact of these agreements on increasing FDI 
flows.  
2.2 Data Collection & Sources  
 
In the second half of this chapter, I present the results of the qualitative coding of investor-state 
disputes, which was undertaken as the first stage of this research project.  
 The dataset includes 584 arbitration cases from 1990-2014 about which sufficient 
information could be found (at least the home and host state, investor and industry). The data 
collection began in 2012 and the dataset was updated at the beginning of 2015. Data were 
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collected from a variety of sources. As mentioned above, there were no comparable datasets at 
the beginning of this research. However, two databases of investment arbitration cases helped to 
give me an initial overview –  the UNCTAD IIA database and the IIAPP database created by 
Gus Van Harten at Osgoode Law School in Toronto.
6
 Beyond this, I was able to access most of 
the awards of the cases included from the ITALaw website
7
 and the ICSID pending and 
concluded case lists. Of course, given the rules on transparency of the respective institutions, 
there is a greater representation of ICSID cases than those under UNCITRAL rules.  
 The information about the measures taken and actors and institutions involved in the 
cases was drawn primarily from two sources. The first source of information about an arbitration 
case is of course the arbitration award, and any other documentation (for example, the initial 
notice of arbitration) related to the arbitration proceeding. The number of these documents which 
are publicly available varies significantly from case to case; in some cases nothing is published, 
in others, only the final award is made public, while in others every procedural step of the 
arbitration, including submissions from respondents and claimants, is published online. The 
second source of information which was invaluable to the data collection undertaken here, 
especially in cases with little other public documentation, was the Investment Arbitration 
Reporter (IAReporter) website.
8
 A subscription-only arbitration and investment treaty news site, 
this service is extremely thorough in uncovering and publishing information about arbitration 
cases. It generally provides articles on the background of the cases, as well as analyses of the 
various rulings at different stages of the arbitration, and the final award. In some cases, it was 
necessary to find further sources of information on the cases, usually from national news and 
business news websites.  
2.3 Coding the Cases 
 
The coding itself was undertaken in a series of steps. As mentioned above, the entry for each 
arbitration case includes a number of different elements:  
 The respondent state; 
 The investor; 
 The home state of the investor; 
                                                 
6
 http://www.iiapp.org  
7
 http://www.italaw.com  
8
 http://www.iareporter.com  
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 The industry; 
 The relevant IIA; 
 The case outcome; 
 The measure taken ; 
 The domestic institution involved, and more generally, the branch of government 
(administrative, legislative, judicial); and  
 The “target” of the measure. 
 The first five categories are for the most part unambiguous – most obviously the respondent and 
investor are in the name of each arbitration case. The home state of the investor was considered 
to be the other signatory of the IIA, although this does not necessarily entail that the nationality 
of the investor, or ultimate parent company belongs to that state. The industry was first coded 
inductively, and then categorized more broadly according to the sector classification used by the 
World Bank.  
 The final four categories required substantially more investigation. The case outcome was 
based on reading the relevant awards where possible, as well as the classification of cases on the 
ICSID and UNCTAD IIA databases, and their categories (see Figure 2.4 below) were adopted 
here. Both the domestic institutions involved, and the “target” of the measure were coded based 
on a review of the arbitration proceeding documents and articles from the IAReporter website.  
The domestic institutions which were the sources of the triggering measure(s) were identified 
first. These institutions ranged from the office of the executive to the legislature, to various 
ministries and state-owned enterprises. These were then further categorized as administrative if 
they were taken by a body made up of unelected officials or by decree; legislative, if a law was 
passed by an elected body; or judicial, if the measure was the decision of, or resulted from the 
decision of a domestic court case. A measure was coded as general if it applied to an entire 
industry or the general population, and specific if it applied to an individual investor or small 
group of investors within an industry.  
 Coding the measure taken by the state which triggered arbitration was the most work-
intensive part of the data collection, and was done in two steps.  I began by first inductively 
describing the measures after reviewing the relevant data sources. Subsequently, I created 
categories of measures, and finally assigned each measure to a category. The first source of 
information was again the documents related to the arbitration proceeding. Specifically, most 
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final awards contain a summary of the “undisputed” facts of the case, which generally gives a 
timeline of events, and the specific actions of the state to which the investor objects. If this was 
ambiguous or unclear, I double-checked my interpretation of the measure using the IAReporter 
summaries, and other secondary sources of information.
9
 The next sections present the results of 
this data collection, as well as some descriptive statistics from the statistical analysis presented 
primarily in Chapter 3.  
2.4 Home and Host States in Investment Arbitration 
Most countries in the world  have signed and ratified at least one investment treaty (with some 
notable exceptions, such as Brazil), and therefore a wide range of countries can, in theory, play 
the role of both home and host state for FDI. However, the reality looks somewhat different. 
Most BITs are in fact signed between developed, capital exporting (home) countries, and 
developing, capital importing (host) countries. Therefore, in the event of an investor-state dispute 
covered by a BIT, it is generally the latter who is the respondent in arbitration, while the former 
is merely the home state of the claimant (the foreign investor). Large multilateral or regional 
investment agreements such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and NAFTA alter this dynamic 
somewhat, although at least with regard to the ECT, the respondents have generally been Eastern 
European and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with investors coming from Western 
Europe.  
The following graphs demonstrate this dynamic. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of 
GDP per capita levels (as classified by the World Bank) for all signatories to at least one IIA. 
Here, the distribution of income levels generally reflects the numbers of developing and 
developed countries globally.  
                                                 
9
 Unfortunately, there was no opportunity to test for inter-coder reliability for this project. However, I attempted to 
control for intra-coder reliability, reviewing my entire database approximately eight months after it was first 
completed. This exercise led to some changes, due also to the release of new information about some cases, but 
overall reinforced my initial coding scheme. 
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Figure 2.1GDP per Capita of all IIA Signatories 
 
On the other hand, Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of income levels for country-years in which 
there was at least one case of investment arbitration. Here, we see a clear concentration of 
investor-state disputes in country-years in which the state is at a middle income level. As stated 
above, this is due largely to the fact that developed countries, while still attracting more FDI than 
developing countries, have not signed IIAs among each other. Therefore, most investment that is 
covered by an IIA flows into developing countries. On the whole, however, the world’s least 
developed countries attract far less FDI, and therefore, most investor-state disputes take place in 
middle income countries.  
Figure 2.2GDP per Capita of Respondent States 
 
However, a slightly different pattern emerges when we look at the countries which have 
individually faced the greatest number of arbitration cases, shown in Figure 2.3. Interestingly, 
the top respondent countries are a mix of middle and high income countries. Argentina and 
Venezuela, as the top two respondents, are rather exceptional cases. Nearly all of Argentina’s 
investment claims are related to measures it took during the financial crisis in the early 2000s. 
Under Socialist president Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan government expropriated many foreign 
owned industries, especially in the extractive sector. On the other hand, the cases in the 
remaining countries in this graph cannot be explained by any one cause.   
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Figure 2.3Frequent Respondent States 
 
 Of note, however, is the inclusion of Canada, the United States and Mexico – the 
signatories to NAFTA – among the most frequently respondent countries. Canada and the United 
States, both high income countries, are not the first countries that come to mind as risky locations 
for investment. The expectation during the negotiation phase of NAFTA was that its investment 
protection chapter was for the benefit of US and Canadian investors in less-developed Mexico 
(Heindl, 2006). However, Mexico is not the most frequent respondent of the three. Instead, both 
Canada and Mexico have faced an equal number of cases and the United States is not far behind. 
This rather equal distribution of cases under NAFTA suggests that the traditional rationale for 
ISDS as creating an additional layer of protection for investors in less stable, developing 
countries does not necessarily hold up when developed states sign IIAs among themselves. 
NAFTA cases suggest that either advanced and open democracies are just as likely to take 
measures which disadvantage investors as developing countries; or that investors, once given the 
opportunity to use ISDS as a tool to pursue their aims, will do so in a much wider variety of 
situations than may have been predicted during NAFTA’s design and negotiation phase.  
 The distribution of democracies and non-democracies among IIA signatories is also of 
interest to this project, given the focus on the contribution of domestic-level politics and policy-
making to investor-state disputes. As with GDP, the level of democracy (measured by the 
country’s Polity score) is different when looking at all signatories of IIAs, or the smaller group 
of states who have acted as a respondent in an arbitration case. In the general population of IIA 
signatories, the mean Polity score is 3.6 on a scale ranging from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (full 
democracy), placing it in the anocracy (neither fully autocratic nor democratic) category. 
However, in country-years with at least one arbitration case, the Polity score is slightly higher at 
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5.1. The relationship between democracy and investment arbitration will be discussed at greater 
length in following chapters.  
 Finally, transition, or formerly state-planned economies are very frequently implicated in 
investor-state arbitration cases. While they make up only 18 percent of the country-years in the 
database, a transition economy is the respondent state in 32 percent of the cases.  
2.5 Outcomes  
 
As can be seen in Figure 2.4 below, investors and states have won roughly the same number of 
cases so far. However, the distribution of awards in favour of the claimant and respondent are not 
the same under all IIAs. As we can see below, while claimants have won slightly more cases 
overall, states win more often under NAFTA than they do under other IIAs. It is interesting to 
note however, that the United States has yet to lose a NAFTA case, while Canada and Mexico 
have lost a fair number. Therefore, the overall higher rate of states successfully defending 
NAFTA claims is in fact driven by the United States’ enviable performance in defending itself as 
a respondent state.  
Figure 2.4Outcomes 
 
 
Another issue of note is the settlement of arbitration cases. It is often difficult to know what a 
settled case indicates, as the terms of the settlement are often kept confidential. As one former 
lawyer for the government of Canada, and advisor to many developing countries on investment 
treaty issues explained,  
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We don’t know what settlement means, or how many cases a government settles, or what they did 
in the settlement, simply because of the risk. Not because of the merits of the claim but the risk of 
a greater judgement. One should not assume that a settlement is an admission that the claim had 
merit (Interview # 5). 
 
Therefore, a settlement may indicate that the investor has received payment from the host state, 
if the latter has calculated that they could be forced to pay a greater award if the arbitration 
process were to be continued. On the other hand, a case may be settled at the behest of the 
investor, if they similarly do not like their chances of reaching a favourable award if the 
arbitration runs its course. Either way, the cases that fall into this category may obscure the 
financial burden that arbitration places on states. 
 The category of discontinued arbitration proceedings is similarly ambiguous, and it is 
difficult to ascertain what exactly has taken place in every case. In some instances these cases 
may have been settled, in others the proceedings may have been discontinued if the parties fail to 
take the required procedural steps to continue with arbitration; or simply runs out of funds to 
continue paying its legal team.  
 Finally, the last category represents cases in which the arbitration tribunal, for a variety of 
legal reasons, have declined to proceed, given their judgement that investment arbitration is not 
the proper forum for the resolution of the conflict.
10
 
 The issue of the burden that investment arbitration places on states is inherently linked to 
the development status of the respondent. One of many criticisms that have been launched at the 
IIA regime, particularly by governments such as Bolivia and Ecuador which have been frequent 
respondents to investment claims, is that the system unfairly targets developing countries. In an 
statistical analysis, Franck (2009) finds no statistically significant relationship between a 
country’s development status and the outcome of an arbitration case. In a more recent article, she 
finds that any link between the outcome of an arbitration case and the development status of the 
respondent country disappears when the country’s Polity score is introduced as a control, 
indicating that “a host state’s level of democracy, some aspect of domestic political 
infrastructure, or other variables or combinations of variables could exert more influence on 
[arbitration] outcomes” (Franck, 2015, p. 60). Ultimately, while the final award may not depend 
on a state’s development status, the likelihood that they will be involved in investment 
                                                 
10
 The original IIA UNCTAD database sometimes coded TRJ cases as wins for the respondent, and therefore the 
numbers in this category may be slightly inaccurate. 
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arbitration at all is certainly greater for developing or middle income states, as discussed above, 
which may contribute to the perceived unfairness of the system. Whether or not a state’s 
democracy level also makes it more or less likely to be a respondent is the subject of later 
chapters.  
2.6 Industries in Investment Arbitration 
 
Not all investment has the same impact on the host state, and this may account for the 
distribution of cases by industry. While investors in a wide range of industries have made claims 
against states, disputes are highly concentrated in the extractive industries of oil, gas and mining. 
The second largest category is comprised of disputes involving electricity and other energy, 
which includes the generation and distribution of hydro, coal, wind, solar, geothermal and 
nuclear energy. The third largest category is construction, which often involves the building of 
large infrastructure projects such as highways and dams. Figure 2.5 shows the distribution of 
arbitration cases across other industries. 
 The top two industry categories – extractives and energy – present specific challenges to 
states, and it is unsurprising that they make up the majority of cases of investment arbitration. As 
will be discussed below, much has been written about the politics of extractive industries, and 
the relationship between investors and states in this sector.
11
 Today, given the capital intensive 
nature of mining and oil and gas extraction, these industries are dominated by foreign 
corporations, especially in developing countries. However, as the extensive literature on the 
‘obsolescing bargain’ and political risk makes clear, and as will be discussed at greater length in 
following chapters, foreign investors in extractives are often seen to be especially vulnerable to 
policy reversal after an investment has been made, given the high sunk costs in any extractive 
project. As will be discussed in the following chapter, policy change or “instability” is at the 
heart of many investor-state disputes, and policy measures such as the introduction of a windfall 
tax, and the refusal to grant an exploitation permit following mining exploration activities, have 
contributed to many investor-state disputes.  
 
                                                 
11
 Ranging from literature on the resource curse to the extensive obsolescing barging literature.  
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Figure 2.5Industries in Arbitration 
 
On the other hand, energy generation, distribution and consumption are important areas of 
national policy, as both industrial and household consumers depend on stable and universally 
accessible sources of energy. In a liberalized energy market, governments must work with 
investors to achieve this, but the goals of energy companies and the demands imposed on 
governments by domestic constituents may not always be complementary, which may in turn 
contribute to investor-state disputes (Krajewski, 2012). This will be discussed at greater length 
both in the following chapter, and in Chapter 8, which focuses on disputes between Hungary and 
two foreign electricity generators.  
 Disputes are spread across other industries fairly equally. As stated above, I relied 
primarily on the categories of sectors used by the World Bank for classifying investor-state 
disputes by industry. In some cases, however, such as health care and pharmaceuticals, I have 
disaggregated categories (in this case the World Bank categorizes pharmaceuticals as “other 
industry”) in order to highlight some industries that are particularly relevant to public policy.  
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2.6 Domestic Institutions and Types of Measures  
 
The domestic institutions involved in an investor-state dispute are those that have formulated 
and/or enacted the policy measure(s) to which the investor objects. Therefore, we can derive 
from this an indication of the domestic interests at stake in these disputes. Not all cases involve 
only one institution, and therefore for each entry, I coded all relevant institutions, relying on the 
same data sources mentioned above. In some cases, there was significant ambiguity regarding 
the domestic actors involved; for example, many arbitration documents simply refer to 
“regional” or “local authorities”, which makes coding difficult. Figure 2.6 displays the 
breakdown of domestic institutions.  
Figure 2.6Domestic Institutions Involved in Investor-State Disputes 
 
While of all the domestic institutions listed here the legislature is the single institution most often 
involved, the majority are administrative or bureaucratic bodies. Therefore it is not surprising 
that most of the measures taken which are subsequently challenged by investors are 
administrative. Indeed 61 percent of cases (281) were triggered primarily by administrative 
measures; 26 percent (117) were triggered by legislative measures alone; and 11 percent (50) 
were related to judicial decisions.
12
 The remainder relate to cases in which the state failed to act 
                                                 
12
 Unfortunately sufficient information was not available to code the relevant institutions and measures for all cases 
included in the database. 
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– for example failed to protect an investment from physical harm – and therefore cannot be 
coded as legislative, administrative or judicial measures per se.  
 A number of interesting patterns emerge when we look at the groupings of measures 
taken by institution, state and industry. Slightly less than half of the cases in the legislative 
category involve Argentina, due to the “pesofication” law passed by the country’s parliament 
during the financial crisis in 2002. The other respondent countries in this category include 
Albania, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, Panama Slovak Republic, Spain, 
the United States and Venezuela – the majority of which are high income countries. Therefore, 
we can see that investors are most frequently challenging legislative measures in developed 
countries. On the other hand, investor-state disputes in which domestic courts were implicated 
included a much wider range of respondent states, with high income countries such as Canada 
and the United States, but many more developing countries such as Egypt, Laos, India, Jordan, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka ; judicial measures are more routinely challenged 
by investors in developing states. Unsurprisingly, cases involving state-owned enterprises were 
concentrated in disputes with extractive companies (oil, gas and mining); public utilities 
(electricity and other energy, and waste management); and telecommunications companies.  
 As stated above, I further coded the type of measure taken by the state which was 
challenged by the investor, and the results are displayed in figure 2.7. The clear majority of cases 
involve the cancellation of a project, agreement or licence. Investor-state disputes triggered by 
this measure span different industries and levels of development, but are generally administrative 
(although a few of these cases also involve judicial decisions). Expropriation of a foreign 
investment makes up the second largest category of measures taken, although it is important to 
keep in mind that Hugo Chavez’s series of expropriations make up over 25 percent of these 
cases. The third most frequent measure is the rather broad category of regulatory change. 
Included within this category are measures which ban specific industrial activities; ban certain 
substances (for example, pesticides); or other changes to the regulatory framework of an entire 
industry. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of these are legislative measures, and with exception of 
Egypt’s recent change to its minimum wage and Uruguay’s imposition of plain packaging on 
tobacco products, all of the cases which see investors challenging regulatory measures have a 
developed country as the respondent. Additionally, half of these cases involve electricity or other 
energy companies, which underscores the public-policy dimension of these disputes.  
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Figure 2.7Measures 
 
 As I note in the introduction, the measures taken can give a hint at the extent to which the 
underlying causes of investor-state disputes are related to lack of state capacity or more simply, a 
change in preferences toward (a specific) investment. For example, the currency control category 
is made up primarily of investor-state disputes emerging from the Argentine financial crisis; 
these cases are therefore clearly connected to the state’s inability to respect agreements made 
with investors previously. Similarly, the category of “failure to protect investment” generally 
relates to the inability of the state to provide physical security to an investment which is also 
likely connected to state capacity. Finally, the contractual/payment obligations category is more 
ambiguous, but as Wellhausen (2015) notes, at times governments “have used breach of 
contracts with foreign firms as a means to supplement budgets in hard times... Breach in the form 
of withholding payments can provide a third budgeting option apart from cutting spending or 
raising taxes from domestic actors” (p. 18). This suggests that at times contract breach may be 
the result of difficult economic circumstances, and an unwillingness to take other policy 
measures to deal with the crisis.  
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 The final question, and what the above only hints at, is whether most measure are which 
are challenged by investors are aimed at individual investors, or entire industries. Unsurprisingly, 
categories such as the cancellation of an agreement, contractual obligations, or the refusal to 
grant permits are associated with individual investors or projects, while regulatory changes or 
currency controls have a broader impact aiming to regulate behaviour universally, or within a 
specific industry. Measures such as expropriations may target only individual investors or an 
entire industry. Indeed, the majority of measures that lead to arbitration (66 percent) are aimed at 
specific investors, while 32 percent are aimed at the general population or an entire industry. 
Again, the remaining two percent of cases refer to those in which the state failed to act, for 
example to provide an investor protection against terrorist attacks. Of course, “specific” 
measures may nonetheless be associated with much broader policy changes – for example, the 
cancellation of a mining permit may be part of efforts by the government to put a halt to all 
mining activity in the country, as is exemplified by the case study presented in Chapter 7. It is 
therefore difficult, as in the case of the administrative measures, to infer too much from the fact 
that a measure was targeted at a specific investor.  
2.7 Unknown Cases 
 
One major challenge facing researchers of investment arbitration is the confidentiality 
surrounding many investor-state disputes. Indeed, cases only officially become public with the 
consent of both parties to the dispute, and even when the existence of a case is made public, the 
final award may not be published. Therefore, there are two types of unknown cases: the “known 
unknowns” in which the incidence of a dispute is made public, but the details of the dispute and 
final award are not; and the “unknown unknowns” – i.e. the cases which may exist, but about 
which we know nothing.  
 Both types of unknown cases provide challenges for this research. This chapter presents 
the results of the coding of investor-state disputes, but is limited to cases about which a sufficient 
amount of information can be found; for example, this database excluded cases for which 
information about the country of origin of the investor, and the type of investment, could not be 
identified. Therefore, this chapter does not present information about all investor-state disputes 
that have been made public. However, cases where at least the date of the initiation of 
arbitration, and the respondent state are known, do appear in the dataset I use for my statistical 
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analysis in Chapter 3, as the dependent variable employed there is merely the incidence of 
arbitration in a given country-year. However, the spectre of “unknown unknowns” is more 
troubling here. If there are statistically significant patterns of cases about which no information is 
made public – for example, if certain states routinely do not disclose that they have been taken to 
arbitration – this may bias the results of the statistical study.  
 In an attempt to address this issue, I corresponded with a number of investment 
arbitration experts
13
 about the issue of unknown cases, and its potential impact on the validity of 
this study.  
 There was no clear consensus about the possible number of “unknown unknowns”. One 
interviewee said he estimates that completely unknown cases make up about 10% of the total, 
while another said it could be “dozens and dozens”. On the other hand, Professor Salacuse 
countered that the number of completely unknown cases was likely not significant.  There was a 
general agreement that the number of cases about which the existence is totally unknown is 
likely smaller than the cases for which only the final award remains confidential. This is likely 
because the existence of arbitration cases often becomes public over time. Indeed, all three 
agreed that the number of unknown cases is declining, as more awards eventually are leaked to 
the public. In other cases, we are alerted to past arbitrations when either party attempts to enforce 
or set aside the final award in domestic courts.   
 In terms of the patterns of the “unknown unknown” cases, it was suggested that Middle 
Eastern governments may be more secretive about their investment disputes than others, and 
more generally, that autocratic states might be more likely to keep awards confidential. However, 
there is at least one example of an advanced democratic state – the United Kingdom – refusing 
the release the award of an arbitration case in which it was the respondent.
14
 In terms of 
industries, it was further suggested that cases related to defense/security interests would be more 
likely to be kept confidential.  
 Recent research which explains the variation in ICSID awards that are kept confidential 
or remain secret concludes that cases which involve an investment with a particularly long time 
                                                 
13
 These were: Jeswald Salacuse , investment arbitrator and professor of international law at Tufts University; 
Howard Mann, former NAFTA negotiator and defence lawyer for the Canadian government, currently legal advisor 
at the International Institute of Sustainable Development, which advises many developing countries in the 
negotiation of investment treaties; and Luke Peterson, editor of IAReporter which systematically uncovers and 
researches investment arbitration cases. These interviews were carried out over e-mail in early 2015. 
14
 Sanchetti v. United Kingdom.  
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horizon are more likely to remain secret due to strategic considerations of both parties (Hafner-
Burton, Steinert-Threlkeld, & Victor, 2014). It is suggested that investors in these industries may 
wish to avoid public knowledge of concessions made to host governments, in an attempt to keep 
disadvantageous policies from being adopted by other states.  These authors further argue that 
states that have already experienced numerous arbitration losses, as well as extremely litigious 
investors, may also be more likely to keep arbitration confidential. Their first claim is of most 
interest to this project, and the results reinforce their hypothesis – projects with long time 
horizons, such as infrastructure projects, mining, and oil investments have the highest probability 
of being involved in a confidential arbitration.  Given their focus on ICSID cases, this study does 
not immediately shed light on any patterns of “unknown unknowns”; ICSID publishes the names 
of the claimant and respondent in all arbitration cases carried out under the auspices of the World 
Bank.  However, it is feasible that the mechanism governing the choice to keep ICSID awards 
confidential may also be operating in cases under different arbitral rules in which there is no 
requirement to publicize the case at all; in other words, cases arbitrated under UNCITRAL rules 
may also be more likely to remain secret when the investment has a particularly long time 
horizon. Given the already high number of known cases in the construction and extractive 
industries, this would suggest that – at least in terms of industry of the investor – the world of 
unknown cases is not significantly different than the known cases. Of course, this does not give 
us any clues as to the identity of the respondent states in these cases, which is of greater interest 
to this project, when it comes to the validity of the statistical results presented here.  
2.8 Conclusion  
 
 The goal of this chapter was to provide an overview of the universe of known investment 
arbitration cases, with a focus on the industries and domestic institutions involved, and the 
content and target of the measures taken which ultimately motivated the investor to pursue 
arbitration. A number of initial findings emerge from this first empirical analysis.  
 First, middle income countries are the most frequent respondents in investment 
arbitration. This is due primarily to the development of the investment protection regime and 
global capital flows, as most IIAs are signed between capital importing and capital exporting 
countries, and developed countries have not historically signed many IIAs together. Therefore, 
while overall more investment flows to developed countries, investment covered by an IIA flows 
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primarily into developing, especially middle income, countries, and these countries face greater 
odds of being to be sued by investors. However, there are some exceptions to this rule – most 
apparently that of host states within NAFTA. While NAFTA’s investment chapter was originally 
meant to protect American and Canadian investors in Mexico, Canada has been a respondent as 
many times as Mexico, and the US has also faced a significant number of investment claims (in 
fact, all three countries are among the most frequent respondents overall). As was discussed in 
the introduction, IIAs were designed to protect investors in unstable policy environments which 
are particularly a feature of developing countries, and therefore the initial finding that these 
disputes are concentrated in developing countries is unsurprising. However, the fact that Canada 
and the United States are frequent respondents suggests that developed countries are not immune 
to investment arbitration. Moreover, it is at least in part the aforementioned development of the 
regime that has led to the concentration of disputes among developing countries, and not the fact 
that high income, liberal democracies do not take measures which investors find objectionable.  
 This chapter further examined the industries that are most often involved in investor-state 
disputes, and finds that it is investments with a significant public policy component – i.e. those in 
extractive industries and electricity and other energy provision – which are among the most 
frequent claimants. As will be discussed in later chapters, these industries are quite heavily 
regulated and impact a wide range of stakeholders and interests, and this may contribute to the 
frequency with which investors in extractives and energy turn to arbitration. 
 A number of different domestic institutions are involved in these disputes. Legislative 
bodies – both national and subnational – are the single institution most frequently implicated in 
these disputes. However, they are outnumbered by a variety of administrative bodies – from 
national ministries to state-owned enterprises. Interestingly, it appears that disputes in developed 
countries more frequently involve legislative measures than those in developing countries, while 
investors are more often challenging judicial measures in developing countries. Administrative 
measures make up the greatest category, and are frequent in all states. The fact that investors are 
more often challenging administrative rather than legislative measures may serve to weaken 
some of the arguments against ISDS. Critics of the regime worry that democratic processes are 
hindered by the existence of investment arbitration; particularly, that investors are challenging 
legislation passed by democratically elected representatives. Proponents of the regime will point 
to the relatively few legislative measures that have been challenged as proof that the regime 
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instead serves merely to keep in check discriminatory and arbitrary administrative measures. 
However, this line of argumentation may underestimate the “legitimacy” of the goals of many 
administrative measures (while also perhaps overestimating that of legislation in some cases); as 
will be discussed at greater length in the case studies, it is not the case that administrative policy-
making cannot have a significant “public interest” component. Finally, given what is presumably 
the far higher rate of administrative than legislative decision-making and policy output generally, 
it is only logical that these administrative policies and institutions are most often implicated in 
investor-state disputes.  
 This chapter has presented broad patterns in the distribution of investor-state disputes, in 
terms of states, industries, and domestic actors involved, and measures taken which are 
challenged by investors. However, while I have presented some possible explanations for these 
patterns, elaborating on the possible causal relationships that explains investor-state disputes is 
the work of the following chapters.  The following chapter presents a theoretical account of 
investor-state disputes based on the literature on political risk, investor-state bargaining, and the 
determinants of FDI, and develops hypotheses that are tested using statistical analysis in Chapter 
5.  
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Chapter 3 Domestic Demands and International Agreements 
 
Bilateral investment treaties and other investment agreements are the product of the increased 
legalisation of international economic relations, along with the international trade and finance 
regimes (Goldstein et al, 2001). However, while IIAs govern the relationship between 
transnational entities (foreign firms and state governments), investor-state disputes take place 
largely at the domestic level. Indeed, the subject matter of most of these disputes involve issues 
of interest to domestic actors  – whether narrow interest groups or the wider public – and the 
measures contested by investors are taken by national or subnational institutions.  Therefore, a 
theoretical perspective which captures the interaction between domestic and international actors 
and institutions is necessary to adequately understand investor-state disputes; as Simmons (1994) 
argues, to “artificially segregate international and domestic influences could in fact lead to a 
misunderstanding of international economic relations. Domestic determinants of preference 
orderings... should be integrated into an explanation as to why states [find] it difficult to abide by 
the rules” (p. 11).  
 I adopt this approach to explaining investor-state disputes, constructing a theoretical 
framework based on work in liberal IR theory and international political economy, both of which 
emphasize a causal relationship between the preferences of domestic actors and foreign policy 
choices made by states. The theoretical assumptions outlined here underlie both the selection of 
variables included in the large-N study, presented in Chapters 4 and 5, as well as the more in-
depth analysis of the specific investor-state disputes included in the case study chapters.  What I 
do not attempt is the elaboration of a causal model which can be applied to a wide range of 
investor-state disputes.  The decision to forgo an attempt to develop a causal model is due to the 
idiosyncrasies of my dependent variable – the incidence of an investor-state dispute in a given 
year which culminates in arbitration. As the results of my coding of the known universe of cases 
presented in the previous chapter clearly demonstrate, what is represented as a “1” in a dataset is, 
in fact, quite a diverse variable – investors have turned to arbitration as a result of wide range of 
measures, from expropriation to existing legislation on health care. Therefore, attempts to 
identify a single causal mechanism which is expected to explain all cases are unlikely to produce 
a convincing result. However, on a more general level, what is common to nearly all investor-
state disputes is a change in policy which investors perceive places them in a disadvantageous 
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situation. This chapter therefore provides possible causal explanations for these policy changes 
more broadly, based either on states’ cost-benefit calculations or the lack of capacity of state 
actors to maintain an investment-friendly environment. Within the sections dedicated to these 
respective explanations, I put forward a number of factors related to investment in particular, 
which may precipitate changes in domestic preferences toward investment, or weaken state 
capacity to respect IIAs. 
 In section 3.2, I present a picture of investor-state disputes as the result of cost-benefit 
calculations on the part of decision-makers who face competing demands of investors (supported 
by the investment protection regime) on one hand, and domestic actors on the other. This 
understanding of investor-state disputes corresponds with the enforcement approach to 
compliance elaborated by Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, (1996) which explains treaty compliant 
behaviour as the result of international agreements that are able to impose sufficiently high costs 
on states to ensure conformity with treaty demands. This approach, which focuses on cost-
benefit decision-making in the face of competing demands of domestic actors and investors, 
must first identify the domestic and/or state interests which are in opposition to those of the 
investor, and thus push the state to renege on its earlier commitment to respect investors’ rights. 
In section 3.3 I present a competing explanation, in which lack of state capacity to maintain a 
sufficient standard of investment protection is the primary cause of investor-state disputes, based 
on the managerial approach to compliance which explains non-compliant behaviour as the result 
of vague or unclear treaty language and low levels of bureaucratic capacity (Chayes & Chayes, 
1995). In this section I also include a discussion of recent work on BIT diffusion and bounded 
rationality given the implications of this work on my own research question.  
Given that I draw significantly on theories of compliance with international agreements, 
it is important to mention the limitations of the concept as applied to investor-state disputes. In 
part, this is due to some idiosyncrasies of the IIA regime.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
investment protection regime is comprised of thousands of similar, though not identical treaties. 
More importantly, the design of the dispute settlement mechanism gives a significant amount of 
freedom to the arbitral panel to rely on its own interpretation of the treaty provisions (Van 
Harten, 2013). Ultimately, this makes determining compliance less than straightforward; in some 
cases two tribunals have come to differing conclusions regarding very similar issues, or even the 
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same dispute.
15
  This possibility introduces meaningful uncertainty for states and investors alike, 
if the same facts can be interpreted as both treaty-compliant and non-compliant by different 
tribunals. It also makes ultimate rulings of compliance perhaps less clear cut than in other kinds 
of international disputes.  
  However I argue that the underlying logic of these two approaches to compliance – the 
managerial and enforcement schools – provide interesting starting points for a discussion of the 
decision-making that leads to investor-state conflicts. Instead of explaining the ultimate rulings 
on compliance, the assumptions outlined in sections 3.2 and 3.3 can help us explain what appear 
to be decisions to take measures that disadvantage investors. In the case of the enforcement 
approach, this would suggest that the costs of maintaining a policy environment favourable to 
investors become too high in the face of competing (domestic) pressures. On the other hand, if 
the managerial approach has greater explanatory power, the origins of investor-state disputes are 
not found in changing preferences but rather lack of capacity to maintain a stable policy 
framework for investors which inadvertently leads to unfavourable conditions for investors.  
3.1 International Agreements and Domestic Policy  
International relations in the post-Cold War era are increasingly legalized (Goldstein, et al, 
2001), and while many international regimes and agreements govern inter-state relations, others 
set international standards for activity that takes place within the state. The push to strengthen the 
rule of law at the international level is based on the assumption that law provides a more neutral 
and predictable means of resolving conflict (Slaughter & Raustiala, 2002);  for example, the 
move from the GATT to the WTO was a product of states’ frustration with the perceived 
politicization of the former (Stone Sweet, 1997). Increasingly, the settlement of disputes between 
international (or transnational) actors falls to these tribunals, removing disputes from the political 
sphere of diplomatic relations to the (theoretically) more predictable legal realm (Keohane, 
Moravcsik, & Slaugher, 2001). Thus, while investment treaties and other policy tools that 
promote economic openness are generally taken as a sign of liberalization, this should not be 
conflated with less regulation: 
[i]n spite of a tendency to view globalization as a system in which economic actors act free of 
political chains, numerous examples suggest rather than a dismantling of the political 
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 For example, the often-cited Methanex and Metalclad decisions, as well the different findings of CME/Lauder v. 
Czech Republic cases, and even the different findings of the Electrabel and AES Summit cases presented in Chapter 
8. 
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framework, one merely replaces another. The practice of free trade, for example, requires as 
many laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms as closed markets, if not more (Chorev, 
2005, p. 319). 
This move towards legalization creates “constitutional rights and an ‘economic constitution’” at 
the international level which aid in the functioning of global markets (Petersmann, 2011, p. 14). 
Investment protection is an excellent example of this, as IIAs have remedied deficiencies that 
existed in investment protection when it was based on customary law alone and investors were 
dependent on home states to advocate diplomatically on their behalf in any dispute with a host 
state (Schill, 2010).  
 However, international legalization has an impact on legislative and regulatory processes 
at the domestic level, thus highlighting the changing spatial nature of regulation as opposed to its 
outright decline; as the state exercises less control over the market, new international rules are 
required to maintain the smooth functioning of economic relations at the international level. In 
order to meet the standards of investment protection, IIAs require states to maintain an 
appropriate legal and regulatory framework –  one that, with the inclusion of a provision that 
waives the requirement of investors to first seek legal restitution in domestic courts (local 
remedies), endows arbitrators with the power to decide on the legality of domestic regulation 
(Montt, 2009). 
 Therefore, international agreements create a situation in which states may face competing 
demands –  national and even subnational governments are increasingly constrained by and 
beholden to international norms and regimes, but are first and foremost responsible to domestic 
actors. In this way, as Frieden and Martin (2003) argue, “globalization, understood as 
developments in international economic integration, alters the choices available to national 
governments; this in turn affects national policy (and, one could continue, international 
outcomes)” (p. 122). As will be discussed at greater length below, this feedback between the 
international and domestic spheres undoubtedly characterizes investor-state disputes, and it 
would be remiss to ignore the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy choice in any 
analysis of the subject.  
 The “bottom-up” approach to international interactions privileges variation in domestic 
actor interests in explanations of state engagement with international regimes, and thus assumes 
that “a domestic coalition of social interests that benefits (ideally or materially) directly and 
indirectly from particularly regulation of social interdependence is more powerfully represented 
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in decision-making than the countervailing coalition of losers from cooperation” (Moravcsik, 
2012, p. 87).  In other words, states do not engage in international cooperation unless it is in the 
interest of influential domestic actors to do so. Indeed, without “social demands concerning 
globalization” states would have no incentive to engage with international regimes at all 
(Moravcsik, 2012, p. 84).  
3.2 Domestic Preferences and Investor-State Disputes  
This project explores the role of domestic actors and interests in states’ policies toward foreign 
investment, and the domestic drivers of disputes between states and foreign investors. Given 
their emphasis on the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy decisions, appropriate 
theoretical approaches to understanding the causes of investor-state disputes can be found in 
liberal IR theory and IPE literature which similarly focuses on the interplay between domestic 
and international spheres.   
In order to capture this dynamic, Frieden and Martin (2003) advocate for a two-stage 
analysis of domestic sources of foreign policy decisions, which looks first at the influence of  
domestic actors on decision makers at the national level, and subsequently examines state 
decision-making given domestic interests and international constraints such as treaties. First, this 
analysis requires an identification of the relevant domestic actors, which may be narrow sectoral 
interest groups, or broader segments of the population. If they are to influence foreign policy 
choices, these interests must necessarily be organized in some capacity, with the goal of having 
an impact on a relevant set of state actors. Finally, these interests are mediated through domestic 
institutions, whether they are electoral, legislative, or bureaucratic, and can influence the position 
a state will take in its interaction with other states, international organizations, or (transnational) 
private actors, as circumscribed by the relevant regime (Frieden & Martin, 2003).   
We can identify a similar logic explaining the interaction of states with international 
regimes in the enforcement approach to compliance, which understands compliance as 
endogenous to state interests. States will comply with international agreements when the costs of 
non-compliance are greater than those which will be imposed by domestic actors that favour 
non-compliance. In this section, I discuss domestic actor and state interests vis-à-vis foreign 
investment through the lens of these theoretical approaches, and describe investor-state disputes 
as the result of cost-benefit calculations on the part of the state.  
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3.2.1 Domestic Interests and Organization  
The first step in analyzing the impact of domestic actors on international interactions is to 
identify the relevant domestic actors and their interests. It is difficult to make generalizable 
claims about patterns of domestic-international interaction, given the range of potential variation. 
For example, the domestic interests at the heart of the analysis depend on the issue area – 
whether trade, environment, human rights, or in this case, foreign investment – and therefore 
must be identified on a case by case basis. The type of interest – narrow or broad – is likely to 
determine the means by which groups organize, which again depends on the state context in 
which this organizing takes place; for example human rights advocates in authoritarian states 
often work in conjunction with international actors to strengthen their relatively weak position 
vis-à-vis national governments (Keck & Sikkink, 1999). On the other hand, influential special 
interest groups may rely on official or unofficial lobbying of government actors to attain their 
policy preferences; these groups can define national policy preferences through “informal 
networks, personnel rotation between public and private sectors, the threat of disinvestment, and 
financial inducements for electoral campaigns or personal enrichment” (Murillo, Scartascini, & 
Tommasi, 2008, p. 21).  
 Despite this complexity, work on the impact of organized interests on domestic-level 
institutions has led to more general observations, which can be applied to an analysis of investor-
state disputes. Electoral institutions, for example, can play a key role in facilitating domestic 
actors’ influence on foreign policy decisions by communicating their preferences to politicians 
(Frieden & Martin, 2003; Mattes,et al., 2014). Therefore, the electoral strength of domestic 
interest groups should determine their ability to affect policy change. However, the ability of 
groups to successfully advocate for their preferences is also a function of the capacity of these 
interests to organise. For example, while larger interest groups are generally better able to 
influence policy through greater electoral leverage, narrower interest groups’ access to 
information and ability to monitor policy outcomes can also empower relatively smaller groups 
to successfully push for (non-)compliance with an international regime (Dai, 2005, 2007).   
 The responsiveness of state institutions to domestic actors is therefore central to the 
ability of interest groups to influence policy. In the first instance, this suggests that democratic 
institutions will be more responsive to wider interest groups, while autocratic governments will 
depend on, and therefore consider the demands of, a smaller group of domestic actors (Bueno de 
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Mesquita & Smith, 2012; Mattes et al., 2014). For example,  democracies are more likely to 
pursue environmental protection policies, as it is more cost effective to provide such public 
goods when the selectorate is large (Cao & Ward, 2015). Additionally, much work in political 
economy demonstrates the varied success of interest groups in influencing different branches of 
democratic governments. For example, while both executive and legislative branches of 
government are susceptible to electoral pressures, the executive branch is generally more 
oriented towards international relations and has a greater ability to act unilaterally, while 
legislative bodies are more attuned to, and constrained by, domestic interests (Brewster & 
Chilton, 2014). Therefore, they argue that when an international agreement imposes unpopular 
constraints on domestic policy, “the executive branch [is] more likely to comply and act quickly 
to comply than Congress” (p.2). However, if an issue is more highly politicized and legislative 
approval is needed, international cooperation may be more difficult to achieve, as elected 
officials must be responsive to the varied demands of their constituents.   On the other hand, 
other scholars regard the executive, at least in presidential systems, to be more likely to respond 
to unilaterally to electoral pressure (Wiesehomeier & Benoit, 2009). 
 While it is often assumed (especially when it comes to trade policy) that broader 
(domestic consumer) interests suffer at the expense of narrow sectoral (domestic producer) 
interests (Milner et al, 2003), the aforementioned work makes it clear that under certain 
conditions, mass interests can also play a role in policy outcomes, especially when the policies 
under consideration are highly politically salient (Dai, 2005; Frieden and Martin, 2003).  More 
broadly, this work  suggests that there are various ways in which domestic interests may have an 
impact on foreign policy choices or international interactions, made possible by varying 
constellations of domestic actors and institutions. 
 What domestic interests are implicated in policy decisions regarding FDI? Compared to 
other policy areas, determining the interests affected by foreign direct investment is fairly 
difficult, requiring, as Frieden and Martin (2003) note, “substantial extension and imagination” 
(p. 128). While trade policies affect producers and consumers in a comparatively predictable 
manner, the impact of FDI on the host state is somewhat more ambiguous (Jensen and Lindstadt, 
2013). 
  Like most policy decisions, however, the attraction of FDI will create both local winners 
and losers, which will in turn shape preferences towards investment. Much of the literature on 
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the benefits and drawbacks of FDI focus on its effect on the labour market and technology 
transfer. The potential of FDI to contribute to economic growth is a product of three interrelated 
features. First, FDI contributes to the capital stock of the host country, and is arguably more 
stable than other international capital flows such as portfolio investment, because of the 
difficulties of withdrawing FDI once the investment is made (Colen, Maertens, & Swinnen, 
2013).  Second, FDI can increase the demand for employment, particularly if it is a “green field” 
investment, in which a new venture is created, rather than simply a foreign takeover. Similarly, if 
foreign firms are more technologically intensive, they may create a higher demand for skilled 
labour, which should in turn raise wages and create an incentive for further investment in 
education (Moosa, 2002; Pandya, 2010; Pinto, 2013). Finally, foreign firms are generally 
assumed to be more efficient than local firms (especially in developing countries) and to spur 
positive spill-over effects through competition with, and imitation by, domestic business (Colen, 
Maertens & Swinnen, 2013).  Therefore, domestic actors who benefit from employment and 
spillover effects would likely have an interest in maintaining good relations with investors. 
Indeed, this is the conclusion reached by Pinto (2013) who claims that leftist governments, which 
depend on labour as an electoral base, are in fact more positively disposed toward FDI than 
right-wing governments more closely associated with the domestic business-owning  class. 
 However, FDI can have a negative impact on some sectors if the greater competition 
from more efficient foreign firms “crowds out” domestic businesses. Moreover, the incentives 
offered to foreign business, such as free trade zones, can unduly disadvantage local firms (Colen, 
Maertens & Swinnen, 2013). In this case, the domestic actors which would most obviously have 
an interest in more restrictive policy toward FDI would be those employed or owning businesses 
in uncompetitive domestic industries.  
 Additionally, all FDI projects are not created equal. While FDI in manufacturing may, as 
described by Pinto (2013), win the support of labour, other politically salient issues related to 
FDI may contribute to anti-investment preferences of domestic actors, an issue which Pinto 
largely ignores. As I argue in more detail in Section 4.4.1, these relate in large part to the type of 
investment, and the ways in which specific projects affect local stakeholders, which in turn may 
also relate to the historical context in which the FDI takes place. In the face of responsive 
domestic institutions, these interests may be translated into policy measures which are 
challenged by investors in arbitration.   
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 As discussed above, if the interests involved are those of powerful actors, such as 
domestic firms or state-owned enterprises, it seems likely that they will pursue their goals 
through lobbying or unofficial channels. On the other hand, mass interest groups – whether 
mining-affected communities or electricity consumers – must instead rely on electoral pressure 
or more contentious forms of politics to communicate their interests to decision-makers. This 
implies that both elected officials and administrative agencies will be frequently involved in 
investor-state disputes, and Chapter 2 underscored that both types of domestic institutions take 
measures which are challenged by investors in arbitration. 
 In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of measures which subsequently 
trigger investor-state arbitration are administrative (61 percent), with legislative measures at the 
heart of 26 percent of disputes. This suggests that perhaps electoral pressure is a less common 
motivating factor in investor-state disputes, as bureaucratic decision-making should be somewhat 
insulated from these forces. However, it should not be assumed that all administrative decision-
making is removed from public involvement or pressure; for example there is a trend toward 
public participation in the planning stages of large extractive projects, and the rejection of 
projects due at least in part to public pressure has led to a number of cases of investor-state 
arbitration.
16
 As mentioned above, political economy theories which seek to explain trade 
protectionism usually predict that concentrated, special interest groups will be most successful in 
having their demands for protectionist policies met at the expense of more diverse and less 
organized consumer groups who would benefit from free trade (Milner, Mansfield & Rosendorff, 
2002). In the case of investment disputes however, it seems a wider variety of organized groups 
– populations in the vicinity of extractive projects, citizens concerned with environmental issues, 
and even voters in contested elections – may also be important and influential “stakeholders”. 
This suggests that one important means of organization is through public pressure from domestic 
interest groups, and that mass interests may be frequently implicated in investor-state disputes. 
 3.2.2 State Interests and Investment Agreements 
 
The second stage of Frieden and Martin’s analysis involves identifying states’ interests or the 
“outcomes they desire.” Following from the discussion above, national preferences can be 
derived from the preferences of domestic actors – albeit those that are sufficiently powerful, 
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 For example: Bilcon of Delaware et al v. Canada; St Marys Cement v. Canada.  
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whether through elections or less public channels –  to have an influence on state decision-
making and whose interests therefore become analogous to those of the state (Moravcsik, 1997). 
In this case, the emphasis must be on an analysis of the organization of these collective interests, 
and how they affect national-level decision-making. While this approach is necessary to the 
analysis of individual cases of investor-state disputes, and structures the analysis presented in the 
case studies in Chapters 6-8, we can additionally deduce some state interests related to the 
investment regime by revisiting the patterns of investor-state disputes outlined in Chapter 2.  
 The identification of state interests or preferences is notoriously difficult, given the 
limitations of inducing preferences by observing state behaviour – it cannot be assumed that 
observable strategies or outcomes are congruous with the outcomes state actors want to achieve. 
Instead, state actors may be forced to choose between the “lesser of two evils” when taking 
certain policy measures, or simply fail to achieve their preferred outcome (Frieden, 1999). 
However, work on the signing and ratification of BITs suggests that this does indicate a state 
interest in attracting investment (Poulsen, 2015). The attraction of investment and protection of 
foreign investors are interests that are likely common to all signatories to an IIA. However, if we 
adopt the logic of the enforcement approach to compliance, host states which are the respondents 
in an arbitration case appear to have interests that compete with investment protection and 
promotion.  
 What generalizable statements is it possible to make about these competing interests in 
host states? As was discussed in the previous chapter, investor-state disputes are concentrated in 
middle income countries. The immediate reasons for this are fairly clear. Historically, most 
investment treaties have been signed bilaterally between a developed and a developing state, and 
investment has flowed from the former to the latter; until recently, very few IIAs, with the 
exception of NAFTA, have been signed between developed state partners. Therefore, most 
investment covered by an IIA, and that can therefore be the subject of arbitration, is hosted by 
developing or transition economy countries. However, as the world’s poorest countries, mostly 
located in Sub-Saharan Africa, attract less FDI overall; most investment in fact flows to middle- 
and high-income countries. This explains in part why middle income countries are frequent 
respondents in investment arbitration.  
 However another factor may also play a role in the concentration of disputes in middle 
income countries – the greater impetus for regulatory change.  As Tienhaara (2009) argues,  
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Given the low base level of regulation in developing countries, and the pressures from both 
domestic and international sources for governments to ‘catch up’ to international best practices, 
would it not be fair to assume that investors should expect regulation to change even more 
dramatically in developing countries than in developed ones? (p. 211) 
 
As will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter, policy stability is of central 
importance to foreign investors, and it is the change of policy governing an investment which 
often leads to a dispute with a host government. However, as Tienhaara notes, international 
organizations and regimes often pressure developing countries to improve regulatory standards 
and domestic actors in these states may also advocate for policy change, especially regarding 
environmental or labour standards. Similarly, liberalization processes advocated by international 
financial institutions for developing and transition countries can include the withdrawal of 
subsidies and other state aid, changing the policy framework on which investors have previously 
relied. Wherever the pressure is coming from, therefore, developing and democratizing states  
may be more likely to experience the changing or ratcheting up of regulatory requirements than 
in developed countries where standards are already fairly high (Tienhaara, 2009; Bonnitcha, 
2014). This shift in policy may in turn alter the terms of existing agreements with investors and 
trigger arbitration. Therefore, while developing states certainly have an interest in attracting FDI, 
they may also have an interest, due to pressure from both internal and external actors, in 
changing regulatory standards or policy frameworks governing an array of issue areas.   
 In short, the most basic interests of the states participating in the investment protection 
regime include the attraction of investment into host states, and the protection of investors from 
capital exporting states. Given this project’s focus on investor-state disputes, it is interested in 
the former – the interests of capital importing, or host states. For reasons related in part to the 
historical pattern of investment flows, most respondent states are middle income, developing or 
transition states. While these states are undoubtedly highly interested in attracting foreign capital, 
they also face pressures from domestic and international actors that may lead to policy change 
that has an impact on the terms of foreign investment.  
3.2.3 Cost-Benefit Calculations and Compliance with IIAs  
 
 The two previous sections presented a discussion of the interests of domestic actors and 
states regarding investment on which states base their policy stance toward FDI or particular 
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investments. At the subnational level, this included the potential negative effects of foreign 
investment on host populations, both in the form of competition for local business and the impact 
of the energy and extractive industries on the broader population. At the national level, states that 
sign IIAs quite likely have an interest in attracting investment but may also face resistance from 
domestic actors, based on the interests discussed above. More broadly, general shifts in policy at 
the national level may conflict with commitments made previously to investors.  
  Following from the assumptions inherent to the enforcement approach to compliance, as 
well as the framework for analysis of domestic-international interactions elaborated by Frieden 
and Martin (2003), these interests should form part of the cost-benefit calculations states make in 
the face of a possible investor-state dispute. However, the strategic setting, delineated in this 
project by the international investment protection regime, provides the costs which counter the 
domestic benefits that accrue from taking a certain policy measure; if international agreements 
are able to impose sufficiently high costs, they constrain states’ policy options (Downs, Rocke 
and Barsoom, 1996). For example, in a study on the imposition of capital controls, Kastner and 
Rector (2003) find that the international economic regimes can change the cost-benefit 
calculations made by state actors: when possible sanctions from the enforcement of an 
international regime are considered, “cost-benefit calculations become more complicated... the 
higher the costs associated with violating the standards of an international regime, the more a 
leader would be willing to sacrifice other goals to pursue policies in accordance with that regime 
(Kastner and Rector, 2003, p. 6). Ultimately, these authors claim that the presence of 
international regimes which regulate states’ policy options will lessen the ability of domestic 
actors to dictate policy.  
 This perspective suggests that a state’s respect of international rules will depend largely 
on the interplay between domestic interests and constraints imposed by the regime. This echoes 
the assumptions put forward in the enforcement approach to compliance, which understands 
compliance with international agreements as largely a result of treaties which do not place heavy 
demands on states; in other words, states do not negotiate and sign treaties with which they 
would find it difficult to comply (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996). In order to shape the 
preferences of states to accord with the goals of the agreement, a “deep” regime (i.e. one that 
requires greater behavioural changes of the signatory states) is more likely to require an attendant 
enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance; punishment for violations must be greater than 
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the benefits derived from defection from the regime (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996).  
Compliance is therefore understood as endogenous to the preferences of states, which are in turn 
subject not only to international constraints, but to the demands of domestic actors (Grieco, 
Gelpi, & Warren, 2009). According to this explanation, violations of international agreements 
are due to the fact that they place too great a demand on states in the face of countervailing 
domestic pressures, even considering possible retribution through an enforcement mechanism. 
Compliance is therefore the result of a deliberate choice, presumably arrived at following a series 
of cost-benefit calculations. This in turn implies that decision-makers are aware of the possible 
ramifications of noncompliance with an international agreement, and take this into an account 
when formulating domestic policy.  
 Gains from compliance can accrue from international sources – for example, through 
loans or foreign aid from international financial institutions – as well as domestic. In the case of 
the latter, the benefits of compliance with an agreement can come from the support of pro-
compliance domestic actors who actively support incumbent leaders; as Simmons (2010) notes, 
“when a potential procompliance constituency is large... and when an international agreement 
provides significant new information on the government’s record of compliance, a government 
will have strong electoral reasons not to violate international agreements” (p. 278).  The benefits 
of non-compliance are likely derived primarily from the domestic level, as described above, 
either from the support of influential interest groups or from voters who, for a variety of reasons, 
may not support treaty-compliant behaviour. As discussed above, the former is generally 
associated with domestic sectoral interests that stand to either benefit or lose from foreign policy 
choices (Milner et al., 2003). However, narrow interests may not be compatible with mass 
interests, and therefore it is necessary for state actors, at least in democracies, to accommodate 
both.  In this way, mass interests, particularly through electoral pressure, can also have an impact 
on states’ compliance with international agreements.  
 The evidence for the direction of the effect of democratic constituencies and elections on 
compliance decision-making is ambiguous. One strand of literature argues that democratic states 
are generally more likely to comply with international agreements, and gives significant credit 
for this to vigilant voters (Gaubatz, 1996; Jensen, 2003; Milner et al., 2003; North & Weingast, 
1989). According to Gaubatz (1996), for example, democratic societies hold certain normative 
beliefs which facilitate compliance – most importantly a respect for the rule of law – and these 
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beliefs motivate democratic voters to punish leaders who violate international agreements. 
Greater transparency in democratic policy-making process also helps domestic actors to hold 
leaders accountable to prior commitments (Gaubatz, 1996). Milner, et al. (2003) similarly 
emphasize the role of “audience costs,” although, with their focus on trade cooperation, their 
analysis places greater importance on the material benefits that voters associate with agreements 
which lower trade barriers. In their view, voters are able to connect their material circumstances 
to foreign policy decisions and punish or reward leaders accordingly.  
 However, other scholars argue that the relationship between democracy and treaty 
compliance “is more complex and less predictable than often assumed” (Slaughter and Raustiala, 
2002, p. 548). Most obviously, for democratic pressures to be associated with higher rates of 
compliance, voters must support the goals of the treaty itself, which cannot be assumed purely on 
the basis that they belong to a democratic state (Tomz, 2002). Moreover, it is crucial that these 
voters have access to the information regarding their state’s treaty compliance, and a sufficient 
understanding of the issue to make the connection between treaties and outcomes, which would 
enable voters to punish non-compliant governments (Dai, 2007). This may be too much to expect 
of the average voter, given the complexity of most international agreements and the issue areas 
they seek to govern (Tomz 2002). Therefore, whether domestic voters are simply unable to 
adequately enforce compliance through elections, or they actively oppose compliance with some 
agreements, domestic audience costs are insufficient to stop democracies from violating 
international agreements; for example, Rickard ( 2010) finds that “the most frequent violators of 
agreements negotiated within the framework of the WTO are high-functioning democracies with 
strong, credible opposition parties and regular, competitive elections” (p.712). At the very least, 
it is clear that a democratic constituency is no guarantee of greater compliance with an 
international agreement, and may in some cases promote noncompliance. Whatever the direction 
of the influence, there seem to be strong arguments for the thesis that shifts in domestic 
preferences, communicated to policymakers via democratic elections, can affect the preference 
of governments towards international agreements (Slaughter and Raustiala, 2002). This in turn 
lends support to the enforcement approach to compliance, which gives credit for (non-
)compliance with international agreements to purposive action on the part of state actors. 
However, in making decisions regarding international agreements, state actors must also 
consider the costs these impose in the event of non-compliance. In the case of IIAs, a number of 
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costs can be associated investment arbitration. First, as was discussed in the introduction, is the 
potentially high cost of the arbitration process itself, as well as the possibility of an ultimate 
award in favour of the investor. In the event of an investor-state dispute, states may also face 
reputational costs which decrease its attractiveness to foreign investors in the future. In fact, a 
recent study found that the fact that a state has been a respondent in an arbitration case, 
regardless of the ultimate findings of the tribunal, reduces inward FDI flows (Allee & Peinhardt, 
2011).  Developing countries therefore face particularly high costs for non-compliance with an 
IIA, given their need for FDI and greater costs to these governments of an award, relative to their 
GDP. Therefore, these states should be particularly sensitive to the external costs imposed by the 
regime. 
However, as I discuss below, cost-benefit calculations in investor-state disputes pose 
significant difficulty, as these agreements introduce uncertainty for states at a number of 
junctures, and thus complicate cost-benefit decision-making.  
3.2.4 Uncertainty and Investor-State Disputes 
 
 Of course, despite their best efforts at weighing the costs and benefits of a specific policy 
measure, states face a great deal of uncertainty in the face of international regimes. As Frieden 
and Martin (2003) argue, uncertainty plays an important role in international cooperation efforts 
in a number of ways. First, at the time of signing a new agreement, states are uncertain about 
what their future preferences might be, due to possible changes in the preferences of domestic 
actors or external conditions (van Aaken, 2009). Therefore, escape clauses – “any provision of 
an international agreement that allows a country to suspend the concessions it previously 
negotiated without violating or abrogating the terms of the agreement” – are included in many 
international agreements in order to allow states more flexibility in meeting their obligations 
(Milner and Rosendorff, 2001, p.830). This flexibility should reduce official noncompliance or 
defection from the regime. Escape clauses may be especially important for democracies, as 
leaders in these states are more sensitive to the changing preferences of domestic constituents in 
election periods (Rosendorff & Milner, 2001).  
 However, states face uncertainty not just about their own future preferences (and those of 
influential domestic actors) but also about the actual scope and implication of contractual or 
treaty provisions – the rules governing their interactions with other actors (van Aaken, 2009).  
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Therefore, while there will always be some degree of uncertainty inherent to decision-making, 
perhaps especially at the international level, effective domestic institutions should go some way 
towards reducing it, highlighting the importance of bureaucratic effectiveness, and domestic 
institutions generally, for international cooperation or compliance with international agreements, 
which will be discussed at further length below.  
 IIAs are primarily meant to reduce uncertainty for investors by helping states credibly 
commit to maintaining an investor-friendly environment by means of the threat of investment 
arbitration. However, IIAs introduce meaningful uncertainty into domestic policymaking as it is 
likely difficult for a state to predict whether or not an investor will turn to arbitration following 
the implementation of a specific policy measure; this decision relates to calculations the investor 
must make given their own assessment of the potential costs and benefits of using this dispute 
resolution mechanism – information to which the state will not have access. The expansion in 
use of ISDS as a tool for investors to pursue their interests, as discussed in the introduction, 
introduces greater uncertainty for states as investors can challenge measures which are only 
indirectly related to their own operations. This is made possible by the functioning of the 
arbitration mechanism, by which investors are empowered to initiate arbitration without having 
to rely on their own governments to advocate for them. According to van Aaken (2009),  
The system is unique for public international law in that it gives investors ius standi to take 
disputes to international tribunals directly, mostly without exhaustion of local remedies. This 
provision thus gives international investment law immense force, because private (juridical) 
persons are much more likely to take up their own cases than to rely on governments to grant 
them diplomatic protection as used to be the case. (p. 513)  
 
Therefore, the potential exists for investors to launch fairly frivolous claims against states, if the 
barriers for investors’ use of arbitration are fairly low.17 Moreover, the rise of third-party funding 
of investment arbitration, in which claimants will seek financial support from another firm or 
investor, who will then share in the award if the claim is successful, increases the capacity of 
investors to use arbitration to their benefit. This in turn may make it more difficult for states to 
predict when an investor will turn to arbitration, given that the cost-benefit calculations of the 
                                                 
17
 An excellent example of this is St Marys Cement v. Canada, a case that in many respects was quite similar to the 
Bilcon v.Canada case presented in Chapter 6. However, in this case the claimant was in fact Canadian, and opened a 
letterbox company in the US after filing for arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. Given that the investor was 
Canadian (and ultimately owned by a Brazilian multinational), there was no way for the government to anticipate 
that it would turn to NAFTA arbitration.  
66 
 
investor may be based on an even greater array of factors, for example its ability to access 
additional funding, than the state initially considers.  
Finally, in the event that a dispute with an investor does culminate in arbitration, the state 
faces uncertainty regarding the ultimate ruling of the tribunal. This uncertainty is exacerbated by 
the architecture of the investment protection regime, in which there is no single text of outlining 
standards of investment protection, but rather over 3,000 IIAs, and no sitting judicial body. 
Moreover, the ad hoc nature of arbitration tribunals introduces yet more uncertainty:   
Since the composition of the tribunals varies from case to case, so may their interpretations. 
Although some of the variations may be attributed to difference in the wording of the treaty text, 
sometimes tribunals also interpreted identical wording in different ways, leading to inconsistent 
interpretation. Many of the interpretations of the vague terms to be found in the BITs are thus 
highly disputed, thereby creating legal insecurity for investors and states (van Aaken, 2009, p. 
514)  
Thus is clear that within the context of the investment protection regime, states face a great deal 
of uncertainty with regard to whether a dispute with an investor will materialize and what the 
outcome of such a dispute may be. Proponents of the regulatory chill hypothesis discussed in the 
introduction argue that the threat of arbitration, and uncertainty regarding the outcome, is enough 
to dissuade some states from taking specific policy measures, even those that are non-
discriminatory towards foreign investors and in the public interest.  Indeed, significant anecdotal 
evidence implies that the explicit threat of arbitration has stopped new policy measures in some 
cases.
18
 However, states are clearly continuing to take measures which investors challenge via 
arbitration. Whether states make these policy decisions unaware that they may lead to arbitration, 
or whether they consciously choose to risk a dispute with foreign investors at the behest of other 
interests is less clear. This, and the related issues of bureaucratic capacity, will be discussed in 
the following section, as an alternative explanation to the causes of investor-state disputes. 
3.3 Domestic Capacity and Investor-State Disputes  
 
The ability of an international regime to genuinely constrain domestic policy space is dependent 
upon the relevant state actors’ awareness of the regime in question and the demands it places on 
the state. This again underscores the role that other domestic institutions play in the formulation 
                                                 
18
  References to this phenomenon have come up both in interviews I’ve conducted, but there are a number of well-
known cases: Canada allegedly had plans to introduce plain packaging laws for tobacco, but backed down following 
the threat of arbitration, and New Zealand, Namibia, Ghana, Togo and Uganda have apparently faced similar 
warnings.  Australia and Uruguay have passed similar policy measures and subsequently faced arbitration. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/health/tobacco-industry-tactics-limit-poorer-nations-smoking-laws.html?_r=0  
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and application of domestic policies, though from a different perspective than adopted in the 
previous sections. In this section, I examine the possibility that investor-state disputes are caused 
primarily by a lack of capacity of domestic institutions. I extend the concept of capacity here to 
include host state awareness of the investment protection regime, and therefore discuss the 
implications of recent work on bounded rationality and BIT diffusion on the present discussion 
(Poulsen & Aisbett, 2013; Poulsen, 2015). This latter work contributes significantly to our 
understanding of the role of “the capacities and limits of human decision-making” in policy 
making (Poulsen, 2015, p. 17). 
One strand of literature which takes seriously the role bureaucratic capacity and 
uncertainty in international cooperation and (non)compliance, is the managerial approach to 
compliance with international agreements.  Instead of interest calculations, proponents suggest, 
noncompliance is generally inadvertent – due to a lack of bureaucratic capacity, the vagueness of 
treaty provisions, and the inflexibility of agreements to accommodate changes over time (Chayes 
and Chayes 1993; Chayes and Chayes, 1998; Freeman, 2013). Financial limitations of the state 
can reduce capacity, and Chayes and Chayes (1998) argue that this is a problem most acutely 
faced by developing countries which are more likely to lack technical and bureaucratic resources.  
Administrative capacity of this kind requires the education and training of personnel, access to 
sufficient information, and the required mandate or authority to implement compliant policies, 
without which “rule-consistent behaviour may simply not be within a signatory’s choice set” 
(Simmons, 1998, p.83).  Moreover, a lack of political capacity may threaten compliance when a 
government is unable to ensure that the behaviour of domestic state and non-state actors (such as 
businesses) is compliant with international standards (Tallberg, 2002).  
More recent studies provide empirical evidence to support the importance of state 
capacity in respecting international agreements such as in human rights treaties (Cole, 2015) and 
environmental protection standards (Cao and Ward, 2015), drawing on the managerial approach. 
Cao and Ward (2015) operationalize capacity as the ratio between predicted and actual tax 
extraction, with predicted levels as a function of GDP per capita. On the other hand, Cole uses 
index measures of bureaucratic effectiveness, military involvement in the government, and 
control of corruption. Despite these differing measures of capacity, both studies find that higher 
levels of state capacity are positively correlated with their respective dependent variables.   
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 State capacity additionally depends in part on the individual policy makers’ expertise and 
awareness of relevant information. Rather than assume that these individuals have access to all 
relevant information and can easily weigh the costs and benefits of any decision, a bounded-
rationality framework assumes that policy makers are “subject to cognitive constraints and often 
prone to mistakes” (Poulsen, 2015, p. 17). Recent work suggests that bureaucratic awareness of 
the implications of signing IIAs has historically been low, which could in turn increase the 
likelihood of non-compliant behaviour. Building on survey data of BIT negotiators and other 
relevant stakeholders, Aisbett and Poulsen (2013) find that   
practically all officials noted that they were unaware of the far-reaching scope and implications of 
BITs during the 1990s, when the treaties proliferated… few realized that the treaties had such a 
considerable reach and were enforceable not just in principle but also in fact (p. 11).  
Indeed, it was not until states faced their first arbitration claims that policymakers understood the 
full extent of the costs of signing a BIT, which for most states did not occur until the turn of the 
century, when BIT claims took off. Until that time, states that had never faced an arbitration 
claim underestimated the impact of the regime. 
Although focused on explaining the reasons that states have continued to sign BITs 
despite the significant costs associated with arbitration, this argument complicates the 
straightforward explanation for investor-state disputes based on cost-benefit calculations 
presented above. In the context of specific disputes, this work suggests the possibility that states 
may not be making cost-benefit decisions regarding specific benefits with a full understanding of 
the potential costs provided by IIA provisions, and would thus take different measures regarding 
foreign investment if they were acting with full information. However, while this might explain 
earlier investor-state disputes, or the first disputes faced by an individual state, as time goes on 
and countries face more claims, the assumption that states do not understand the consequences of 
these agreements may become less likely. This is, however, an important challenge to the cost-
benefit assumptions, and will be explored both in the large-N study and case studies 
Ultimately, this focus on capacity and bounded rationality of decision makers 
underscores the importance, not just of electoral institutions and domestic interests in 
determining foreign policy choices as discussed in the previous section, but that of capable 
modern bureaucracies. Indeed,  
 in complex, industrial societies, the technicality and complexity of many policy matters, the need 
for continuing control of matters, and legislators’ lack of time and information have caused the 
delegation of much discretionary authority, which often includes extensive rule-making power, to 
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administrative agencies. Consequently, agencies make many decisions and issue many rules that 
have far-reaching political and policy consequences (Anderson, 2003, p. 53). 
 
While administrative agencies may have limited influence on broad policy direction, they do 
have significant input into the details of policy measures and how they are put into practice. 
When administrative decisions are made in a policy area that is additionally governed by an 
international regime, these agencies must consider both the policy goals set out by elected 
officials as well as the obligations of the state under the relevant agreement – a situation which 
may prove quite challenging, especially in developing states with weaker bureaucracies that lack 
personnel with specific issue-area expertise (Poulsen, 2015). Therefore, it is not just pressure 
from interest groups, but also the capacity of the relevant institutions themselves that has an 
impact on policy outcomes; if administrative and regulatory bodies do not have the required 
information or capacity to integrate international rules into the formulation of policy, this will 
also affect a state’s policy-making with regards to its international commitments (Chayes and 
Chayes, 1998).  
 What role does state capacity play in investor-state arbitration?  As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, bureaucratic or administrative state agencies are often implicated in these disputes, 
and a focus on state capacity may also help to explain the concentration of investor-state disputes 
in middle income countries, which face challenges related to corruption, political instability, and 
government capacity (Keijzer, Kraetke, & van Seters, 2013). Therefore, it may be that a further 
explanation for the concentration of investor-state disputes in middle income countries is that, 
despite their interest in attracting FDI, they are unable to maintain investment friendly 
environments and avoid arbitration due to a lack of capacity of domestic institutions. Adopting 
this line of argument, Freeman (2013) finds that investor-state disputes are caused primarily by a 
lack of capacity to control corruption and supply adequate private property protection to 
investors. He therefore concludes that his findings lend empirical support to the managerial 
school’s understanding of compliance. Of course, the relevance of bureaucratic capacity extends 
beyond the protection of property rights when it comes to explaining the causes of investor-state 
disputes. As discussed in the previous chapter, investor-state disputes arise in a wide range of 
issue areas, from environmental protection, to the granting of telecommunication licences, to 
financial regulation. Therefore, the state’s lack of bureaucratic capacity may contribute to 
investor-state disputes not only due to its inability to secure the property rights of the investor, or 
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maintain open investment policies, but additionally due to its inability to effectively regulate the 
industry as a whole in which the investment takes place. The case study of the dispute between 
El Salvador and Pacific Rim, presented in Chapter 7, underscores point – in this case, the lack of 
bureaucratic capacity to effectively regulate the mining industry in El Salvador played a large 
part in the eventual decisions to take policy measures which triggered the dispute. 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for this project, and draws primarily on liberal 
IR theory to explain how domestic actors and institutions can influence foreign policy decisions 
– in this case the treatment of foreign investors, given the constraints imposed on states by IIAs. 
In the first section, I argue that economic globalization, underwritten by international treaties 
such as IIAs, can place states in the situation of having to choose between the demands of 
domestic actors, and those of international agreements. While the concept of compliance is 
perhaps less fruitfully applied to investor-state arbitration and IIAs than other international 
agreements, the logic underlying two important approach to explaining compliance – the 
enforcement approach and the managerial approach – provide a useful starting point for broad 
explanations of the causes of investor-state disputes, and more abstractly, the way states deal 
with the potential conflicting demands placed on them by domestic and international actors.  
 The enforcement approach to compliance, which argues that states only comply with 
agreements when it is in their interest to do so (and hence that deeper agreements require an 
enforcement mechanism to increase the costs of non-compliance relative to compliance), 
suggests that state actors actively decide whether to comply based on cost-benefit calculations. 
Applied to explanations of investor-state disputes, this implies that state actors decide to risk 
potential loss in an arbitration case based on the benefits they can accrue from acceding to the 
“anti-investment” demands of domestic actors. This in turn requires an analysis of the relevant 
domestic preferences, and the ways these are organized and impact state decision-making, in 
order to determine the domestic “causes” of investor-state disputes.  
 On the other hand, the managerial approach to compliance suggests that non-compliance 
with international agreements is the result of a lack of state capacity to comply, due, for example, 
to bureaucratic weaknesses or the ambiguity of treaty provisions. In the case of investor-state 
disputes, then, this would imply that taking measures which harm investors’ interests are not the 
result of explicit cost-benefit calculations, but are inadvertent. This may also arise due to a lack 
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of awareness among policy-makers of the real costs associated with IIAs and investor-state 
arbitration, as was suggested may be the case (or at least may have been the case at the beginning 
of the arbitration boom beginning in the late 1990s), by work on bounded rationality and the 
decision by host states to enter into investment agreements.  
 Given the wide range of issues and states implicated in investor-state disputes, it is likely 
that these potentially competing explanations for the causes of investor-state disputes are not in 
fact mutually exclusive. In the next chapter I formulate more specific hypotheses about the role 
of domestic actors and institutions in increasing or decreasing the likelihood of investor-state 
disputes. These are roughly grouped according to the two broad explanations presented in this 
chapter, and draw additionally on more subject-specific literature on political risk and 
expropriation, and the determinants of FDI. These are subsequently tested statistically in Chapter 
5.   
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Chapter 4  Domestic Institutions & Actor Preferences as Determinants of 
Investor-State Disputes  
 
In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of the industries and states most often involved in investor-
state arbitration; which policy measures are being challenged by investors; and which domestic 
institutions were most often implicated in these disputes. This allows us to identify some very 
broad patterns in the distribution of investor-state disputes across these categories. The goal of 
this chapter is to hypothesize the possible causal relationships underlying these patterns based on 
the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3. While I focus here on specific variables which 
can be operationalized and tested in the next chapter by means of regression analysis, these 
hypotheses relate to the broader explanatory categories identified in the previous chapter – shifts 
in preferences toward FDI, state capacity, and exposure to the investment regime.  
  Very little work has looked specifically at the underlying causes of investor-state 
arbitration. Therefore, this chapter discusses a number of strands of literature which examine 
investor-state relations more generally in order to apply some of these insights to explanations of 
investor-state arbitration cases. This includes literature on the determinants of foreign direct 
investment inflows; factors contributing to political risk and the obsolescing bargain; and finally, 
studies which explain incidences of expropriation. What connects these three bodies of work is 
the implicit or explicit importance of policy stability.  
The literature on the determinants of FDI focuses on the aspects of a state that make it an 
attractive host for investment. Most obviously, economic factors such as access to new markets 
or natural resources play a role in investors’ decision making regarding where to make an 
investment. However domestic institutions and policies, and to a lesser extent, international 
investment agreements, play a role in attracting FDI as well; indeed, as I will discuss below, 
institutions which increase policy stability allow firms to take advantage of attractive economic 
opportunities presented by the host state, while policy instability and weak domestic institutions 
are unattractive to investors. This literature therefore highlights the importance of institutions in 
attracting investment and maintaining friendly investor-state relations. The arguments presented 
in this literature mirror those put forward by scholars who work on political risk, which I turn to 
in the next section.  
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Political risk, as opposed to economic risk, is a concept inherent to the understanding of 
investor-state disputes, as it is exactly this which IIAs are meant to decrease. It is therefore likely 
that domestic institutions and state behaviour that increase political risk will also be associated 
with an increase of cases of investor-state arbitration. Interestingly, while political instability and 
violence present the most obvious forms of political risk, work on the subject suggests that a 
much wider range of state behaviours and policy measures are considered by investors to 
increase risk significantly. 
Finally, I draw on the literature which more specifically focuses on the causes of 
expropriation. These studies also examine domestic institutional factors which contribute to the 
likelihood that leaders will reverse their policy on foreign investment, and forcibly divest owners 
from their investments. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, expropriations are at the heart of many 
investor-state disputes, and therefore, it seems plausible that many of the relationships identified 
in this literature will hold for explaining investor-state disputes that culminate in arbitration.  
Going beyond a focus on institutions, I also discuss the role of domestic non- or sub-state 
actor preferences toward FDI in investor-state disputes. As I argue below, in the face of 
responsive domestic institutions, the preferences of both narrow and broad interest groups may 
have the ability to foment a shift in state preferences toward FDI. Therefore, I discuss a number 
of possible contributing factors to negative in domestic preferences toward investment, drawing 
in large part on the patterns presented in Chapter 2.   
Additionally, as in Chapter 3, I also discuss a different approach to understanding the 
causes of investors-state disputes which focuses on state capacity. The literature discussed above 
adopts an explicitly rational choice approach to explaining the formulation of policies which 
negatively impact investors. Yet, as I discuss below, temporary economic crises, weak 
bureaucratic capacity and a lack of awareness of the investment protection regime may also 
engender investor-state disputes – despite the intentions of the state to maintain an investment-
friendly environment. 
While the literature on expropriation focuses on what is generally an undisputed factual 
event, the existence of an investment arbitration case again signals something rather different – 
namely that a measure was taken by a state that an investor has subjectively deemed 
objectionable. Therefore, I argue that an important additional determinant of investor-state 
arbitration is the investment protection regime itself. Namely, exposure to opportunities to be 
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sued by an investor – through the amount of investment hosted, investment treaties ratified, and 
the growing awareness of investors of the possibilities afforded to them by arbitration 
mechanisms – will increase the number of disputes and therefore must be controlled for.  
In the following sections, hypotheses are formulated which will be put to the test in 
Chapter 5. These causal arguments can be operationalized with variables related to domestic 
preferences, domestic capacity, and features of the investment protection regime itself.  
4.1 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
In this section, I briefly examine the determinants of FDI – the characteristics of host states 
which are associated with higher inflows of investment. These are indicative of what investors 
perceive as an investment-friendly environment and an examination of the factors which attract 
foreign investors is a useful starting point for this investigation. As will be discussed below, 
while economic factors such as market size and natural resources play an important role in 
investment decisions, investors rely on international agreements and strong domestic institutions 
to ensure they can reap the benefits of attractive economic conditions, and thus these political 
and legal factors can also be considered determinants of FDI. 
Specific policies related to investment, political institutions, and economic conditions all 
play a role in attracting FDI, although with varying degrees of importance. Firms choose to 
invest abroad, according to Dunning, (2001) based on where they can enjoy ownership, 
internationalization, or locational advantages. Ownership advantages are those that foreign firms 
have over local businesses, such as intellectual property, while internalization advantages are 
those that incentivize a firm to engage in vertical integration rather than merely licensing foreign 
firms to produce a certain product. Finally, advantages, such as the presence of significant new 
markets, access to natural resources, or efficiency enhancing factors such as cheap and/or skilled 
labour, determine specific locational choices (Colen, Maertens and Swinnen, 2013).  
Beyond the attractiveness of specific characteristics of a host state mentioned above, a set 
of policies must be in place which ensures foreign investors are able to take advantage of them. 
One way of indicating to investors that investment protection is a domestic priority is to sign 
international agreements to that affect – BITs and other IIAs are designed to help states make 
credible commitments regarding the protection of investors’ rights. This commitment – that 
states will ensure an investment-friendly environment even after an investor has sunk significant 
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resources into their territory (see discussion of obsolescing bargain below) – may in turn increase 
investment in two ways. On the one hand, signing a BIT could increase dyadic FDI flows 
between the two parties to the treaty. On the other, signing BITs with important home countries 
can send a signal that a potential host state is making an effort to protect foreign investment, 
which may boost FDI generally (Rose-Ackerman and Tobin, 2011). However, the role of 
international commitments, including BITs and other IIAs, in encouraging investment remains a 
source of scholarly debate, with the body of work on the effectiveness of BITs in increasing FDI 
inflows characterized primarily by a lack of consensus (Aisbett, 2009; Kerner, 2009; Tobin & 
Rose-Ackerman, 2011); as was discussed at greater length in the introduction, the empirical 
evidence that IIAs do in fact increase inward FDI flows is quite inconclusive. Indeed, given the 
widespread adoption of BITs and other IIAs, creating, at least on paper, similarly investment-
friendly environments, it is unsurprising that country-specific economic attributes remain of 
central importance to investors (Busse and Hefeker, 2005).   
Other policy choices are made by states in an effort to attract FDI may relate to all 
businesses operating in the country, or specific sectors. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
World Bank and other global financial and development institutions encouraged developing 
countries to “modernize” their tax codes, for example by lowering mining royalties to attract FDI 
in the extractive sector (Emel & Huber, 2008). Other countries, particularly in East Asia and 
Latin America, have promoted their manufacturing industries by offering free trade zones in 
which companies can take advantage of cheaper labour sources without being subject to import 
and export taxes. These  strategies make sense if locational factors are considered in a firm’s 
investment decisions as outlined above – if these policies lower the cost of business, and capital 
is highly mobile, then it would follow that they would attract greater investment (Bellak & 
Leibrecht, 2005; Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2008; Olney, 2013). Other scholars however 
find no evidence that higher FDI flows are associated with less regulation. Instead, they argue, 
domestic political interests keep states from giving into the exigencies of the globalized market, 
and encourage states to maintain welfare and redistributive policies (Basinger & Hallerberg, 
2004).   
Whatever the impact of specific policies on FDI, the importance of policy stability for 
attracting investment is clear, and as “physical investment is partly irreversible, rational 
behaviour by the private sector calls for withholding investment until much of the residual 
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uncertainty regarding the success of the reforms is eliminated” (Rodrik, 1991, p. 231).  When 
significant resources have been sunk into an investment, and policies relevant to the investment 
are changed, investors can lose considerable sums. It is therefore not surprising that the negative 
effect of policy uncertainty has been found to be stronger for firms that have a higher degree of 
investment irreversibility (Gulen & Ion, 2015).  
Unfortunately for foreign investors, host states can be incentivized to make these kinds of 
policy changes which alter the investment environment. For example, it can be in the interest of 
states to impose windfall taxes or to remove subsidies once an investment has been made – 
particularly because it is difficult for the investor to withdraw its investment without incurring 
severe economic losses. This is the essence of the obsolescing bargain theory of company-state 
relations, which assumes that the balance of power between firms and states evolves over time 
(Eden, 1991). Prior to the entry of an MNE to a host country, the government is in a weaker 
bargaining position as it attempts to attract FDI, presumably at the expense of other competing 
countries, by offering investment incentives. However, once the investment has been made and is 
costly to withdraw, the balance of power shifts in favour of the state, which can then alter the 
policy framework in which the investment was made (Eden, 1991). Therefore, it may be that the 
major obstacle facing foreign investors is not high regulatory standards or taxes, so much as the 
uncertainty that the policies under which the investment was made will not subsequently be 
changed post-entry (Waelde & Kolo, 2001). This policy stability is in turn dependent on 
institutions that facilitate intertemporal agreements which ensure that “the political power of the 
incumbent is not abused… [and which] prevent the prevalence of policies that favour the 
dominant actor of the moment and ignore others” (Spiller, Stein, & Tommasi, 2008, p. 6). 
Thus, domestic political institutions also play a role in attracting FDI by making it easier 
or more difficult for foreign firms to reap locational benefits, most importantly, by ensuring 
policy stability. This corresponds, unsurprisingly with the focus of the literature on the 
determinants of expropriation and political risk, which will be discussed below. Much of the 
academic literature that focuses on this issue examines whether autocratic or democratic 
countries play host to more FDI, and will be discussed at length in the next sections.  
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4.2 Defining Political Risk  
 
While investments may become unprofitable due to changes in the economic climate, FDI is also 
vulnerable to political events, and it is to ensure against this that countries sign IIAs. According 
to Kobrin (1979), when we talk about political risk we are concerned with “the impact of events 
which are political in the sense that they arise from power or authority relationships and which 
affect (or have the potential to affect) the firm’s operations” ( p. 71).  
Risk may be categorized in a number of ways. For example, the impact of political events 
may be on a macro scale, where all FDI in a country is negatively affected, regardless of home 
country or sector. Alternatively, political processes may create “micro risk” where only 
particular firms or sectors feel an adverse impact from a political decision (Moosa, 2002). 
Additionally political events may impact either the firm’s ownership or its operations. In the case 
of the former, assets may be forcibly expropriated, while in the latter case measures are taken 
which constrain profitability without destroying the enterprise, for example through the levying 
of higher taxes (Kobrin, 1984). 
Expropriation, the forced divestment of equity ownership (Li, 2005), has typically been 
the most highly visible manifestation of political risk. Expropriation was relatively common in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, as post-colonial states took control of foreign-owned businesses, 
especially in strategic industries such as oil, gas and mining, due in part to a political emphasis 
on independence; Kobrin (1984) argues that expropriation became a default for governments 
lacking the administrative sophistication to control foreign business through regulatory means.  
Expropriation became rarer in the 1980s, as the number of projects left available for 
expropriation declined, and managerial and administrative ability improved, allowing 
governments to exert influence over foreign investors by less direct means (Kobrin, 1984). The 
number of expropriations increased slightly in the 2000s, again primarily in the extractive 
industry, with leaders in Bolivia and Venezuela recently favouring widespread nationalizations. 
However, most expropriations today can be defined as indirect, or “creeping expropriations” 
where governments “use selective enforcement of laws to expropriate the assets or income 
streams of firms” (Jensen et al., 2013, p. 3).  
 Of course, while expropriation is the worst-case scenario facing foreign investors, firms 
can experience adverse effects from wide range of government actions and policies. For 
78 
 
example, in a survey of electricity and telecommunications firms, managers cited “decisions that 
altered the terms of contracts, the structure of the market or the firm's latitude to set prices or 
make new service offerings” as typical manifestations of risk (Henisz & Zelner, 2002). In 
another survey, managers of multinationals listed increased taxation, corruption and judicial 
uncertainty as the top three obstacles to doing business (Henisz & Zelner, 2002). Transfer risk, 
the inability to convert and transfer currency and thus repatriate profits, is also cited as a 
significant and common risk to foreign investors (Graham et al., 2012). These perceptions echo 
Kobrin’s (1984) prescient argument that political risk would come primarily in the form of 
threats to operations, not ownership.  
Kobrin further argued that the oft-cited problems of political instability and violence were 
not the biggest threats to FDI. While sudden regime changes may cause upheaval, they do not 
automatically imply the adoption of anti-FDI attitudes, as exemplified by the 1971 coup in Chile 
that replaced socialist President Allende with the pro-market Pinochet. In fact, he argues,  
Political instability and conflict are not necessary or even frequent prerequisites to constraints 
imposed on foreign firms as a result of changes in the political environment. Price controls, 
limitations on foreign ownership and employment, local content regulations, partial or complete 
expropriation, exchange and import controls, remittance restrictions and the like may result from 
the regular functioning of the political process owing to losses or gains in the regime’s power or 
to changes in the character and power of the opposition or of interest groups (Kobrin, 1979, p. 
39). 
 The concept of political risk then is inherently connected to policy change. The results of 
the aforementioned surveys of managers of multinationals emphasize that business interests can 
be threatened by a wide range of policy measures, including, but not limited to, outright 
expropriation of an investment. Kobrin (1979) argues that political risk is not manifest only in 
situations of conflict and instability, but is present in the “regular function of the political 
process” (p. 39). If this observation holds, political risk should not necessarily be greater in 
autocracies or unstable states than in democracies. However, as will be discussed in the next 
section, this is not the conclusion drawn in the bulk of the literature on regime type and FDI.  
4.3 Domestic Institutions, FDI and Political Risk 
 
In what follows, I develop the specific hypotheses which will be tested in the next chapter, based 
on an examination of literature on the relationship between domestic institutions, political risk 
and in particular, expropriation of foreign-owned investments.  
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  Much of the literature on the role of domestic political institutions in attracting FDI 
focuses on differences between autocratic and democratic host countries. Some earlier work on 
the subject concluded that autocratic governments were better able to provide attractive 
investment conditions to multinationals given their insulation from public pressure. In short, 
these governments are able to keep wages low and offer better entry deals to MNCs, thus 
attracting more FDI (Jensen, 2003). On the other hand, the argument goes, democratic leaders 
may choose to support domestic business interests over foreign investors. Indeed, while the 
impact of FDI can be quite positive, the entry of foreign firms into a domestic market certainly 
can create local “losers” by introducing more efficient and competitive practices and pushing out 
local firms, or in cases such as large-scale extractive investments, render traditional livelihoods 
unsustainable due to land and water use of mining and oil operations. As a result, local 
communities or businesses may lobby the government for favourable (protectionist), policies 
(Acemoglu, 2008; Li & Resnick, 2003). In particular, Li and Resnick (2003) argue that while 
domestic businesses are able to influence both autocratic and democratic governments, in a 
democracy, “domestic interests that lose out to MNEs can resort to elections, campaign finance, 
interest groups, public protest and media exposure” to pressure the government to adopt more 
favourable policies (p.183). Therefore, the ability of autocratic governments to set investment-
friendly policies such as tax breaks and subsidies, even at the expense of domestic interests, 
should attract more FDI to these host countries (Li & Resnick, 2003). However, the bulk of the 
recent literature on the subject, including statistical analyses, does not bear this argument out –  
democracy level is most often positively correlated with inward FDI flows (Freeman, 2013; 
Jensen, et al, 2012; Jensen, 2003; Li, 2005). Ultimately, the authors of these studies argue, 
democracies are better able to provide what is most important to investors: a transparent and 
stable policy environment.  
 One way in which democracies create an investment-friendly environment is through 
greater transparency. Given that they are routinely held accountable to voters, democracies are 
generally more transparent than authoritarian governments, which are often found to be less than 
open about market-relevant data, manipulating official statistics and forcing investors to rely on 
informal sources of information (Jensen, 2006). Moreover, a free press, generally a feature 
associated with democracies, allows foreign investors to better understand and predict 
government actions (Jensen, 2006). Finally, more transparent instruments to lobby government 
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officials are more likely to be found in democratic states, giving foreign investors a chance to 
engage directly with policymaking. While bribery may also provide a method to influence policy 
decisions in authoritarian states, corruption and FDI are statistically negatively correlated, 
suggesting that MNEs do not prefer this strategy (Wei, 1997). In fact, poorly functioning 
institutions and high levels of corruption raise the cost of doing business and therefore are 
generally correlated with lower levels of FDI (Colen, Maertens & Swinnen, 2013).  
Democracies are further associated with the protection of property rights, which is 
intuitively of great importance to foreign investors. Again, early political theorists feared that 
democracy would threaten property rights as universal suffrage would empower the poor 
majority to vote for the redistribution of wealth (Knutsen, 2011). However, as the historical 
record makes clear, this fear was largely unjustified; neither in Europe and North America, nor in 
newly democratizing countries, has the advent of democracy been associated with large-scale 
expropriations (Knutsen, 2011). In fact, recent work finds that autocracies are more likely to 
expropriate and exhibit less respect for property rights in general. Therefore, investors channel 
FDI towards locals which exhibit “fundamental democratic rights, such as civil liberties and 
political rights” (Busse & Hefeker, 2005, p. 10). Therefore, I will test the hypothesis that 
 H: a state’s democracy level will be negatively correlated with the likelihood of an 
investor-state dispute. 
The existence of higher numbers of “veto players” is often employed to explain 
democratic regimes’ respect for property rights (Henisz & Mansfield, 2006; North & Weingast, 
1989; Weymouth, 2010). Veto players are individuals or groups in a political system whose 
consent is necessary for a change to the status quo, and “as the number of veto players in a 
political system increases, policy stability increases” (Tsebelis, 2000, p. 446). In democracies, 
institutions such as the legislature and independent judiciaries serve to limit the ability of the 
executive to engage in opportunistic policymaking, thereby “making the government’s 
commitment to private property credible, reducing expropriation risks for foreign investors, and 
attracting more FDI” (Li, 2005, p. 3). Effective veto players thus contribute to policy stability, 
and the ability of governments to make credible commitments. This in turn has been linked to 
economic growth (Fatás & Mihov, 2013),  currency stability (Weymouth, 2010), and commercial 
openness (Henisz & Mansfield, 2006), as well as increased FDI flows. However, in a recent 
study, the presence of greater numbers of veto players was argued to significantly change the 
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type of risk faced by investors, but not do away with it altogether (Graham et al., 2012). 
Specifically, greater constraints on the executive decreased the likelihood of an expropriation, 
which, the authors argue, is a highly politically salient event signalling an overall lack of respect 
for property rights that can impact domestic voters as well as foreign investors. On the other 
hand, imposing restrictions on the repatriation of capital garners very little domestic public 
attention, and is thus an easier way for constrained governments to extract rents from foreign 
investors (Graham et al., 2012). Therefore, veto players may be associated with lower rates of 
expropriation, but not necessarily impede the government from taking measures that harm the 
interests of investors altogether. However, since the relationship between policy change and 
political constraints is generally considered to be negative,  
 H: The presence of greater numbers of veto players will be correlated with a decreased 
likelihood of investment arbitration. 
 
On the other hand, institutional features may instead make decision-makers more likely 
to respond to anti-investor sentiment. For example, while Tsebelis argues that the executive in 
presidential systems actually enjoys less control over congress, and is therefore, less able to 
unilaterally pass new laws than leaders in a parliamentary system, presidents often have a high 
degree of control over their ministries or secretaries (Heffernan, 2005; Verney, 1992). Moreover, 
presidents are generally directly elected by voters (as opposed to leaders in parliamentary 
systems, who are chosen by the party), and are thus likely to be more responsive to electoral 
pressures. As Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) note, specifically with reference to Latin 
American governments, presidents have a high degree of independence from their parties, and 
“may feel that the exigencies of leadership compel them to adopt a ‘Burkean posture’ of ignoring 
partisan mandates for the ‘good of the nation’” (p.5). This may make presidents more likely to 
take unilateral measures against investors, especially when faced with public or special interest 
group pressure. The high number of investor-state disputes in Latin American countries, all of 
which are presidential systems, suggests this might be the case. Moreover, as was discussed in 
Chapter 2, the majority of measures taken which lead to an investor-state arbitration case are 
administrative not legislative, meaning the influence of the executive and ministries in these 
decision-making processes is an important factor in these disputes. Therefore,  
 H: States with presidential systems will be more likely to be involved in investor-
state disputes. 
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Thus, the ability of a state to ensure an investment-friendly policy, according to the veto 
player argument, is not reliant solely on a democratic system per se, but to the greater number of 
political constraints within democracies compared to autocracies. More generally, domestic 
institutions which contribute to policy stability should decrease the number of investor-state 
disputes in which the state is involved. However, while greater numbers of veto players make 
policy change less likely, both the status quo and possible policy changes depend also on the 
preferences of the relevant actors. It should not be assumed that domestic actors in a democracy 
will necessarily be pro-foreign investment, or have an interest in protecting certain projects. The 
interests of domestic constituencies will necessarily have an impact on a host country’s treatment 
of foreign investors, as I discuss in the next section.  
4.4 Foreign Investment and Domestic Preferences  
In this section I argue that if domestic institutions are sensitive to popular discontent regarding 
FDI, this may result in policy changes that disadvantage investors. In a recent article, Pelc and 
Ureplainen (2015) come to a very different conclusion regarding the political nature of 
investment treaty breach. They claim that because governments are the only direct beneficiaries 
of expropriation, unlike when domestic producers lobby for trade protectionism, governments 
will not be pressured by domestic interest groups to violate an investment treaty. However, as I 
have repeatedly argued here, and they themselves admit, investment treaty breaches are not 
limited to outright expropriation, and instead encompass a wide range of policy measures, 
opening up space for the influence of non-state actors. Indeed, as I discuss below, the empirical 
overview of investor-state disputes provided in Chapter 2 suggests a number of “entry points” for 
domestic actors’ preferences to have an impact on an investor-state dispute. 
 How can we identify shifts in domestic preferences? A change in government is one 
proxy indicator for such a change in domestic preferences. For example, Rosendorff and Smith 
(2014) find that changes in leadership that result from a shift in the underlying preferences of a 
leader’s “support coalitions” increase the likelihood of initiation of a dispute at the WTO (see 
also: Mattes, et al., 2014). This implies that a change in policy following an election is due to the 
change in preferences of a leader’s base of electoral support. Mattes, Leeds and Carroll (2014) 
conceptualize this base of support in democracies as “those who vote for or associate with the 
leader’s party” (p. 19). In autocracies the source of leader support is rather the small groups – for 
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example the military – which “hold sway over policymaking” (p. 19). When these groups 
change, they argue, we are more likely to see policy changes in autocracies.  
The same processes could quite easily be at work with regards to changes to domestic 
preferences towards FDI, and the subsequent initiation of investment arbitration. Similarly, 
Bonnitcha (2014) suggests that transitions between regimes, particularly the move from 
autocratic to democratic systems, may engender investor-state disputes. As mentioned above, the 
prediction of widespread redistribution of property alongside processes of democratization was 
not born out. However, if an authoritarian regime has relied on patronage or cronyism to support 
itself, a transition to democracy may require that previous deals in which foreign investors that 
were granted overly favourable terms be re-evaluated (Krajewski, 2013). In other words, the new 
regime may be faced with demands from domestic groups which alter the terms of an investment 
without resulting in expropriation.
19
 Finally, and more generally, electoral pressure may 
encourage domestic leaders to take measures which are counter to investors’ interests, to win the 
favour of key domestic constituents, in the lead up to a highly contested election. Therefore, to 
best capture these related, but slightly different dynamics, I put forward that  
 H: leader transitions will be positively correlated with the likelihood of an 
investor-state dispute.
20
 
 
 This may also manifest itself in the election of governments who are ideologically 
opposed to FDI, or at least to investment which they do not believe significantly benefits the host 
state. Traditionally, leftist and nationalist governments have been more prone to expropriate, 
although recent literature finds an ambiguous effect of the presence left leaning governments on 
the likelihood of expropriation – being positive, but statistically insignificant (Li, 2005). More 
recently, Pinto (2013) has come to the opposite conclusion, finding that leftist governments in 
fact favour FDI as it increases domestic demand for labour. However, as I discuss below, Pinto 
appears to only consider the influence of FDI in manufacturing – not a sector in which investor-
state disputes are concentrated. Indeed, ideological motivations appear to have a role in recent 
investor-state disputes, as Leftist governments such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia have 
                                                 
19
 As Bonnitcha (2014) notes, recent cases that challenge policy changes resulting from the Arab Spring in Egypt 
bear this out.  
20
 While an increase in investor-state disputes is likely to come after a regime change, the relationship between an 
election and a dispute may be more complicated. For instance, a government which senses anti-FDI sentiment may 
attempt to leverage this during an election, and thus we would see a correlation in investor-state disputes and the 
lead-up to an election.  
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adopted a ‘post-neoliberal’ attitude towards foreign investment, which includes the renegotiation 
of public service agreements with private enterprises, and tax increases for foreign-owned 
mining companies.  This is due to a “change in policy-maker perceptions regarding the 
opportunity costs of regulating foreign companies” which is part of a broader rejection of the 
Washington- consensus model in Latin America over the past decade (Haslam, 2009, p. 121). 
Indeed, the withdrawal from ICSID of Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador – ruled by leftist 
governments with (in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador) a strong support from indigenous social 
movements committed to an anti-neoliberal normative agenda – suggests that ideological 
motivations may have an effect on engagement with the investment regime, and echoes 
Rosendorff and Smith’s (2014) argument regarding the impact of leadership changes on WTO 
disputes:  
 H: States with leftist governments will be more likely to be involved in investor-
state disputes. 
 
 The logic of this argument contradicts to some extent the role of democratic institutions 
in decreasing the likelihood of an investor-state dispute found in the literature on political risk 
and expropriation. However, recent work on investor-state disputes comes to similar conclusions. 
Increasingly, as Simmons (2013) notes, democratic governments are attempting to annul 
arbitration awards against them, and that these annulment attempts are concentrated in specific 
sectors – namely water, gas and electricity. This implies that investor-state disputes are being 
triggered by policies that have an impact on, and perhaps were taken at the behest of, broad 
domestic interest groups. Thus, while many variables discussed here are predicted to have a 
similar effect on the dependent variable as they do in studies on expropriation, the underlying 
causes, found in domestic preferences, may be different. For example the large number of 
investor-state disputes related to mining, oil and gas projects mirror the pattern of expropriations 
in the extractive industry. However, a number of these cases stem not from outright 
expropriation, but pressures on the government from domestic constituents concerned with 
environmental damage; the viability of traditional livelihoods; and the lack of economic benefits 
from these projects accruing at the local level. It would be a mistake to write off all investor-state 
disputes in this sector, therefore, as the result of opportunistic behaviour toward a vulnerable 
investment for which sunk costs are high and mobility is low. Thus, the impact of democracy 
level on the likelihood of investor-state disputes is likely to be more ambiguous than on 
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expropriation alone.  This therefore suggests a competing hypothesis to that regarding a state’s 
democracy level, stated above. It may be that democracies are more likely to be involved in 
investor-state disputes because their institutions are necessarily more sensitive to anti-FDI 
sentiment.  
 From this discussion it is clear that the preferences of domestic actors towards FDI 
cannot be assumed to be positive or negative, and may vary depending on the type of investment, 
industry. If policymakers are receptive to the pressure from anti-investment domestic interests, 
then they may be more likely to take a measure which is subsequently challenged by investors in 
arbitration. One way of determining whether this mechanism is functioning is the correlation 
between investor-state disputes and changes in government or even regime. However, it is not 
just the functioning of domestic institutions and the preferences of domestic actors which 
increase the likelihood of a dispute. The functioning of the investment protection regime itself, 
and the decision-making process with regard to specific investments, will also have an impact on 
the likelihood of a dispute. This will be discussed in section 4.6. However, I first briefly discuss 
the importance of two trends in investor-state disputes which was first presented in the 
qualitative coding of investor-state disputes presented in Chapter 2.   
4.4.1 Controlling for Industry and Historical Legacy – The Concentration of Disputes in 
Strategic Industries and Transition States 
 
This chapter focuses primarily on the domestic institutions which promote or reduce policy 
stability, thus in theory diminishing or increasing the likelihood of an investor-state dispute. 
However, as was discussed in the previous two chapters, there are patterns in the distribution of 
investor-state disputes that are fairly easy to “eyeball” and must be controlled for, when trying to 
determine the impact of domestic institutions on the likelihood of a dispute. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, investor-state disputes are concentrated in just a handful of industries – namely oil, 
gas and mining, and electricity and other energy.
21
 These are generally considered “strategic” 
industries, which are often formerly state-owned. Of course, domestic businesses in these sectors 
may be affected by the entrance of foreign firms. As these industries are generally highly 
regulated and often include state-owned enterprises, there may be numerous government actors 
                                                 
21
 As one interviewee in El Salvador noted, the country has never had an investment dispute in a “normal” sector 
such as manufacturing, which is also highly internationalized in the country. Instead, disputes are concentrated in 
strategic sectors such as energy and extractives.  
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with an interest in these investments. Therefore, the most powerful stakeholders involved in 
these cases may be domestic competitors or government officials with an interest in extracting 
rents from foreign investors.  
 On the other hand, these industries often have a high degree of salience for broader 
interest groups and foreign investment in both has been highly contentious. Extractive industries, 
while often having a direct impact on those that live in the vicinity of the project, are also often 
negatively viewed by the population based on their perceived environmental impact, as well as 
the idea that mineral rights should remain in the hands of the state (Bebbington, et al., 2008). 
Investment in public services has the potential to have considerable distributional effects on 
citizens (Krajewski, 2013). Therefore, investors in these sectors are particularly likely to be faced 
with anti-investor sentiment, or at least changing preferences towards investment and the 
concentration of disputes in these areas is indicative of the impact of domestic stakeholders on 
investor-state disputes.  
Investment projects which generate greater negative externalities, and thus are more 
likely to generate anti-FDI sentiment may be at greater risk of expropriation or other anti-
investor measures. The most obvious example of this is investment in the extractive industries. 
The dependence of a country on resource rents is associated with a range of economic and 
governance problems, described together as the “resource curse” (Ross, 1999) and lead to lower 
levels of growth. While many governments offer generous incentives for investors,
22
 they may 
reassess the wisdom of these contracts when rising mineral prices allow companies to make 
unanticipated profits (Hajzler, 2012). In particular, the effectiveness of the extractive industry as 
a driver of development is often a catalyst for significant public debate, especially with regards 
to windfall taxes and the perception of an unfair repatriation of profits on the part of foreign 
investors.
23
  Extractive projects are also associated with higher levels of social conflict and the 
destruction of traditional livelihoods in nearby communities, to which the many mining 
company-community conflicts around the world attest (Davis & Franks, 2014; Haslam & 
Tanimoune, 2016)  When these local pressures are combined with rising mineral prices, the 
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 For example, mining royalties as low as 1% in many Latin American countries.  
23
 For example, the arbitration case Paushok et. al v. Mongolia was initiated after the country imposed a windfall tax 
on the gold mining company. This took place in the midst of a public debate about the role of mining in the domestic 
economy.  
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incentives for governments to renegotiate contracts to appease domestic interests are quite 
strong.  
Foreign investment in utilities – water, electricity, gas, and sometimes 
telecommunications – is often quite contentious as well (Moosa, 2002). This may be the case in 
situations in which the privatization of formerly public services leads to foreign acquisitions of 
water, gas and electricity utilities. These privatisations can have distributional impacts, with “the 
biggest ‘losers’…those disadvantaged customers who were subsidised under the old regime, but 
now often denied access” (Chang, 2004, p. 791). When the status quo is changed, voters may 
punish incumbents. Indeed, Post and Bril-Mascarenhas (2014) find that governments fear being 
saddled with the blame for removing a program that benefits voters, which leads them, in their 
example, to maintain inefficient subsidy programs. This work implies that voters are sensitive to 
changes in programs which affect their well-being, and that politicians are aware to this fact. In 
the case of investor-state disputes, if privatization leads to higher utilities prices, domestic actors 
may pressure governments to institute price controls or other measures which negatively affect 
an investment. This places governments in a situation of facing competing pressures, as IIAs and 
other agreements may restrict the ability of governments to enact policies such as administrative 
pricing which can mitigate the impact of privatization on customers (Krajewski, 2012).  
Both extractive projects and utilities are also fairly vulnerable to expropriation for quite 
practical reasons. The sunk costs of an investment in mining or oil extraction are quite 
substantial, as the investor is quite literally tied to the ground in which the minerals exist. 
Therefore, it is relatively easy for a host government to take over an investment if they have the 
incentive to do so. Similarly, public utilities are often less technologically sophisticated projects 
than other investments, and simpler for local authorities to operate after a takeover (Colen and 
Guariso, 2013). Unsurprisingly, expropriations are concentrated in extractive industries and 
utilities, especially since the 1990s, when overall expropriations decreased. In fact, one study has 
found that while IIAs do not attract more FDI overall, they are associated with an increase in FDI 
in the extractive industry, perhaps as investors in extractives recognize their uniquely precarious 
situation (Colen & Guariso, 2013).  Therefore,  
 H: the percentage of GDP which is comprised of fuel exports will be positively 
correlated with the likelihood of a dispute.
24
 
                                                 
24
 Unfortunately, I have not been able to find sufficient data on utilities privatization to include this in my 
regressions. 
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The historical legacy of a state may contribute to its relations with foreign investors, 
shaping the preferences of the population towards FDI, as well as the policy framework which 
governs investment. The early scholarly focus on expropriation was due in large part to the effect 
of colonialism and subsequent independence on the propensity of a state to expropriate (Kobrin, 
1984). However, other historical experiences may have an impact on investor-state relations. 
Transition economies – that is, formerly state-planned economies – are very frequently the 
respondents in arbitration case, which may be explained in part by the higher levels of corruption 
in a number of these countries.
25
 However, they may also be more often faced with competing 
international and domestic pressures. For example, policies which have privatized formerly 
public services such as water, gas and electricity, have been met with resistance from populations 
who had previously enjoyed universal access (Krajewski, 2012). As Salacuse (2008) notes, the 
economic liberalization that was undertaken by most countries in the 1980s privileged investors’ 
rights, which “may have led foreign investors to undertake their investment with high and 
perhaps unrealistic expectations about their importance to the country and their status in it” 
(p.23). The subsequent disappointment of these expectations, for example when privatization 
efforts meet domestic resistance to higher prices, may lead to more frequent investor-state 
disputes. Moreover, as Muchlinski (1996) notes with regard to the Czech Republic (and which 
can be said of a number of transition economies, at least in Europe) “a complex series of hitherto 
distinct regulatory fields – foreign investment, privatisation and competition – and the distinct 
levels of Czech national and European supranational laws, are coming together into an integrated 
web of standards” (p.659). This alone may create a situation in which investors are 
disadvantaged by regulatory confusion. A number of cases in which the respondent states argue 
that regulatory changes were made in order to comply with EU law suggest this possibility.
26
 
Therefore,  
 H: Transition countries are more likely to be involved in investor-state disputes. 
                                                 
25
 The mean control of corruption score  for countries in my dataset is -0.347 for transition economies and 0.086 for 
non-transition economies, with lower scores indicating higher levels of corruption.  
26
 Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic; Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19); 
Mercuria Energy Group Limited (Mercuria) v Poland; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania (ICSID 
Case  No. ARB/05/20) 
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4.5 State Capacity and Investor-State Disputes 
The previous sections have focused on domestic preferences toward FDI, and the ways in which 
domestic institutions can increase or decrease investor-state disputes. However, these hypotheses 
all assume an explicit cost-benefit approach to the policymaking leading to investor-state 
disputes, which may not reflect reality. As the managerial approach to explaining compliance 
with international agreements suggests, states may violate treaties because they do not have the 
capacity to comply (Chayes and Chayes, 1998). In the case of investment treaties, this implies 
not a deliberate change in policy due to pressure from domestic interest groups, but instead 
policy change that either inadvertently disadvantages investors or is taken under duress. A state 
may also fail to live up to its commitment to protect investors through a lack of capacity to act, 
rather than the enactment of a specific policy measure.  
For example, economic crises may have an impact on foreign investors. The notable 
number of investor-state disputes that arose from the Argentine financial crisis clearly 
demonstrates that investors’ interests can be threatened by deterioration in a host country’s 
economic condition. On the other hand, Jensen et al. (2013) find that on the whole, economic 
crises lessen the likelihood of an expropriation event and increase market-friendly policies in 
general. This is due in part to greater host sensitivity regarding reputational damage during a 
crisis. Furthermore, economic crises make the host state more vulnerable to measures such as the 
suspension of bilateral or multilateral foreign aid, which could result from a turn toward less 
market-friendly practices. In this case, political actors external to the state act as a constraint on 
domestic policy towards foreign investors. Therefore, while there is no clear consensus at this 
stage, I will test the hypothesis that, 
 H: States in the midst of a financial crisis will be more likely to engage in an 
investor-state dispute. 
 
However, capacity relates not only to temporary changes to a state’s circumstances, but 
to the ability of domestic institutions to maintain an investment-friendly environment. For 
example, Freeman (2013), finds that a state’s institutional capacity to protect investors’ rights is 
a strong determinant of investor-state disputes. Specifically, he finds that measures which 
indicate a control of corruption and a strong rule of law are negatively correlated with the 
likelihood of an investor-state dispute. Therefore, I will also test the hypothesis that  
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 H: state capacity to control corruption will be negatively correlated with the 
likelihood of a dispute. 
 
More generally, an institutional awareness of IIAs and state commitments to attract 
investors’ rights, may be linked to institutional capacity, and have an impact on the likelihood of 
an investor-state dispute. As was discussed above, the purpose of IIAs is often interpreted to be 
increasing the ability of states to make credible commitments to protect foreign investment 
(Bonnitcha, 2014). However, the effectiveness of these agreements (or, from a more critical 
point of view, the likelihood that they create regulatory chill) depends on policy-makers’ 
awareness of the provisions of the agreement and the ability to incorporate this into the policy-
making process. Aisbett and Poulsen’s (2013) recent survey of BIT negotiators and other 
relevant stakeholders casts some doubt on whether IIAs have an impact on domestic 
policymaking prior to the initiation of an arbitration case by an investor, as awareness of these 
agreements among relevant actors in host states was found to be very low. Instead, their research 
suggests that IIAs were negotiated without full knowledge of the implications of the treaty on the 
part of the negotiators (generally officials from foreign affairs and trade offices) let alone the 
civil servants in the array of ministries and agencies which are often involved in investor-state 
disputes. In a similar study, it was found that Canadian policymakers in a variety of fields do not 
routinely consider IIA obligations when formulating new policies (Côté, 2014). However, this 
may change over time; as states face more arbitration cases and become more familiar with the 
implications of the agreements, they should be able to make more calculated decisions in the face 
of competing domestic and investor demands. On the other hand, states that have faced few or no 
arbitral claims (and/or have very weak administrative capacity) may unknowingly take measures 
which have the potential to trigger investor-state disputes.
27
 Of course, this assertion requires the 
caveat that it will always be difficult for state actors to predict whether taking a policy measure 
will result in an investor-state dispute. It likely quite challenging for states to predict when an 
investor will choose to send a notice of intent to arbitrate and then follow through with the 
arbitration process, as a number of factors on the “investor side of the equation” may have an 
impact on their choice to do so. However, it is possible that past arbitration experience may 
enable a state to better predict what measures will be negatively viewed by investors: 
                                                 
27
 This pattern can be seen on a more macro level as some states that have faced a large number of arbitration claims 
withdraw from ICSID and terminate their BITs. On the other hand, institutional learning may be hampered with high 
bureaucratic turnover, a problem in many developing countries (Poulsen, 2015). 
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 H: state awareness of the regime may decrease the likelihood of an investor-
state dispute, as procedures are put into place to ensure that new policies 
comply with provisions in IIAs. 
 
Similarly, a strong bureaucracy and legal counsel should help governments take into 
account their commitments to international investors when developing new policies, and thus 
avoid conflicts with investors.
28
 Therefore,  
 H: government effectiveness will be correlated with a lower likelihood of 
investor-state disputes. 
4.6 Exposure to the IIA Regime and Investor-State Disputes 
Finally, investor-state arbitration cannot take place without the legal regime that makes it 
arbitration possible and investors willing to use it. While investor-state arbitration was 
uncommon before the mid-1990s, its use has grown quickly in the past twenty years, and 
investors’ awareness of the possibilities afforded to them by the IIA regime likely has an impact 
on the number of investor-state arbitration cases. Freeman assumes that “investors will want to 
resolve their disputes with host governments without having to resort to arbitration if possible” 
(Freeman, 2013, p. 58). It is not clear that this assumption is correct. As Simmons notes, “one 
consequence of ratifying bilateral investment treaties that contain dispute settlement provisions 
seems quite clear: they have led to a burst of (possibly unanticipated) litigation” (Simmons, 
2013, p. 28). Moreover, as was discussed in the introduction, the incentives for some actors 
within the arbitration system promotes its use; indeed, 
as a result of its growth, various factors have developed that encourage recourse to this form of 
dispute settlement process. In a sense, these factors are a result of the growth in international 
arbitration, but they may also be a cause for increased recourse [to it] (Salacuse, 2008, p.123).  
 
 Salacuse’s observation is supported by the publications of law firms which promote the new 
“innovative” uses of arbitration that allow investors to, in the words of one such publication, 
challenge “government policies or practices in fields that historically have not been the subject of 
BIT jurisprudence” including anti-tobacco legislation (Nelson et al., 2013). The likelihood of an 
investor-state dispute may simply increase over time, as investors become more aware of the 
possibilities presented by IIAs, and law firms specializing in investment arbitration become more 
numerous and interested in promoting its use. Therefore, as time goes on and the awareness of 
                                                 
28
 Some states are trying to combat policy-making patterns that lead to investor-state disputes by setting up 
institutions such as Peru’s Coordination and Response System for International Investment Disputes.  
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the IIA regime and the uses of arbitration increases, disputes may increase as investors turn more 
often to arbitration, suggesting a competing driver of disputes, perhaps lessening the effect of 
state awareness of the regime over time, that  
 H: investor awareness over time will increase the likelihood of a dispute. 
Finally, the state must be exposed to opportunities to be sued, and therefore it is likely that the 
number of IIAs signed and the amount of inward investment itself are determinants of investor-
state disputes, as both increase the exposure of states to the regime. Therefore,  
 H: factors that increase a state’s exposure to opportunities to be sued, including 
the amount of investment hosted by the state, and the number of treaties ratified, 
all increase the likelihood of a dispute. 
4.7 Conclusion: The Causes of Investor-State Disputes under the IIA Regime  
 
In this chapter I have concentrated on the different variables identified in the literature which 
contribute to an FDI-friendly environment, or conversely, to political risk. What is common to 
almost all investor-state disputes, from those precipitated by expropriations to those in which an 
investor challenges a legislative measure, is a change in attitude toward foreign investment 
generally, or more often, a specific project. Therefore, in this discussion I have endeavoured to 
focus on indicators that may be associated with, facilitate, or impede the expression of change in 
preferences towards FDI.  
 Most of the work cited here that employs statistical analysis to examine the impact of 
various factors on political risk uses expropriation events as the dependent variable. Given that 
IIAs were intended to protect investors from exactly this type of risk, I assume that to some 
extent the factors that contribute to a government’s propensity to expropriate will also increase 
the likelihood of an investor-state dispute. However, investor-state disputes that go to arbitration 
are triggered by a much more diverse range of measures than outright expropriation alone. 
Therefore, both the states involved, and the causes of the disputes, may also be somewhat 
different, as we have already seen in Chapter 2.  
 As the above discussion indicates, policy stability is inherently tied to domestic political 
institutions, with strong institutions encouraging leaders to respect intertemporal agreements. As 
democracies are associated with stronger checks and balances within the political system, as well 
as greater transparency, these countries should be better able to provide policy stability and 
predictability. The assumption is often made in the literature that policy makers in democratic 
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countries are more likely to respect agreements with foreign actors, and that they are held to 
these commitments by an audience of voters who both favour investment and compliance with 
international agreement (Jensen, 2003). However, the above discussion on domestic preferences 
and FDI (as well as the more theoretical discussion in the previous chapter) problematizes this 
assumption – there are a number of situations in which domestic preferences may not be in 
favour of protecting foreign investment.  Indeed, both democratic and autocratic leaders depend 
(though in different ways) on their domestic bases of support, and regime type does not ensure 
that these domestic actors will have preferences which favour foreign investors. Thus, changing 
economic and political circumstances may make a government unable or unwilling to respect 
investors’ rights. Moreover, while policy stability undoubtedly is preferred by foreign investors, 
policy changes are often enacted in the face of domestic pressure and therefore, to paraphrase: 
one man’s policy stability may be another man’s unresponsive government. 
 Indeed, the difference in dependent variables between this study, and those which focus 
solely on expropriation, requires a different normative evaluation, of policy change. 
Understandably, the bulk of the relevant literature conceives of expropriation as a fairly 
unequivocal bad – something to be avoided through strong institutions, credible commitments, 
and the rule of law. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, expropriations are merely a subset of 
investor-state disputes, which may be triggered by a much wider range of measures; therefore, 
the fact of an investment arbitration case has a much more ambiguous meaning. Indeed, not all 
policy changes which negatively impact an investment are necessarily rent-seeking or 
discriminatory measures, taken at the behest of narrow interests. As we can see in both the 
categories of policy measures in Chapter 2, as well as the case studies presented in Chapters 6-8, 
while policies may create losers in the form of foreign investors, they may at the same time be 
taken for a variety of reasons for which we may or may not find normative support. This raises 
the issue of the tension between democratic institutions and investor-state disputes which is 
highlighted both by the results of the statistical analysis and the case studies. While the literature 
on the determinants of expropriation and protection of investors’ rights generally concludes that 
democratic institutions decrease the likelihood of expropriation, the relationship between 
democratic institutions and investor-state arbitration is less obvious. Given that democratic 
institutions may also be more sensitive to anti-investment sentiment of domestic constituencies, 
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and the wide range of measures which can trigger an investor-state dispute, it appears that the 
relationship between the two is more ambiguous than has often been assumed.  
 On the other hand, there may be situations in which the state is unable to maintain an 
investment-friendly environment, or respect commitments previously made to investors. For 
example, as Argentina’s experience demonstrates, states may breach IIAs when in the midst of a 
severe financial crisis. Weak domestic institutions may also increase investor-state disputes if 
control of corruption is low, or perhaps more commonly, there is simply a lack of awareness 
among different ministries or agencies of commitments made to foreign investors or the 
possibility of arbitration itself. This points to a different underlying cause of investor-state 
arbitration – namely, lack of state capacity.  
 Finally, as discussed above, awareness of, and vested interest in, the investment 
protection regime itself may be the driver of some disputes. As investors become more aware of 
the existence of IIAs, and investment lawyers become more interested in promoting the use of 
arbitration, investors may more commonly resort to arbitration rather than other means of solving 
a dispute with a host state. Of course, this depends on the state’s exposure to the regime, via 
amount of investment hosted, and IIAs ratified. Therefore, a combination of investor awareness 
of, and state exposure to, the investment protection regime will likely increase the number of 
arbitration cases.  
 In the following chapter, these hypotheses will be put to the test with a statistical study 
using a dataset of investor-state disputes from 1990-2013.  
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Chapter 5  The Determinants of Investor-State Arbitration 
 
The previous chapter has formulated a number of hypotheses regarding variables which 
contribute to the likelihood of investor-state arbitration cases. This chapter provides an empirical 
test of those hypotheses. These are grouped into three categories which correspond to the broader 
underlying causes identified in the introduction: those related to state exposure to the investment 
protection regime; those related to state capacity; and those related to domestic institutions and 
changing preferences toward FDI, as well, as a full model which includes all the variables. 
Additionally, building on the discussion in Chapter 2, I present a regression with regional 
dummies in order to provide a more in-depth look at the distribution of arbitration cases 
geographically. 
5.1 The Dataset  
 
The analysis carried out in this chapter is based on an original dataset of investor-state disputes 
from 1990-2013. Information on the disputes was gathered from a number of sources which 
compile information and documents relating to investor-disputes, including the UNCTAD IIA 
database; the ICSID lists of pending and concluded cases; Andrew Newcombe’s ITALaw 
website; and the Investment Arbitration Reporter service. Included in the dataset are 144 states –  
all countries that have signed and ratified at least one IIA, as these states have, at least in theory, 
the opportunity to act as a host state for investment covered by an agreement, and subsequently 
be taken by an investor to arbitration. A list of these countries can be found in Appendix I.
29
  
 
5.2 The Dependent Variable and Model Choice  
The incidence of an arbitration case or cases in a given country-year serves as the dependent 
variable, and the dataset includes 564 arbitration cases
30
 hosted by ICSID, UNCITRAL and other 
forums such as the International Chamber of Commerce and Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. 
The year in which the case takes place was determined as the year the case was registered at the 
respective arbitral forum. Figure 5.1 gives the distribution of the dependent variable.  
                                                 
29
 A few smaller states that have signed an IIA have been excluded due to lack of data for the variables of interest.  
30
 The statistical database does not include cases from 2014, given the delay in generating data for the relevant 
independent variables. Therefore, the number of cases here is different from Chapter 1, which includes 2014 cases.  
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Figure 5.1Distribution of Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable can be measured as a count variable that ranges from 0 to 18 cases in a 
given country-year. Alternatively, the dependent variable can be expressed by a binary variable, 
which is 1 when there is at least one case in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
Such a data structure points to a number of possible regression models to choose from. 
As is often the case with discrete response variables, the data is characterised by over-dispersion 
– in other words, the variance of the dependent variable greatly exceeds the mean – and there are 
relatively few positive outcomes on the dependent variable. Therefore, it could be advisable to 
use a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB). A ZINB model assumes that some variable 
is inflating the number of observed zeroes; in this case, some countries will always face a 
negligible risk of arbitration every year, while other countries are more likely to be involved in 
an investor-state dispute. The first process modeled by the ZINB is a logistic regression to 
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determine whether the state faces a risk of dispute at all, while the second stage models a count 
model (NBREG) accounts for the positive number of disputes.
31
  
The challenge with a ZINB model is to find a theoretically satisfying variable that 
accounts for these excess zeroes. In a similar study, Freeman (2013) uses a dummy variable 
indicating that a country has signed at least one investment treaty in his ZINB model. However, I 
do not believe this adequately captures the process at work generating these “excess zeroes.”32 
The number of treaties ratified may perhaps increase the chances a country has to be faced with 
arbitration, and therefore a variable indicating the number of treaties signed could be used in the 
inflation equation. However, among the countries that have signed the most investment treaties 
are traditional home countries such as Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Therefore, 
this seems to misrepresent the relationship between number of treaties signed and likelihood of 
being involved in investor-state arbitration as a host country. One solution could be to create a 
variable which indicates whether a state is traditionally a “home” or “host” for foreign 
investment, for example, the amount of inward FDI that is covered by an investment treaty. 
However, there is not sufficient data for the country-years covered by this dataset to allow for 
this. Moreover, using a ZINB model is restrictive, in that it does not allow for lags or leads on 
the independent variables, nor does it support a panel structure.  
 Therefore, I opt here to use population averaged panel logistic regression, changing the 
dependent variable to a dummy, indicating whether or not the state has faced one arbitration case 
in a given year. This decision is based on my assumptions about what I am trying to capture with 
this model: the underlying factors which contribute to shifting state preferences toward (an) 
investment. Based on my analysis of the cases, out of the 564 investor-state disputes included in 
this dataset, 160 (or 28 per cent) are due to the same state measure (and take place in the same 
year as at least one other case). Other disputes may be explained by more general processes, such 
as the numerous expropriations and nationalizations taking place in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela, even if they are individually triggered by different state measures. Therefore, the 
binary dependent variable (rather than a count) may better reflect the state behaviour, which is 
ultimately what this project is trying to explain, while the count model might better capture the 
                                                 
31
 For a similar use of the ZINB model, see Copelovitch and Pevehouse (2012). 
32
 Moreover, it does not make sense to include countries that have not signed an IIA in a database of investor-state 
disputes, as these countries necessarily will not be involved in an investor-state dispute. However, there are many 
countries that have signed significant numbers of treaties and not been a respondent in arbitration. Therefore, 
choosing this variable tells us little about the process generating excess zeroes.  
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factors which lead investors to turn to arbitration. However, as a robustness check, I include 
output from the NBREG models in the appendix.  
5.3 Explanatory Variables  
 
The independent variables are presented in the following table.  
Table 5.1Independent Variables 
Category Hypotheses Indicator Hypothesiz
ed Effect 
Source 
Exposure 
 
H1: factors that increase a 
state’s exposure to 
opportunities to be sued, 
including the amount of 
investment hosted by the 
state, and the number of 
treaties ratified, all increase 
the likelihood of a dispute. 
 
FDI Stock  Positive World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
Number of Treaties 
Ratified 
Positive Own collection 
H2: investor awareness over 
time will increase the 
likelihood of a dispute. 
 
Time Positive -  
Capacity H3: States in the midst of a 
financial crisis will be more 
likely to engage in an 
investor-state dispute. 
GDP Growth Ambiguous World Bank 
Development 
Indicators  
Economic Crisis Ambiguous (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010)  
H4: government effectiveness 
will be correlated with a 
lower likelihood of investor-
state disputes. 
 
Control of 
Corruption/Govern
ment 
Effectiveness
33
 
Negative World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
Political Stability Negative World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators 
GDP per Capita Negative World Bank 
Development 
Indicators 
H5: state awareness of the 
regime may decrease the 
likelihood of an investor-
state dispute, as procedures 
are put into place to ensure 
that new policies comply 
with provisions in IIAs. 
Cumulative Cases 
faced by state 
Negative Own data collection 
                                                 
33
 Although these variables are measuring different things, they are so highly correlated I have just used the control 
of corruption variable here.  
99 
 
Institutions 
and 
Preferences  
H6: a state’s democracy level 
will be negatively correlated 
with the likelihood of an 
investor-state dispute 
Level of 
Democracy 
Negative Polity Score 
H7: The presence of greater 
numbers of veto players will 
be correlated with a 
decreased likelihood of 
investment arbitration. 
Veto Players  Negative Political Constraints 
Index (Henisz, 2005) 
H8: States with presidential 
systems will be more likely 
to be involved in investor-
state disputes 
Presidential System Positive Database of Political 
Institutions (Beck, et 
al, 2000)  
H9: States with leftist 
governments will be more 
likely to be involved in 
investor-state disputes 
Leftist Incumbent Positive  Database of Political 
Institutions (Keefer 
and Walsh, 2001) 
H10: Transition countries are 
more likely to be involved in 
investor-state disputes. 
Transition Country Positive Formerly State-
Planned Economies 
H11: leader transitions will be 
positively correlated with the 
likelihood of an investor-
state dispute. 
Leader Transition 
(lead and lag) 
Positive Change of Source of 
Leader Support 
(Leeds et al, 2012) 
Change in Source 
of Leader Support 
(lead and lag) 
Positive Change of Source of 
Leader Support 
(Leeds et al, 2012) 
H12: the percentage of GDP 
which is comprised of fuel 
exports will be positively 
correlated with the likelihood 
of a dispute. 
Extractives 
(combined oil, gas 
and minerals rents)  
Positive World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators  
 
As was mentioned above, these variables are grouped into three categories, which relate broadly 
to different explanations of the causes of investor-state disputes. Additionally I include regional 
dummies.  
The regional dummies were originally to be included as control variables. However their 
inclusion does not have a significant effect on the explanatory variables of interest. However, 
some regions have a consistently significant, positive or negative correlation with the dependent 
variable, and are substantively interesting. The dummies represent regions based primarily on the 
World Bank’s definitions, with some small differences. I group Canada, Mexico and the United 
States together in NAFTA, instead of putting Mexico in the Latin America and Caribbean 
category. Following the IMF, I include Georgia in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) category. The full list of countries in their regional grouping can be found in the Appendix.  
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 The variables in the first substantive category relate to the state’s exposure to the 
investment regime, and thus opportunities to be taken to arbitration, and test hypotheses 1 and 2. 
The first is amount of FDI stock hosted by the state ($US). The second is the number of IIAs 
(BITs and FTAs with investment chapters, as well as the ECT) that the state has ratified. Finally, 
I include time as a variable related to exposure, to account for the growing awareness of IIAs on 
the part of investors.  
 The variables in the capacity category relate to the institutional capacity of the state, as 
well as temporal issues which may affect the state’s ability to respect IIAs, and test hypotheses 
3-5. GDP per capita is generally considered to be positively related to good governance or 
bureaucratic effectiveness (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2003) and is positively correlated with the 
government effectiveness indicator. I also include a squared term to account for a possible 
curvilinear relationship between income and investor-state disputes. The control of corruption 
and political stability variables taken from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators, capture, the 
perception of the extent to which the state is captured by elite or private interests, and the 
likelihood that the state will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional means (Kaufmann 
and Kraay 2003).The economic crisis variable is dummy, taken from Reinhart and Rogoff's 
(2010) dataset of banking and domestic and external debt crises. Finally, the cumulative cases 
variable is a running total of the number of cases faced by each state. In theory, this could 
suggest a level of awareness in the government of the possibility of investment arbitration; the 
more cases a country has faced, the greater understanding of IIAs it will have. If a state is 
interested in avoiding disputes with investors, therefore, it could use this information to avoid 
further disputes.
34
 
 The final category relates to domestic institutions and preferences, which may have an 
impact on government treatment of foreign investment, and test hypotheses 6-13. These variables 
are drawn from the discussion on political risk and domestic institutions/preferences presented in 
the previous chapter. The Polity score measures a state’s level of democracy, based on the 
presence of “institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences 
about alternative policies and leaders”; institutionalized constraints on the executive; and 
guaranteed civil liberties (Marshall & Gurr, 2013, p. 14). The president variable is simply a 
dummy indicating whether or not a country has a presidential system of government. The veto 
                                                 
34
 Of course, this analysis is, as mentioned in Chapter 2, limited to only known cases.  
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players indicator is represented by the political constraints index (POLCONV) created by Henisz 
(2013). This indicator measures “the number of independent veto points over policy outcomes 
and the distribution of preferences of the actors that inhabit them” (Henisz, 2013). These veto 
points include the upper and lower houses of the legislature, sub-federal units and the judiciary. 
The transition country indicator is also a dummy, indicating whether a country was a formerly 
planned economy. These include the ex-Soviet republics, Eastern Europe, and Cambodia, Laos, 
China and Vietnam. The leader transition variable is taken from the Change in Source of 
Leadership Support (CHISOLS) project and indicates a year in which a new leader comes to 
power that has either the same or different societal support base as the previous leader (Mattes et 
al., 2014).
35
 The leader transition dummy is included with both a lead and a lag, as a dispute 
could conceivably be more likely either before or after a leader transition. In the first case, a 
leader may take certain measures to win the support of voters in the run up to an election, while 
in the latter a leader may be fulfilling promises made to the electorate vis-à-vis a specific 
investment project or FDI more generally.  The leftist incumbent is a dummy variable which is 
positive when the ruling party is identified with a left wing political ideology, and is taken from 
the World Bank Political Institutions database.  
  Finally, I include a lagged dependent variable in all the models. This is because, as 
Simmons (2013) notes, investor-state disputes often come in groups, “whether this represents a 
piling on of investors, or the widespread consequences of particular government policies” (p. 
30). Either way, it seems likely that the incidence of a case in a previous year will be strongly 
correlated with the incidence of a case in the current year. 
 For ease of interpretation, I display the odds ratios rather than the coefficients in the 
regression tables below. The odds ratio of a logistic regression presents the odds of a “success” 
(i.e. a 1 on the dependent variable) with a one unit change in the independent variable. The 
results of odds ratios are always positive; therefore, a coefficient of 1.8 odds ratio means a 
positive result is 80 percent more likely while a 0.80 coefficient means a positive result is 20 
percent less likely.   
                                                 
35
 The leader transition variable includes the SOLS variable which indicates transition only with an underlying 
change in societal support. In both the NBREG and Logit models, with both a lead and a lag, the SOLS variable on 
its own was not significant, so I have only included the leader transition variable here.  
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5.4 Results  
 
In this section I present the results from the models based on the groupings of variables discussed 
above. In each section I am not testing these groups of variables against each other in the same 
model, as the explanations for the causes of investor-state disputes are not mutually exclusive. 
Instead I am interested in the effect of specific variables within their own category of 
explanation. I present a full model in the appendix as well as the models without the lagged 
dependent variable. 
5.4.1 Regions and Special Cases  
Table 5.2 presents the results of the logistic regressions using the regional dummies. 
Subsequently, the number of ratified IIAs and amount of FDI stock hosted are added as 
explanatory variables.  
Table 5.2Regional Dummies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES case case case 
    
Treaties  1.046*** 1.040*** 
  (0.00505) (0.00649) 
FDI Stock   1.079 
   (0.0604) 
CIS 3.347** 2.382** 2.237* 
 (1.984) (0.841) (1.023) 
Latin America 2.672 2.859*** 2.987*** 
 (1.608) (0.999) (1.075) 
W. Europe 0.419 0.0361*** 0.0313*** 
 (0.281) (0.0249) (0.0246) 
NAFTA 12.79*** 10.52*** 7.231*** 
 (7.009) (3.540) (3.071) 
E. & S.E. Asia  1.066 0.349 0.275* 
 (0.639) (0.234) (0.196) 
MENA 1.529 1.076 0.966 
 (0.964) (0.367) (0.372) 
Sub. Africa 0.558 0.975 0.936 
 (0.332) (0.340) (0.357) 
S. Asia  1.788 1.442 1.372 
 (1.147) (0.563) (0.577) 
E. Europe 3.621** 1.297 1.345 
 (2.038) (0.397) (0.469) 
Constant 0.0787*** 0.0378*** 0.0236*** 
 (0.0426) (0.00973) (0.0126) 
    
Observations 3,083 2,935 2,620 
# of iso3n 144 143 136 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Given what we already know about the distribution of arbitration cases from Chapter 2, 
the results in Table 5.2 are unsurprising. Although the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia dummies do not have a statistically significant effect on the 
outcome variable, the direction of the odds ratio is as expected. However, with the inclusion of 
the number of ratified IIAs and FDI stock hosted, we get a better sense of the degree to which the 
distribution of cases is driven solely by how much investment different regions attract or how 
many IIAs they have in force, which therefore sheds light on the “exposure” hypotheses. For 
example, when the amount of FDI hosted and the number of ratified treaties are not included, the 
odds of a Western European state being the respondent in an arbitration case are 60% lower than 
that of a non-Western European state. However, once the positive correlation between the 
dependent variable and an increase in IIAs ratified and FDI stock hosted is controlled for, the 
odds that Western European states will be involved in arbitration are 97% lower than a non-
Western European country. Similarly, the East and South-East Asian dummy is positively 
(although insignificantly) correlated with positive outcome on the dependent variable when FDI 
stock and IIAs are not included in the model; this changes to a negative correlation (which is 
weakly statistically significant) when these variables are included. The relationship is the same, 
although in the opposite direction, with the Eastern Europe dummy, suggesting in this case that 
the greater odds of an Eastern European country becoming involved in an arbitration case is due 
to some extent to the greater number of treaties signed. On the other hand, Latin American 
countries have much greater odds of being involved in arbitration, and this goes up to almost 
three times higher than non-Latin American states when stock and treaties are controlled for, 
suggesting that in these cases “exposure” to the regime is not what is driving disputes.  
Clearly, however, it is the signatories of NAFTA which have the highest odds of 
becoming involved in an investor-state dispute that goes to arbitration, even when the large 
amounts of intra-NAFTA FDI are accounted for. Although difficult to say definitively, I assume 
that the high numbers of NAFTA cases are due in large part to the levels of awareness, or the 
normalization of the use of the dispute settlement mechanism, among North American investors. 
Therefore, this lends support to the hypotheses that both increased investor awareness and 
investment treaties will be correlated with the greater likelihood of a dispute.  Lending some 
credibility to this assertion is the fact that, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, the marginal effect of 
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NAFTA on the likelihood of a case increases significantly over time, and the practice of 
investor-state dispute settlement becomes more widespread. Both the marginal effect of NAFTA 
and the magnitude of the odds ratio is significantly larger than that of the variable indicating the 
total number of ratified investment treaties, as can be seen in the following section. 
 
Figure 5.2Marginal Effect of NAFTA 
 
The results presented here raise the issue of special cases in the universe of investment 
arbitration, discussed briefly in Chapter 2. The most obvious is the case of Argentina, with its 
explosion of arbitration cases following the financial crisis. Venezuela is also an outlier, with its 
numerous expropriations under the Chávez regime. However, the exclusion of Venezuela and 
Argentina from the regression does not significantly alter the effect of the Latin America dummy 
on odds of a country being involved in a dispute. Therefore, it is not only these outlier countries 
that are behind the higher odds of Latin American countries being involved in arbitration.  
5.4.2 Exposure 
 
Table 5.3 presents the results of the models using the variables I have identified as indicative of a 
state’s exposure to the IIA regime. The first, as stated in H1 is simply time, as a proxy for 
increased awareness of investment arbitration on the part of investors and investment lawyers. 
As investor awareness of IIAs grows; as arbitration becomes normalized; and as investment 
lawyers promote the use of the mechanism, the odds of a state being involved in arbitration 
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should increase. The other two variables, included in H2 relate more directly to the opportunities 
a state has to be sued – the more treaties the state ratifies and the more investment it hosts, the 
greater the odds that there will be an opportunity for an investor bring the state to arbitration.  
As can be seen in Table 5.3, the variables of interest have a significant effect in the 
hypothesized direction. As predicted by H1, with each additional IIA ratified, there is a 2.5% 
increase in the odds a state will be sued in the first model, and 1.2% in the fourth model when the 
amount of FDI stock hosted by the country and the year are added. When only logged FDI stock 
is included, an increase in one unit of FDI increases the odds of arbitration by 19%, while this 
effect becomes insignificant when the number of treaties is also included in the model. 
 
Table 5.3Exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES case case case case 
     
Lagged DV 3.008*** 3.236*** 2.612*** 2.492*** 
 (0.588) (0.633) (0.477) (0.493) 
Treaties 1.025***   1.012** 
 (0.00406)   (0.00541) 
FDI Stock  1.189***  1.026 
  (0.0485)  (0.0486) 
Time   1.335*** 1.269*** 
   (0.0744) (0.0731) 
Time
2 
  0.994*** 0.995*** 
   (0.00181) (0.00189) 
Constant 0.0617*** 0.0234*** 0.00728*** 0.00765*** 
 (0.00771) (0.00867) (0.00299) (0.00388) 
     
Observations 2,935 2,620 2,937 2,620 
# of iso3n 143 136 144 136 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As predicted by H2, the passage of time has positive relationship with the number of expected 
cases.  With each additional year, the odds of an arbitration case increase between approximately 
34 and 27% depending on the model. However, the quadratic term is included and this has a 
negative relationship with the DV, suggesting that any increase related to time may level off after 
a certain period. 
Finally, the incidence of a case in the previous year is positively and significantly 
correlated with the dependent variable – a case in the previous year makes a case in the current 
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year three times more likely – suggesting that investors tend to “pile on” after a state takes an 
offending measure.  
 Given that most IIAs cover investment flowing from developed to developing countries, 
it may be that the impact of an additional ratified IIA is different in developing and developed 
states. Figure 5.3 shows the marginal effects of the treaties variable at different levels of GDP 
per capita. As expected, the marginal effect of one additional treaty decreases as GDP per capita 
increases (before becoming statistically insignificant at approximately $45,000 per capita – a 
very high income country), suggesting that signing treaties increases the risk of arbitration more 
for lower and middle income countries than high income countries.  
 
Figure 5.3Marginal Effect of Treaties 
 
5.4.3 Capacity  
 
This section presents the regression results testing hypotheses 3-6. Two types of variables relate 
to the capacity of states to respect investors’ rights – those relating to awareness of the regime 
and bureaucratic capacity, and those relating to economic conditions. Therefore, this model 
includes variables related to institutional capacity as well as just temporal crises. More generally, 
I expect higher levels of GDP to have a negative correlation with the dependent variable – richer 
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countries should have higher levels of bureaucratic capacity, and thus be better able to avoid 
situations in which new policies inadvertently conflict with investors’ rights.36 The state’s past 
experience with arbitration should also have an impact on its ability to assess the risks in new 
policies, and therefore decrease the likelihood of arbitration. The results are displayed in the 
table below. Finally, I include the NAFTA variable in these models as a control given the much 
higher number of cases in the US and Canada than other high income countries. . 
Table 5.4 Capacity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES case case case case case case case 
        
Lagged DV 2.338*** 2.861*** 2.786*** 2.860*** 2.775*** 2.837*** 2.261*** 
 (0.485) (0.620) (0.574) (0.580) (0.548) (0.562) (0.469) 
FDI Stock 0.975 1.086 1.035 1.002 1.020 1.007 1.078 
 (0.0314) (0.0596) (0.0544) (0.0441) (0.0439) (0.0424) (0.0582) 
Treaties 1.018*** 1.027*** 1.022*** 1.023*** 1.027*** 1.025*** 1.019*** 
 (0.00436) (0.00646) (0.00511) (0.00503) (0.00514) (0.00508) (0.00585) 
NAFTA 4.287*** 13.79*** 7.172*** 7.958*** 11.29*** 8.621*** 7.745*** 
 (1.077) (5.347) (1.892) (1.882) (2.888) (2.050) (3.447) 
Cumulative Case 1.223***      1.198*** 
 (0.0513)      (0.0516) 
Cumulative Case
2 
0.996***      0.996*** 
 (0.000915)      (0.000888) 
GDP per Capita  1.000*     1.000* 
  (2.62e-05)     (2.48e-05) 
GDP per Capita
2 
 1.000     1.000 
  (5.16e-10)     (4.62e-10) 
Crisis   0.767    0.949 
   (0.128)    (0.176) 
GDP Growth    1.005   1.007 
    (0.0126)   (0.0108) 
Corruption     0.796***  0.868* 
     (0.0446)  (0.0679) 
Political Stability      0.883** 1.099 
      (0.0481) (0.0852) 
Constant 0.0685*** 0.0376*** 0.0498*** 0.0582*** 0.0442*** 0.0521*** 0.0371*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0157) (0.0204) (0.0197) (0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0146) 
        
Observations 2,620 2,577 2,612 2,567 2,620 2,620 2,534 
Number of iso3n 136 133 133 135 136 136 131 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 However, this relationship should also capture the effect of higher income countries being typical “home” rathr 
than “host” states for FDI. 
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The cumulative case variable follows the expected pattern of a non-linear relationship suggesting 
that states with more experience with ISDS are expected to experience fewer new cases. 
Although the effect of the cumulative case variable is almost identical to the effect of time in the 
previous regression table, the correlation between the two is relatively low (0.351). However, 
both speak to awareness of or experience with the regime, which can from the investor’s side 
suggest greater use of the tool of ISDS, and from the state’s side suggest a learning process 
which could in theory help them avoid further disputes – hence the curvilinear relationship. The 
variables related to a temporal crisis (H3) do not have a consistently significant relationship with 
the dependent variable. Both GDP growth and crisis are statistically insignificant. The results 
related to bureaucratic capacity are also somewhat ambiguous. Neither GDP per capita, nor its 
squared term, has an effect on the odds of a case in either direction. However, as predicted, the 
control of corruption and political stability are negatively correlated with the dependent variable 
in the first model in which they are included, although the latter is not statistically significant in 
the full model.  
 Here again, it seems plausible that the effect of these independent variables would change 
at different levels of income. Therefore, Figure 5.4 shows the marginal effect of the crisis 
dummy variable at different levels of GDP per capita. While the effect of crisis on the likelihood 
of an arbitration case is always negative, we can see that it decreases as GDP per capita 
increases, until becoming statistically insignificant at the highest levels. This suggests that 
countries with stronger institutions are in particular less likely to pass measures which harm 
investors in the midst of a financial crisis. 
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Figure 5.4Marginal Effect of Crisis 
 
5.4.4 Domestic Preferences and Institutions  
  
As was discussed in Chapter 4, domestic preferences, and the institutions which mediate them 
can have an impact on investor-state relations, and thus increase or decrease the likelihood of an 
investor-state dispute. Most obviously, changes in domestic preferences can be expressed 
through elections and/or regime, and therefore I initially include the leader transition variable 
(described above). Preferences towards FDI may also be expressed by the ideological leanings of 
the government, and I include a dummy variable indicating if a left-wing government is in 
power. The historical context in which the investment takes place may also have an impact, and I 
include another dummy variable indicating whether a country is a former planned (transition) 
economy. Finally, investment in certain sectors may be more likely to create conflict with 
domestic actors than others – particularly that in the extractive industry, and I include a variable 
measuring the percentage of a state’s GDP of oil, gas and mineral rents. However, while 
preferences toward FDI may shift, domestic institutions should mediate their effect on policy 
outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are competing hypotheses regarding the effect of 
democracy on a state’s respect of investors’ rights, although more recent work concludes that 
democracies are better able to protect investment. To test this relationship I include the Polity 
score. The number of veto players should also have an impact on the likelihood of a dispute, 
given that greater numbers of veto players make it harder to unilaterally enact changes in policy. 
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States in which some actors are given greater leeway for unilateral decision-making may be more 
frequently involved in investor-state disputes, and, as I explain in the previous chapter, I include 
a presidential dummy variable.  
Tables 5.5 presents the results of the regressions employing the variables related to 
domestic institutions and preferences. These models include more controls than those previous, 
given the strong correlations between the various explanatory variables, which may bias the 
results. For example, countries enjoying higher levels of democracy are generally wealthier and 
tend to attract more investment. Therefore, without the inclusion of FDI stock hosted by the 
state, the Polity score could pick up the effect of FDI stock on the number of expected cases.  
Table 5.5Preferences and Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES case case case case case case case case 
         
Lagged DV 2.927*** 2.903*** 2.832*** 2.784*** 2.902*** 3.023*** 3.312*** 2.677*** 
 (0.574) (0.560) (0.565) (0.566) (0.559) (0.793) (0.718) (0.738) 
Treaties 1.026*** 1.027*** 1.030*** 1.023*** 1.027*** 1.032*** 1.028*** 1.029*** 
 (0.00473) (0.00483) (0.00455) (0.00491) (0.00473) (0.00578) (0.00574) (0.00600) 
FDI Stock 0.960 0.962 0.962 0.993 0.962 0.945 0.960 1.033 
 (0.0409) (0.0422) (0.0415) (0.0435) (0.0409) (0.0495) (0.0450) (0.0589) 
Extractives 1.025*** 1.024*** 1.022*** 1.025*** 1.024*** 1.030*** 1.024*** 1.024*** 
 (0.00579) (0.00568) (0.00582) (0.00597) (0.00570) (0.00827) (0.00743) (0.00790) 
NAFTA 8.905*** 9.355*** 7.888*** 9.791*** 8.502*** 10.86*** 10.08*** 9.192*** 
 (1.921) (1.970) (2.637) (2.301) (1.874) (3.666) (2.792) (2.541) 
Polity 1.040** 1.063*** 1.058*** 1.036* 1.036* 1.049** 1.040* 1.081*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0223) (0.0209) (0.0198) (0.0201) (0.0226) (0.0211) (0.0315) 
Veto Players  0.514*      0.589 
  (0.187)      (0.288) 
President   2.258***     2.499*** 
   (0.513)     (0.805) 
Transition    2.247***    2.593*** 
    (0.484)    (0.622) 
Left      1.262   0.903 
     (0.198)   (0.177) 
Lead Leader 
Trans 
     1.679** 
(0.405) 
 1.789** 
(0.450) 
         
Lag Leader 
Trans 
      1.113 
(0.200) 
1.230 
(0.212) 
         
Constant 0.0538*** 0.0648*** 0.0290*** 0.0359*** 0.0496*** 0.0391*** 0.0450*** 0.00793*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0216) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0154) (0.00460) 
         
Observations 2,537 2,527 2,537 2,537 2,537 1,774 2,023 2,015 
Number of 
iso3n 
132 132 132 132 132 129 129 129 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Interestingly, even when FDI stock is controlled for, a country’s Polity score is positively 
correlated with the likelihood of a dispute in most of the models. This contradicts H6 above, as 
well as the expectations found in the literature on expropriation and political risk. This suggests 
that the relationship between democratic institutions and this broader category of investor-state 
disputes is somewhat different.  
 On the other hand, while the political constraints variable shows the direction predicted in 
H7, the effect is not statistically significant. This may speak to the tension between veto players 
and anti-investment measures underscored by Graham and Kingsley (2012). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, these authors find that more veto players were associated with fewer 
expropriations, but greater restrictions on the transfer of capital (a less highly visible and 
politically salient method of extracting greater benefit from foreign investment than 
expropriation). Given that the dependent variable used here covers such a broad range of 
measures, the ambiguous effect of the political constraints variable is unsurprising.   
 In all of the models in which it is included, as predicted by H8, a presidential system was 
strongly and positively associated with greater numbers of investor-state disputes – increasing 
the odds of a dispute by over 200%. This confirms the hypothesis stated in the previous chapter 
that presidents, given their direct election by voters, and ability to influence ministries and 
administrative agencies, may be more likely to take measures against investors when there is 
public pressure to do so. While presidents may have less control over legislatures than prime 
ministers (Tsebelis, 2000), as we saw in Chapter 2, the bulk of measures taken which have been 
challenged by investors are in fact administrative. Given, finally, the high number of cases in 
Latin American countries with a presidential system, the strong correlation between presidential 
systems and more investor-state disputes is not surprising.  
 A leftist incumbent does not consistently increase the odds of a dispute in either the logit 
or NBREG models, nor does it reach a level of significance. This inconsistent result is in line 
with other recent studies on expropriation and investor-state disputes which show a relatively 
ambiguous link between ideology and expropriation and investment arbitration (Freeman, 2013; 
Li, 2005).  
 As predicted by H10, the dummy variable indicating a transition economy is also 
positively and significantly correlated with an arbitration case in a given country-year, increasing 
the odds of arbitration between two and nearly four times. Although one explanation for this 
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could be the higher levels of corruption in these countries, the positive and significant effect 
remains the same when control of corruption is included in the model (See Appendix II).  
As can be seen in table 5.4, the leader transition variable with a one year lead increases 
the odds of a dispute by between 60 and 70 percent. This suggests that state actors may be taking 
measures in the lead up to an election based on popular pressure, in an attempt to generate 
support. On the other hand, the lagged leader transition variable does not show a significant 
effect here. Unfortunately this dataset contains observations only up to 2008; the addition of 
more data points here might clarify the results somewhat. Moreover, the relationship between 
these dummy variables and the dependent variable assumes that the measure taken which 
triggered the dispute was taken within the year prior to the date on which the arbitration 
proceedings were registered. However, this cannot be assumed, and therefore, these results must 
be read with this limitation in mind.  
 Finally, as predicted by H12, the extractives variable has a statistically significant, 
positive correlation with the dependent variable in most of the models above. 
 Many of the variables in this category are clearly interrelated – for example, democracies 
are associated with higher numbers of veto players. Moreover, the responsiveness of leaders to 
domestic interests is presumably greater in democratic states. Therefore, the relationship between 
leader transition and investor state disputes is likely to be affected by the state’s level of 
democracy. Figure 5.5 shows the conditional marginal effect of the leader transition with a one 
year lead, at different levels of democracy. While the change is not very sizeable, we can see that 
a leader transition has a greater effect on the likelihood of an investor-state dispute at higher 
levels of democracy. 
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Figure 5.5Marginal Effects of Leader Transition 
 
Similarly, although more significantly, the marginal effect of being a transition economy on the 
dependent variable is higher at higher levels of democracy, as shown in Figure 5.6. Although not 
shown here, the marginal effect of a country having a presidential system has a similar 
relationship with democracy, with an increased effect in more democratic countries. This 
suggests that there is a relationship between the responsiveness of state leaders and domestic 
preferences toward FDI, and the likelihood of an investor-state dispute.  
 
Figure 5.6 Conditional Marginal Effects of Transition Economy 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
This second empirical chapter provides an examination of the causes of investor-state 
disputes on a macro level, by testing the three broad explanations developed in the previous 
chapter; namely that exposure to the IIA regime, lack of domestic capacity, and changing 
domestic preferences toward FDI can increase the likelihood of investor-state disputes. 
Before addressing these hypotheses however, I look at the likelihood of investment 
arbitration across regions. Three regions stand out as those with the greatest likelihood of facing 
an investor-state arbitration case – CIS countries37, Latin America, and NAFTA. It seems 
unlikely that the same underlying causes are contributing to the high numbers of disputes in 
these three regions. Indeed, just by including controls for the number of treaties ratified and FDI 
stock hosted we can see that the individual effect of the regional dummies change, with the 
increase in the odds of a dispute from the Latin America dummy only becoming significant once 
FDI stock and the number of IIAs are controlled for. Given what we know about cases in Latin 
America – both the high numbers of arbitration cases in some countries such as Argentina and 
Venezuela, as well as the concentration of politically charged disputes related to the extractive 
industry – it is not surprising that the region itself is statistically much more likely to be involved 
in an arbitration case, even when levels of investment are controlled for. On the other hand, the 
relative impact of the CIS and NAFTA variables decreases slightly, though is still quite high 
with the inclusion of these extra variables. As discussed above, the drivers of investor-state 
disputes in these two regions are likely different, given their varying levels of corruption and 
government effectiveness. 
The regional dummies also clearly demonstrate the role of Western European states as 
traditional home countries, and the way in which NAFTA complicates the developed-developing 
country division when looking at the traditional rationale for investment protection. Finally, the 
high likelihood of investor-state arbitration in Latin American and CIS countries also reflects the 
concentration of disputes in middle income countries, which is likely due in large part to the 
development of the investment protection regime – with the exception of NAFTA, until now 
very few investment treaties have been signed between developed country partners.  
                                                 
37
 The transition economy variable could also be seen as a region, and of course includes both the CIS and Eastern 
European countries, and is similarly positively associated with the likelihood of an investor-state dispute.  
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As predicted, exposure to the investment regime – in the form of ratified IIAs, FDI stock 
hosted, and time – increases the likelihood of an investor-state dispute. Although the magnitude 
of the effect of an additional ratified treaty is not large, it increases the likelihood of a dispute 
both in the exposure models and when included as a control in the models with regional 
dummies. More than either of these variables however, the passage of time, which I take as a 
proxy for investor awareness of the IIA regime (or perhaps the normalization of its use) increases 
the likelihood of a dispute. Taken together, these results suggest that to some extent if investors 
are given access to an ISDS mechanism, they will use it. The statistically greater likelihood of a 
NAFTA country to be taken to arbitration reinforces this point. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is 
not only Mexico, but also Canada and the US which are frequent respondents in NAFTA cases, 
which is surprising, given the original raison d’être of these agreements – to protect investors in 
developing countries where the threat of expropriation was high.   
The results of models testing the effect of variables related to state capacity are more 
ambiguous. The dummy variable representing an economic crisis has a significant, but negative 
effect, at the 90% level in some of the models tested. This suggests that states are not more likely 
to take anti-investor measures during periods in which economic growth is weak, inflation is 
high, or they are in the midst of a debt or banking crisis and are instead perhaps restrained from 
taking these measures when they are more vulnerable. Control of corruption is, as expected, 
negatively correlated with the likelihood of a dispute in the capacity model, but does not remain 
significant in the full model. 
Finally, the results of the regressions of the variables related to domestic institutions and 
preferences suggest that domestic preferences have an effect on the likelihood of an investor-
state dispute. First, and most surprising, is the positive correlation of a state’s Polity score with 
the likelihood of a dispute, even when the amount of FDI stock is controlled for. This contradicts 
the conventional wisdom in much of the literature on political risk and expropriation which 
argues that democracies demonstrate greater respect for property rights and more restraint in 
their policies toward foreign investors. This is due, these studies argue, to greater transparency 
and higher numbers of veto players in democracies. However, as was discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4, there is some ambiguity regarding the effect of democracy on investors’ rights. First, 
earlier work on expropriation assumed that democratic leaders might give in to populist 
tendencies and expropriate from foreigners in order to win domestic support, and this dynamic 
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could explain some investor-state disputes which end in investment arbitration, including those 
stemming from expropriation. Similarly, although with perhaps a different normative valuation, 
Bonnitcha (2014) argues that political instability or upheavals may increase the likelihood of a 
dispute, precisely in cases in which governments become more democratic, and must respond to 
broader social demands, rather than smaller interest groups (including investors) to whom they 
had formerly supported via cronyism or patronage. However, it is important to underline the 
difference made by the dependent variable in this study, as we know that outright expropriation 
does not make up the majority of measures taken that trigger an investor-state dispute. Therefore, 
in some instances, governments may be responding to similar domestic pressures by taking less 
extreme measures than outright expropriation. This is supported by Kobrin (1979) who, as I 
discuss in Chapter 4, sees political risk not arising primarily from political instability and conflict 
but “from the regular functioning of the political process owing to losses or gains in the regime’s 
power or to changes in the character and power of the opposition or of interest groups” (p. 39). 
Of course, these explanations for the role of democracy in investor-state disputes are not 
mutually exclusive: disputes could conceivably arise from populist pandering; from regime 
change and democratization; and from everyday regulatory processes. What is notable, therefore, 
is that democratic institutions cannot be assumed to uphold the commitments enshrined in IIAs – 
this would require a domestic constituency which is pro-investment. Therefore, explaining the 
occurrence of investor-state disputes needs to account for institutional constraints faced by state 
actors in taking a measure, as well as the specific domestic “push” or incentivizing factors that 
motivate states to take measures against investors.  
This brings us back to the different explanations of compliance, found in the enforcement 
and managerial approaches, as well as discussions of bounded rationality. The clearest results 
involve variables that are associated with domestic pressure – the country’s Polity score, a 
presidential system, leader changes, and transition countries. Therefore, it seems that the logic of 
the enforcement approach to compliance better explains the dynamics of investor-state dispute. 
This, however, does not discount that policy-makers are unaware of the ramifications of investor 
protection treaties; they may be responding to public pressure without taking into account their 
obligations under the IIA. The positive relationship between the likelihood of a case and the 
number of previous cases, as well as the passage of time itself, suggest that experience with 
investor-state disputes does not do much to lessen the likelihood of a dispute in the future.  
117 
 
5.6 Limitations to the Analysis  
There are a number of limitations to the results presented here. For example, at times, investors 
initiate arbitration proceedings a good few years after the offending measure has been taken – 
most obviously, many of the arbitration proceedings following the Argentine financial crisis did 
not get under way until 2004 or 2005. More importantly, the regression results are only able to 
tell the “state-side of the story”; while it is possible to collect data on investors involved in 
disputes with states, it is logically impossible to do so for country-years in which no dispute took 
place. Finally, there is the issue of unknown cases – arbitration proceedings are only made public 
with the consent of both parties, and therefore the dataset may be missing cases, which was 
discussed in Chapter 2. This, along with the relatively low number of positive cases, puts 
limitations on the previous results.  
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Chapter 6 Bilcon Ltd. v. Canada 
 
This chapter presents the investor-state dispute between Canada and Bilcon of Delaware Ltd. a 
construction company from New Jersey. The company proposed a quarrying project in Nova 
Scotia in order to supply itself with the raw material it needed for roads and other construction 
projects in the United States. The project was to comprise a quarry and marine terminal from 
which the material would be shipped to the United States. The potential investment generated 
significant opposition from nearby communities and civil society groups, and underwent a very 
strict environmental assessment process by a panel of experts, who ultimately recommended that 
the government not approve the project. Following an official notice that the project would not 
be approved, the investor turned to arbitration under NAFTA’s Chapter 11. As will be discussed 
in greater detail below, this case is quite clearly an example of the contribution of changing 
domestic preferences toward an investment to investor-state disputes, rather than a dispute that 
arose out of a lack of state capacity to maintain an investment-friendly environment.  
 Beyond this, the case is significant in a number of ways. Firstly, it underscores the 
element of increased uncertainty that ISDS brings to domestic policymaking. Secondly, it 
suggests the extent to which ISDS may be driven by investors themselves. Finally it 
demonstrates the challenge that ISDS can pose to the raising of regulatory standards and the 
updating or evolution of domestic legal norms (Johnson & Sachs, 2015). 
6.1 IIAs and Investment in Canada and Nova Scotia  
 
Although Canada has traditionally been a net importer of capital, with an economy based largely 
on natural resources, its stance on foreign investment has fluctuated over the years (Luz & 
Miller, 2002); while during the 1970s, the Foreign Investment Review Agency maintained fairly 
stringent barriers to investment, Canada’s investment climate was liberalized during the 1980s 
with the Investment Canada Act (ICA) (Dawson, 2012). In the late 1980s, Canada also began to 
assert its interests as a capital exporter, signing a number of BITs, known in Canada as Foreign 
Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs) (Luz & Miller, 2002). Finally, Canada furthered its 
commitment to free trade and investment with the signing of the Canadian-US Free Trade 
Agreement in 1988, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Canada 
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is in fact quite dependent on FDI, particularly from the US – 30 percent of Canadian 
employment and 75 percent of its manufacturing exports comes from US FDI (Winham, 2007). 
 This chapter focuses on a case that was triggered by a series of measures taken by both 
the federal government and the provincial government of Nova Scotia – a province with less 
experience with foreign investment than other parts of the country. Foreign direct investment in 
the Atlantic Provinces of Canada is quite low, although Nova Scotia hosts the largest amount of 
FDI in the region; during the time period relevant to this study, the average annual inflow to the 
province was US$1.6 billion, although this is due almost entirely to its off-shore oil production 
(APEC, 2005). Beyond oil extraction, Nova Scotia has traditionally relied on fishing, agriculture, 
and mining. With the overall decline of the fishing industry in the region, Nova Scotia, along 
with other Atlantic provinces, suffers from higher rates of unemployment than other parts of the 
country. Therefore, in the early 2000s the provincial government, led by the Progressive 
Conservative party, promoted low business taxes and the attraction of FDI as a strategy to 
encourage economic growth and increase employment rates (NSED, 2000). The areas which the 
province identified as key economic sectors included fishing and fish products; extractive 
industries such as forestry, mining, oil and gas; agriculture; tourism and culture; communications 
and life sciences (APEC, 2002; NSED, 2000). In particular, Nova Scotia adopted welcoming 
stance toward investment in the mining sector, as laid out in the Department of Natural 
Resources’ 1996 report “Minerals – A Policy for Nova Scotia” which commits to ensuring a 
competitive business climate and promote the province’s mineral potential (DNR, 1996). As the 
claimants state in their Notice of Intent to Arbitrate, it was in the context of this push for foreign 
investment that they initiated their investment in the province (Notice of Intent, 2008). 
6.1.1 Canada and NAFTA  
 
Negotiations for NAFTA followed the entering into force of the Canadian-US Free Trade 
Agreement (CUFTA), and Mexico’s subsequent suggestion of a bilateral trade agreement with 
the United States (Abbott, 2000). Despite long-standing economic interdependence, Canada’s 
efforts to lower trade barriers with the United States first through CUFTA, and subsequently 
with NAFTA faced resistance both within the government and from the electorate due to a long-
standing fear of American encroachment on Canadian sovereignty in general, and specific 
concerns relating to the weakening of Canada’s much more expansive welfare state (Golob, 
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2003; Johnson & Mahon, 2005). According to Abbott (2000), Canada therefore joined the 
NAFTA negotiations “defensively,” as the country had very little previous economic interest in 
Mexico, but did not want to be left out of the United States’ efforts to liberalize Latin American 
markets. 
 NAFTA is a highly detailed trade agreement, comprised of twenty-two chapters including 
Chapter 11 on investment, and is unique in that, at the time of writing, it is the only ratified 
international agreement regulating substantial investment flows between developed countries. 
NAFTA’s ratification has been followed by increased FDI flows between the three signatories, 
which many observers attribute to the agreement in general, and Chapter 11 in particular 
(Abbott, 2000). As we know, however, given the regression results presented in Chapter 5, these 
increased FDI flows have led to an what was an at the time an unexpected number of investor-
state arbitration cases.  
 The rationale behind the inclusion of an investor-state arbitration clause in NAFTA was 
primarily to protect US investors in Mexico, particularly given the country’s history of 
expropriations in the petroleum industry (Heindl, 2006). However, as we saw in Chapter 2, the 
outcome of NAFTA Chapter 11, in terms of investor-state disputes, has been somewhat 
different; Canada has been a respondent in at least as many cases as Mexico, and the US is not 
far behind. Indeed, according to one federal official with whom I spoke “when [Canada] entered 
into NAFTA, we didn’t think we would get sued as much as we are” (Interview #1). Beyond the 
number of cases, Abbott (2000) argues that the dispute settlement mechanism has “ been invoked 
by private investors in circumstances that were not contemplated by NAFTA negotiators” (p. 
522). These likely include the challenges to long-standing Canadian institutions such as Canada 
Post, and the Canadian Health Act. 
 Canada was served with its first notice of intent to arbitrate in 1996 by a Mexican 
generics manufacturer, but arbitration never commenced (CCPA, 2010). The first case that 
progressed to arbitration, and has subsequently become fairly infamous, is that of Ethyl Corp. v. 
Canada, in which an American chemicals manufacturer that challenged Canada’s ban of MMT, a 
gasoline additive (Ethyl Corp v. Canada). Faced with an arbitration case that appeared to be 
going in favour of the investor, Canada repealed the ban, issued an apology to the company and 
settled out of arbitration for $13 million (CCPA, 2010). Thus, the Ethyl case was exemplary of 
the “capitulatory” manner in which Canada resolved its early arbitration cases (Van Harten, 
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2011). More recently, Canada has settled high profile cases with Abitibi Bowater for the 
expropriation of timber and water rights and with Dow Agrosciences over a dispute involving 
another chemical ban. Canada has also lost significant cases, including one with Mobil 
Investments over the imposition of Research and Development requirements, as well as the 
challenge by Bilcon Ltd. discussed in this chapter. On the other hand, Canada has won a number 
of important cases including challenges to its national postal service, lumber export policies and 
the Canada Health Act.  
 The sectors in which Canada has faced disputes are displayed in Figure 6.1.  
Figure 6.1Canada's Disputes by Industry 
 
Many of the sectors in which Canada has experienced disputes mirror those that appear in the top 
ten sectors for arbitration cases overall. On the other hand, as can be seen in the figure below, 
almost half of all cases in which Canada has been the respondent have been triggered by 
investors challenging a regulatory measure.  
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Figure 6.2Canada's Disputes by Measure 
 
Canada’s experience with ISDS under NAFTA has generated significant criticism from civil 
society, particularly surrounding high profile cases related to the environment, such as the 
dispute with Lone Pine Resources, a gas exploration company challenging Quebec’s provincial 
ban on fracking
38
 and the case discussed in this chapter. Some academic observers have further 
expressed concern regarding the impact of NAFTA on Canada’s federal project. According to 
Luz and Miller (2002), NAFTA impedes the ability of provinces to regulate FDI “an area where 
provinces have traditionally exercised significant control. [The result] will likely be a 
concomitant expansion in federal power at the expense of the provinces” (p. 976) Other 
observers take the position that “Chapter 11 has not caused an ‘erosion of federalism’, rather it 
has created circumstances in which governments may have to pay for federalism and for the 
maintenance of democratically instituted policies” (McKinley, 2009, p. 100). As will be 
discussed below, this aptly describes the arbitration case between Bilcon and Canada, in which 
the federal government was found to be in violation of NAFTA as a result of actions taken 
primarily by the provincial government of Nova Scotia.  
6.2 Timeline of the Dispute between Bilcon Ltd. and Canada 
 
In this section I give an overview of the dispute between Bilcon Ltd. and Canada, including the 
antecedents to the arbitration and the arbitration process.  
  The claimants, the Clayton family, own a cement company based in New Jersey, and 
proposed to construct a 152 hectare quarry and marine terminal on Whites Point in Digby Neck, 
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Nova Scotia, on the shore of the Bay of Fundy. The company was eager to find sources of 
aggregate outside the state of New Jersey, where due to higher regulatory standards, opening 
new quarries was no longer feasible (Richler, 2007). While aggregate is ideally consumed close 
to the source as transport costs are high, shipping the extracted aggregate from Nova Scotia to 
the US eastern seaboard was considered an acceptable alternative (Richler, 2007). Initially, the 
investors claim they met with significant support from the provincial government, especially 
from Conservative provincial Minister of Fisheries and Agriculture, Gordon Balser, who was 
also the representative of the riding (electoral district) in which the quarry was to operate (Bilcon 
of Delaware v. Canada, 2015).  
In 2002, the company first filed an application with the Nova Scotia Department of 
Environment and Labour (NSEL) to operate a smaller 3.9 hectare quarry on the site ultimately 
designated for the larger project
39
; this smaller quarry was to be operated in order to gather data 
for the assessment of the extractive process on the environment, as well as to stockpile aggregate 
for future operations (Statement of Defence, 2009). The NSEL determined that as the initial 
blasting of the rock was itself likely to have detrimental environmental effects, the proponent 
required authorization from the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) to proceed. 
In turn, the DFO concluded that an environmental assessment for the larger site, of which this 
smaller quarry was ultimately a part, was required in order for any blasting activity to take place 
(Statement of Defence, 2009).  
The involvement of the federal DFO put the project under both provincial and federal 
jurisdiction, and thus the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) directed the 
environmental application process. In 2003, the DFO advised the claimants to engage the 
services of an environmental consultant who was familiar with the CEAA process, although the 
government alleges that they failed to do so for several years (Document #1). At this time, as 
will be discussed at greater length in subsequent sections, public concern over the project was 
growing, indicated by the dozens of letters from concerned citizens and environmental groups 
archived on the CEAA website. Various government agencies also expressed environmental 
concerns regarding the disruption to marine life habitat, although according to correspondence 
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 The size of the quarry, at 3.9 hectares, was not accidental, as legally a quarry larger than 4 hectares would require 
approval from the Minister of Environment.   
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archived on the CEAA, other officials doubted the project posed a significant threat (Bilcon v. 
Canada, 2015). 
In 2004, the federal Minister of Environment and his provincial counterpart agreed that 
the company’s proposed project would be assessed by a joint review panel (JRP), which is 
undertaken when the minister is of the opinion that a project may generate “significant adverse 
effects” about which there is public concern (CEAA, n.d.). The JRP was comprised of three 
university professors: biologist Robert Fournier, planner Jill Grant, and geologist Gunter 
Muecke. The panel was to review Bilcon’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and solicit 
feedback from the public on what should be included in the statement. The panel was then to 
make further recommendations on the EIS, allow the company to address their concerns, and 
make a final recommendation to the federal and provincial government based on their own 
expertise and public comments, regarding whether the project should be given government 
approval to move forward.  
 The panel accepted over 600 submissions from the public on what should be included in 
the EIS, and held public hearings in June of 2007. During the hearings they received testimony 
from 78 citizens and a further 126 written submissions from local individuals and organisations. 
Based on this input, as well as consultations with federal ministries, such as Environment Canada 
and Health Canada, the JRP issued its recommendation in November of 2007 that the project 
posed a threat to the “core values of the community” as well as “existing and future 
environmental, social and cultural conditions” (Fournier, et al, 2007). Shortly thereafter, the 
federal and provincial governments officially rejected the company’s proposal. In 2008, the 
company announced its intent to arbitrate, and arbitration commenced in 2009.  
6.2.1 The Arbitration: Bilcon of Delaware Ltd. v. Canada 
 
The arbitral tribunal was constituted in April 2009, under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and 
hosted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and took place in Toronto, Canada. The 
tribunal released its final Award in March of 2015. A summary of the investor’s arguments and 
the tribunal’s rulings is laid out in the table below. 
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Table 6.1Arguments and Rulings in Bilcon Case 
Alleged Breach of 
NAFTA  
Claimant’s Arguments Tribunal’s Ruling 
1102 National 
Treatment 
Respondent (in particular various 
ministries and the JRP) extended 
more favourable treatment to 
Canadian investors in like 
circumstances.  
 
Tribunal finds a breach of 
1102 
1103 Most Favoured 
Nation 
Respondent extended more 
favourable treatment to non-
Canadian investors with regard to 
the type and duration of 
environmental assessment. 
 
Tribunal declines to find a 
breach of 1103 (investors 
claims are time barred) 
1105 Minimum 
Standard of Treatment  
Misapplication of domestic law; 
bias and political interference on 
the part of provincial politicians 
Tribunal finds a breach of 
1105 
 
 According to the investor, their legitimate expectations, based on the welcome they 
initially received from provincial officials, as well as the province’s policies regarding 
investment and mining, were frustrated unfairly and in violation of NAFTA articles 1102, 1103 
and 1105 (see above). The specific measures at the heart of the dispute relate directly to the 
environmental assessment imposed on the project (Statement of Claim, 2009). First, the investors 
claimed that the decision of the provincial and federal governments to submit their project to the 
Joint Review Panel was unwarranted given the features of their proposed project. Moreover, they 
argued, other investors – both foreign and Canadian - in “like circumstances” have not been 
subjected to the demanding environmental review process (Bilcon v. Canada, 2015).   
 Additionally, the decision to assess the project by means of a JRP was, the claimants 
argued, not due to legitimate environmental concerns on the part of the government, but political 
bias against the project. In the provincial elections of 2003, Progressive Conservative MP 
Gordon Balser, who had been quite welcoming of the project, lost to local fisherman and Liberal 
candidate Harold Thériault, who, during the public hearings held by the JRP, claimed that he 
won the election based on his opposition to the project. Moreover, Robert Thibault, Minister of 
the DFO and federal MP for the riding in which the proposed quarry would be located, reversed 
his earlier support for the quarry in the face of public opposition, coming out strongly against it 
in the public hearings. The claimants argued that these public statements against the quarry were 
motivated solely by the electoral concerns of Mr. Thibault (Statement of Claim, 2009). They 
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further argued that the delays they suffered after the project was put under the jurisdiction of the 
DFO were due to the Minister’s desire to extend the process as long as possible (Bilcon v. 
Canada). Therefore, the claimant argued that “behind the scenes there was inappropriate political 
interference in the regulatory process” (Bilcon v. Canada, p.4).  
 The claimant also took issue with both the way in which the JRP carried out its public 
hearings, as well as the criteria the panel used to evaluate the project. Regarding the former, the 
claimant suggested that nationalistic and anti-American sentiments were allowed to dominate the 
public hearings (Bilcon v. Canada). Most important, according to the investors, was the basis on 
which the JRP ultimately rejected the project – namely, that it conflicted with “core community 
values.” According to the claimant, this concept  
is not among the environmental impacts that are lawful or proper scope of an environmental 
assessment process under the laws of federal Canada or Nova Scotia. The guidelines for the JRP 
refer to various social effects, like impact on values such as ‘sense of place’, but do not refer to 
the concept of ‘community core values’. (Bilcon v. Canada, p. 6)  
 
The claimant also argued that the JRP members were biased against the project, and in particular, 
did not consider possible mitigation efforts which could offset the environmental effects of the 
quarry. Finally, the claimants argued that in the wake of the JRP’s recommendation, Nova 
Scotia’s Minister of Environment refused to meet with them to hear their concerns or allow them 
any written input to contest the JRP’s decision. Therefore, they argue, the Minister “abdicated 
his responsibility to exercise his independent discretion, denied procedural fairness to Bilcon and 
failed to explain his decision” (Bilcon v.Canada, p.7). 
 The government of Canada refuted these claims. First, the government denied that the 
claimants were given special incentives or treatment to convince them to make their investment, 
and any meetings between the investors and government officials took place after the decision 
was made to invest (Bilcon v. Canada). Furthermore, they argue that given the ecologically 
sensitive nature of the site chosen by the investor – underscored by its status as a UNESCO 
Biosphere – the claimant should have expected a rigorous environmental assessment process. 
Overall, Canada further contested that the expressed environmental concerns were disingenuous, 
and cited correspondence between ministries to that effect.  
 While Canada did not deny that Minister Thibault had an interest in the project, given it 
was to be located in his riding, the government denies he had undue influence on the project’s 
approval process (Government of Canada, 2009).  Minister Thibault, in a sworn affidavit, stated 
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that he had been aware from the outset of both the positive potential the quarry could bring to his 
riding, as well as the growing concern among his constituents. He further stated that he did not 
interfere with the assessment of the quarry and did not contribute to, or desire a delay in the 
process. In addition to Minister Thibault, a number of other government employees contributed 
sworn affidavits regarding the decision-making process surrounding the project, and were 
subjected, as the arbiters note in their summary, “to rigorous cross-examination” during the 
arbitration proceedings (Bilcon v. Canada, p. 9). Overall, Canada claimed that all provincial and 
federal employees “consulted with each other in a normal and lawful manner” (Bilcon v. 
Canada, p. 8).   
 Canada also defended its decision to subject the investor to the rigorous JRP process. 
Given the project’s size, including both a quarry and a marine terminal, the project would in the 
very least been subject to a Comprehensive Study, “itself an extensive and rigorous kind of 
assessment” (Bilcon v. Canada, 2015, p. 9). However, because of the public concern the 
proposed project had generated, the decision to use a JRP, which would allow significant input 
from the public, was considered reasonable. Moreover, the government contested that the 
projects cited by the claimant as being in “like circumstances” were not truly comparable, in 
large part due to varying levels of public concern surrounding them (Statement of Defence, 
2009). The government also contested the illegality of the “core community values” criteria, and 
further notes that, as per the guidelines of the review process, the claimant was given adequate 
notice by the JRP of the inclusion of this concept in its assessment criteria (Bilcon v. Canada, 
2015).  
 Finally, the government of Canada denied that the JRP is in an entity for which Canada is 
responsible under international law, and further stated that the claimant’s argument that Canada 
breached NAFTA Art. 1105 contravenes international norms surrounding the “minimum 
standard of treatment”, which is generally seen to set a very high threshold and “address matters 
where state behaviour is egregious.” Therefore, a misapplication of domestic environmental law 
should not be seen to breach this standard, especially when the findings of the JRP could have 
been fought by the claimant under domestic judicial processes.  
 As can be seen in the table above, the majority of the arbitrators on the Bilcon tribunal 
ruled that Canada did breach NAFTA Articles 1102 (National Treatment) and 1105 (Minimum 
Standard of Treatment). The ruling of breach of Art 1105 hinged on the JRP’s failure to take into 
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account possible mitigation processes when conducting the environmental assessment, based on 
their belief that the project must not be carried out at all (Bilcon v. Canada, 2015). According to 
the tribunal, this violated CEAA guidelines and did not allow the final decision makers – the 
governments of Canada and Nova Scotia – access to all the necessary information to fully assess 
the project. This was, the tribunal decided, a disappointment of the legitimate expectations of the 
investor – that the project “would be assessed on the merits of its environmental soundness” – 
based on the initial welcome they had received from provincial officials (Bilcon v. Canada, 
2015, p. 130). The tribunal blames this outcome on they what they called the JRP’s 
“unprecedented” core community values approach, which was “inimical to the proponents 
having any real chance of success based on an assessment of their individual project on its merits 
in accordance with the laws in force at the time” (Bilcon v. Canada, 2015, p. 130).  
 The tribunal further agreed that Canada had breached Art 1102, guaranteeing National 
Treatment to foreign investors. The tribunal agreed with the claimant that the decision to refer 
the project to the JRP was unusual, but ruled that these claims were time barred, given that the 
decision was taken over three years before the investors turned to arbitration.
40
 Instead, the 
breach came from the treatment that the investors experienced as a result of the JRP’s failure to 
take possible mitigation measures into consideration – something that domestic investors in like 
circumstances had not suffered (Bilcon v. Canada, 2015).  
 As mentioned above, these rulings were not made unanimously, as Donald McRae, 
Canada’s arbitrator, dissented on the ruling of the breach of Art. 1105. He argued that the core 
community values concept was meant to capture the “human environment effects” of the project, 
which was well within the mandate of the JRP, and which their final report makes clear (McRae, 
2015). He further did not agree with the majority that any possible misapplication of Canadian 
law by the JRP could amount to a violation of the international minimum standard of treatment 
(McRae, 2015). Finally, McRae warns of a possible chilling effect for environmental assessment 
as a result of this ruling (McRae, 2015).  
 At the time of writing, it has been announced that Canada is petitioning the Canadian 
Federal Court to set aside the award.  
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 NAFTA limitations period of three years 
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6.3 The Role of Domestic Interests and Institutions in the Bilcon v. Canada Case 
 
This section provides a more in-depth look at the domestic interest groups implicated in the 
potential Whites Point Quarry project, and the way in which these groups interacted with 
provincial and national institutions. It then discusses the decision-making process by 
policymakers and the extent to which Canada’s investment-protection commitments under 
NAFTA were taken into account.  
6.3.1 Domestic Interests: Environmental Groups, Fisherman and Eco-Tourism Providers 
 
As mentioned in the JRP’s final report, the proposed quarry generated significant resistance in 
the communities around Digby Neck, on both environmental and economic grounds. The 
interested parties came both from the local communities, as well as from provincial and national 
environmental groups.  
 The Bay of Fundy is a UNESCO Biosphere reserve, and home to the endangered North 
Atlantic Right Whale, Atlantic salmon and leatherback turtles (Statement of Defence, 2009). 
Concern regarding the sensitive environment was emphasized in the public commentary on the 
project by local citizens, government officials and international environmental groups such as the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Sierra Club. For example, the WWF noted in a letter to the 
CEAA that “large-scale development, like that proposed for Whites Point, has the potential to 
destroy or degrade sensitive marine areas before we fully know what merits protection” 
(Document #2). The letter further noted that, as a member of the Right Whale Recovery 
Implementation Team, the WWF was concerned about the implications of the project. The Sierra 
Club of Canada similarly cited concerns regarding Right whales, among other environmental 
issues such as threats to local biodiversity and greenhouse emissions, in its submission of 
comments on the draft guidelines of the EIS (Document #3). For its part, in 2005 the DFO 
submitted comments to the CEAA on the draft EIS guidelines, underlining its concern for local 
fish habitats in general, and specific at-risk species such as the Atlantic salmon and Right whale 
(Document #4).  
The environmental concerns for the community were quite closely linked to concerns 
regarding the economic impact of the project. The primary economic activity in the area has 
traditionally been commercial fishing, particularly for scallops and lobsters (Statement of 
130 
 
Defence, 2009). The concerns that local fisherman had regarding the project were expressed in 
letters to the CEAA and input into the formulation of the EIS guidelines. For example, a local 
fishermen’s association wrote to the DFO expressing their opposition to the project due to 
contamination of the bay from ballast water brought by the ships coming from New Jersey, 
where coastal waters have been contaminated with a lobster parasite. As the letter explains,  
as a result of the proposed quarry operations vessels will transport cargo from the Digby Neck 
area... to the coastal waters of New Jersey... When these vessels enter our Fundy waters they will 
dump their ballast in their wake prior to arriving in our port. It is well documented that ballast 
water transports foreign organisms that harm kelp, seaweed, clams, worms, fish, and various 
other sea life (Document #5).  
 
Therefore, the association wrote, the quarry project would undermine future fishing operations 
sustainability of the community generally, and they concluded “we strongly oppose a 
development where the negative far outweighs the positive.” A local fishery articulated a number 
of concerns regarding the impact of the quarry in a letter to the DFO, which included 
navigational problems caused by the large marine terminal for small fishing boats, as well as 
increased traffic in the Bay. The letter exhorts the DFO to “take an open approach to this project 
by considering these concerns, instead of letting large companies rule with big numbers” 
(Document #6). A second lobster fisherman’s association wrote in with similar concerns 
(Document #7). 
 Additionally, the area had recently become a destination for eco-tourism activities such 
as whale watching, birding, kayaking and canoeing. In a letter to the DFO very early on in the 
assessment of the project, the Partnership for the Sustainable Development of Digby Neck & 
Islands Society wrote that “tourism operators in the Bay of Fundy area are presently working 
hard to promote such sports as salt water kayaking, canoeing and other small boat activities” 
(Document #8). In the event that a large marine terminal was built in the Cove, the letter 
explains, these small craft would be put in danger, being forced away from the shoreline and into 
the strong currents of the bay in order to navigate around the terminal. This sentiment was 
expressed by a number of other local fishermen (Document #10). A local whale watching tour 
organizer wrote to the CEAA, extensively detailing concerns both the effect of the quarry on 
local whale and dolphin populations, as well as on the tourism industry in the area (Document 
#9).  
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Therefore, while the quarry would bring jobs to the area, there were concerns that these 
economic benefits did not outweigh the costs. The company predicted it would provide 34 
permanent jobs to the community, but the area supported ten lobster fishing licences which 
provided approximately 35 jobs (Richler, 2007). Overall, the lobster industry contributed $300 
million to the area, and $37 million came from tourism activities (Richler, 2007). Thus, the 
potential harm to these key industries generated far more fear from the local communities than 
the opportunities provided by the quarry could allay. As one interviewee summarized “it’s not 
every day that projects get that kind of reaction from the communities, and that was probably a 
product of the location and its magnitude, and it’s a large project in a rural community that has 
some environmental sensitivities... a lot of concerns originated in the cross section of those 
issues” (Interview #3).  
Over the course of the project assessment hundreds of local residents wrote letters to the 
CEAA and other government bodies, expression their opposition to the project. Many of these 
letters spoke not just the potential negative impact of the quarry on specific aspects of the 
environment or economic activities, but rather concerns related to a broader view of what kind of 
development was appropriate for the area. For example, one resident wrote 
“let’s...wholeheartedly embrace a new vision for Nova Scotia based on green industries, 
renewable energy, and high tech enterprises” (Document #11). Others spoke of the importance of 
preserving the area as it was, where residents could “listen to wild seals sunning themselves on 
the rocks, watch the sun set, breathe clean air, enjoy the beauty and unspoiled landscape” 
(Document #12). Lastly, a recurring theme was that the environment and local people would be 
suffering for the benefit of a foreign investor – as one letter writer expressed,  
this pristine, environmentally sensitive area is in danger of being sacrificed and shipped away by 
the boatload to another country for the paving of their roads! All this with precious little benefit 
for the people of Nova Scotia in general, and particularly for those whose lives would be 
disrupted by the advent of a mega-quarry” (Document #13).  
 
As will be discussed below, these broader concerns, as well as specific worries regarding 
the local environment and established economic interests, were well articulated by the 
community and appear to have contributed to the criteria on which the project was judged. 
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6.3.2 Organisation of Domestic Interests  
 
Opposition to the Whites Point quarry began in the local communities around Digby Neck, with 
concerned citizens coming together in a group called the Partnership for Sustainable 
Development of Digby Neck and Islands. Among the goals of the group were to “preserve the 
pristine nature of Digby Neck and Islands and to promote sustainable development that enhances 
and quality of life”; and to “stop the mega-quarry for Whites Cove, Little River, Digby Neck and 
to actively oppose other developments which are inconsistent with the above criteria” (Document 
#14). Ultimately, the group comprised 350 households (540 individual members) out of the 
approximately 800 households in Digby Neck and the Islands combined. This group organized 
fundraisers, raising $100,000 to hire experts to help them in their campaign to stop the quarry. 
The group also participated in the public consultations held by the investor, as well as the JRP 
process, and put up “stop the quarry” signs in the area. In 2002, the Municipality of Digby voted 
against the quarry, and 1,200 people signed a letter stating their opposition to the quarry which 
was sent to the provincial parliament (Richler, 2007). There was also political support at the 
local level; “local MLAs, federal MPs were coming out to speak against, local and municipal 
councils were mostly organized in opposition. There were relatively few speaking out in favour” 
(Interview #3).  
 Indeed, the local representatives at the both the federal and provincial level were involved 
in the fight against the quarry quite directly. Provincial representative Harold Theriault, 
previously a fisherman in the area, was particularly outspoken against the project, for example 
hosting a rally in 2006 outside of the provincial legislature in opposition to the quarry (CBC, 
2006). As the Claimants noted in the arbitral proceedings, Theriault was adamantly against the 
quarry and credited his opposition to his electoral success over Gordon Balser, the Conservative 
MLA who had represented the riding when the project was initiated. Indeed, the election was 
very close, and Theriault was elected by just 327 votes in Digby in 2003, suggesting that the 
issue of the quarry may have been a deciding factor (Elections Nova Scotia, 2003). Robert 
Thibault, the minister of the DFO as well as the federal representative for the Digby riding, was 
also an important actor in the decision-making process; during the arbitration proceedings the 
claimants produced correspondence between Thibault and the Minister of Environment, in which 
the former recommended the JRP process for assessing the quarry (Memorial of the Investors, 
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2009). Additionally, the claimant cited internal e-mails between DFO staff, one of which stated 
that the quarry “is in our Minister’s riding... the announcement of a joint panel review is of the 
nature to take a lot of public pressure off the Minister’s shoulders for the summer months” 
(Memorial of the Investors, 2009, p. 34). Thus, it does appear that the two elected officials for 
the area in which the quarry was to be located had an interest in the project, and the minister of 
the DFO exerted some influence on the assessment process, at the very least recommending the 
JRP.  
The entire assessment process for the quarry guided what appears to be a great deal of 
public discontent and resistance to the project through official channels, and opportunities for 
public input existed at a number of stages throughout. For example, after preparing the EIS 
Guidelines, the CEAA and the provincial Ministry of Environment provided the public 45 days 
to review the text and submit comments to the ministry, which were subsequently passed on to 
the JRP (Document #15). The JRP itself held hearings open to the public, and was mandated to 
take the comments it received into account when issuing the EIS Guidelines that would be 
presented to the investor (Document #15). Numerous groups participated, providing testimony 
and written submissions, many of whom were mentioned in the previous section.  
As can be seen in its final report, the JRP required that the investor directly address 
public involvement, traditional community knowledge, and sustainable development in its EIS. 
Moreover, it is clear that the JRP took community concerns seriously when writing their final 
report, as worries expressed by the community regarding ballast water, tourism and fishing 
opportunities are echoed in the report. For example, the panel writes “the potential effects of the 
Project on the tourism industry are difficult to predict with any certainty, given the many factors 
involved, by the Panel acknowledges that those involved in the tourism industry believe that the 
Project is not consistent with articulated provincial and local policy” (Fournier et al., 2007, p. 
11). Less equivocal is their assessment of the quarry’s potential impact on the local fishing 
industry, as they conclude that “the Project would likely have an adverse environmental effect on 
the socio-economic health and viability of some of the fishing communities of Digby Neck and 
Islands” (Fournier et al., 2007, p. 11). As mentioned in the previous section, many community 
members expressed very broad concerns about the potential impact the quarry would have on 
their way of life and their preferred development trajectory for the area. It is perhaps this that the 
JRP refers to when they discuss the conflict between the proposed project and the “community’s 
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core values.” Indeed, the panel concluded that the greatest negative impact of the project 
concerned  
community core values... Individuals from Digby Neck and Islands identified these by stressing 
the importance of a strong sense of place, a living connecting with traditional lifestyles, harmony 
with the environment, combined with a strong sense of stewardship as a way of life... The 
imposition of a major long-term industrial site would introduce a significant and irreversible 
change to Digby Neck and Islands, resulting in sufficiently important changes to that 
community’s core values to warrant the Panel assessing them as a Significant Adverse 
Environmental Effect that cannot be mitigated (Fournier et al., 2007, p. 14).  
 
As was discussed above, it was this emphasis on core community values which formed the basis 
of the investor’s claims, and was the measure that the majority of the arbitral tribunal argued was 
a breach of the minimum standard of treatment requirement of NAFTA. 
6.3.3 State Interests and Policy Decisions 
 
How did provincial and federal policymakers make the decision to comply with the 
communities’ demands regarding the quarry, and reverse their earlier assurances to the 
proponent that the government welcomed their project? Moreover, to what extent were decision-
makers aware that this policymaking process could trigger NAFTA arbitration? 
  As described above, the decision-making process itself is at the heart of the dispute – 
namely why the project was subject to such stringent environmental assessment procedures, and 
the terms of reference that the JRP used to make its final decision. The material archived by the 
CEAA gives some access to the decision-making process, and the issues considered relevant by 
the various government departments involved.  
 The official consensus of the DFO was that the blasting activity of the quarry would 
endanger local fish stock, which made the DFO the “responsible authority” for the assessment, 
thereby automatically requiring that the environmental assessment be carried out jointly by the 
federal and provincial governments. However, the choice to require the project to be evaluated 
by the JRP was more discretionary. The recommendation was made by Liberal MP Robert 
Thibault, who wrote to the federal Minister of the Environment that, 
In light of the information provided by the proponent, DFO believes that the Whites Point Quarry 
and Marine Terminal, as proposed, are likely to cause environmental effects over a large area of 
both the marine and terrestrial environments… I am of the opinion that an assessment by a review 
panel is the most appropriate level of assessment (Document #16)  
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As discussed above, the archives of the CEAA show that the initial request to form a Joint 
Review Panel came from the DFO, sent to provincial Ministry of Environment, though the final 
decision was made by the federal and provincial environment ministers. 
 The other key issue raised by the claimant was the JRP’s reliance on the concept of 
“community core values” to assess the project, which the claimant argued was not a term that 
was included in Canadian or provincial policy. The basis for the terms of reference which the 
panel was to use to assess the project can be found in provincial policy documents, and these 
suggest a possible foundation for the development of the core community values concept, 
although it is not explicitly identified. As one provincial civil servant noted, “under our 
legislation, socio-economic impacts are considered part of environmental effects, and that is 
maybe a bit different than under different jurisdictions” (Interview #2). Indeed, Nova Scotia’s A 
Proponent’s Guide to Environmental Assessment lays out an extensive definition of 
environmental impact which includes both environmental and socio-cultural impacts. For 
example, the Guide defines environmental effect as “any change... including any effect on socio-
economic conditions, on environmental health, physical and cultural heritage or on any structure, 
site or thing including those of historical... significance” (Nova Scotia Environment, 2001). The 
JRP Agreement which set the terms for their assessment (and to which the proponent was privy 
during the whole process) uses the same broad definition. Thus the panel was empowered, for 
example, to take the “traditional knowledge” of the community into account when assessing the 
project. Following from this, the EIS Guidelines, which the JRP presented to the investor in 
2005, included requirements that the investor “identify the various perspectives and aspirations 
for the future with the region”; and “consider the relationship between the Project and the 
relevant community and regional social and economic development strategies, policies and 
plans” (Fournier et al., 2007, p. 34). The Panel also asked that the investor consider “the 
perceptions people have about their quality of life and their sense of place” (Fournier et al., 2007, 
p.36). Therefore, while political concerns were likely an important factor in the local MP’s and 
MLA’s opposition to the project, the JRP was required to consider these wide ranging concerns 
of the community. However, the term “community core values” does not appear in these earlier 
documents. How the JRP arrived at the use of this term is an open question, although it seems 
possible, as Canada’s arbitrator suggests in his dissent that by “core community values” the JRP 
simply meant to reference the human environmental effects that were clearly part of the panel’s 
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mandate (McRae, 2015). This was echoed by one of the members of the panel, who explained 
that in their view, Nova Scotia’s provincial legislation allowed for a broad interpretation; “we 
were applying provincial legislation that includes social considerations. Federal [legislation] is 
limited to the physical environment, but the provincial legislation is more open. And that gave us 
much more latitude than would have been available in other provinces” (Interview #3). The term 
“core community values” is quite broad and does not appear in previous documents related to the 
specific case of the Whites Point quarry or in broader policy documents. However, it may be that 
the panel was merely using a new term for what they understood to already be included in the 
provincial guide to environmental assessment.  
 How did the “strategic setting,” in this case, bound by Canada’s NAFTA obligations, 
affect decision making regarding the Bilcon quarry? Was this dispute ultimately caused by cost-
benefit calculations of politicians and civil servants, or by a lack of awareness or understanding 
of NAFTA?  
Both the federal and provincial officials interviewed as part of this project claimed that 
there is generally a high level of awareness of NAFTA obligations at the federal level, and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) regularly gives advice regarding 
obligations imposed by international economic agreements with the passage of new laws and 
regulations. As one federal official told me, “as a result of our experience with NAFTA… we 
have gotten quite good at the federal level in taking account of our international investment 
obligations” (Interview #1). However, this same official admitted that “at the provincial level, 
it’s a work in progress” (Interview #4). This sentiment was echoed by another official who 
argued that there was greater awareness at the federal level; “our expertise is there. It’s growing 
in the provinces and territories but it wasn’t on the radar for them earlier” (Interview #1). A 
Nova Scotia official explained that, since the province has not been host to many foreign 
companies, “we wouldn’t be as familiar with potential NAFTA obligations. However, we do 
have folks that provide information and advice on that matter” (Interview #2).  
There is evidence that in this case, decisions were made with some degree of awareness 
of NAFTA provisions, although it appears that the consensus at the time was that it was unlikely 
that the investor would turn to arbitration. The archived material on the CEAA website shows 
that e-mails were sent between provincial departments and DFAIT regarding this issue. For 
example, in an undated e-mail, a DFAIT employee writes that “with regard to the North 
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)  - the current text in the EIS is generally fine” 
(Document #17). Moreover, a law professor from the nearby Dalhousie University was 
commissioned to prepare a report for the JRP on potential NAFTA obligations. This report 
concluded that “on the basis of an analysis of both the rules and the case law, I do not believe 
any foreign investor associated with the project would have either opportunity or interest to 
invoke the provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 (Winham, 2007, p. 15). Moreover, the public 
comments to the JRP show that even locally, the issue of NAFTA arose; as one member of the 
JRP told me “It was an issue that came up quite a bit during the assessment hearings. There were 
a lot of interveners talking about NAFTA, so I think that right from the beginning we were aware 
that it was a possible NAFTA challenge” (Interview #3).  
 However, although they anticipated “some kind of reaction” from the company, the 
NAFTA case “came as a surprise to a lot of people” (Interview #3). One provincial official noted 
“what surprised me personally was that if the company had a problem or issue about the process, 
they had under provincial law and Canadian law, the ability to file for a review [in court]. I think 
that to us what was surprising was that this was the first avenue of complaint... to go straight to 
NAFTA, that was surprising” (Interview #2). However, a federal official expressed less surprise 
that even with attempts to ensure that the decision was compliant with NAFTA obligations, a 
dispute still arose – “I would say that consultation is helpful in that our measures are consistent 
with international obligations, but it doesn’t necessarily help us to avoid claims. Investors can 
bring claims if they want to” (Interview #4). It is clear that NAFTA considerations were factored 
into the decision-making process regarding the Whites Point Quarry, regardless of the fact that 
Canadian officials and outside experts predicted incorrectly that the investor would turn to 
arbitration.  
6.4 Conclusion  
 
The Bilcon v. Canada dispute is a clear case of domestic non-state actors changing the 
preferences of states actors toward a specific investment project. Whether or not the investors in 
this case received special treatment or were offered incentives to invest in Nova Scotia by 
provincial officials, the province did have official policies in place to attract FDI and spur 
development in the mining industry. Moreover, that the investors were given the initial 
opportunity to go through the environmental assessment process implies that there were 
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government officials who believed the project could be beneficial to the province. Indeed, 
George Balser, the area’s provincial representative when the initial investment was made, spoke 
about the benefits the project could bring in terms of employment (Memorial of the Investors). 
However, as was discussed above, local community members had concerns regarding the effect 
of the project on both the environment and existing economic activity in the area, such as fishing 
and tourism. The quarry became an election issue in the 2003 provincial election, and an MP 
who was sympathetic to the views of the quarry’s opponents was elected to the riding. This local 
resistance to the project may have also influenced the federal representative for the area Robert 
Thibault, who was the Minister of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans – indeed as was 
discussed above, it was Thibault who suggested the project be assessed by a JRP. Finally, the 
JRP took the concerns of local people quite seriously, and integrated them into their assessment 
of the project. Therefore, it appears that local interest group preferences were able to influence a 
number of stages of decision-making related to the Whites Point Quarry. In its defence, the 
government cites the high levels of local interest in the project as the reason it was considered 
appropriate to use the JRP assessment process while similar projects, including a nearby quarry, 
had been approved following a less stringent environmental assessment. Moreover, the JRP itself 
refers to the serious threat posed by the project to the “core community values” as the reason that 
mitigation approaches were not thought to be sufficient. It is this decision, the failure to take into 
account the company’s proposed mitigation measures, which the tribunal ruled was the most 
severe breach of Canada’s NAFTA commitments. However, this can only be understood in the 
broader context of local opposition to the project and policy-makers’ and politicians’ 
identification with these interests, which led them to, for example, suggest the most stringent 
level of environmental assessment for the project. Following from this observation, it is possible 
to conclude that the support of citizens in the area provided some incentive for policy makers to 
change their preferences toward the quarry.  
 It is clear from the discussion above that these decisions were very much made “in the 
shadow” of NAFTA obligations, as both DFAIT and outsider experts were consulted regarding 
the possible breaches of NAFTA. This is unsurprising given Canada’s experience as a 
respondent in NAFTA suits, and policymakers I spoke to at the federal level explained that 
Canada’s bureaucracy has developed some expertise in this area. While provincial policymakers 
were less familiar with NAFTA at the time, this cannot truly be considered a lack of capacity, as 
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federal level expertise was relied upon in the decision-making. However, Canadian officials were 
nonetheless unable to predict that the investors in this case would choose to turn to arbitration 
rather than pursue any objections they had to the outcome of the environmental assessment 
process through domestic courts. Aside from the difficulty in predicting when an investor will 
turn to ISDS, state actors must also assess their chances of being successful in the arbitration. In 
this case, the final ruling of the arbitral tribunal is also difficult to predict, and was quite 
remarkable for the expansive understanding of what constitutes a breach of international 
minimum standards of treatment (NAFTA art. 1105) as well as the domestic bodies that Canada 
is responsible for under international law – a panel of three university professors who issued a 
recommendation to the governments of Canada and Nova Scotia.  
 This underscores one aspect of the wider relevance of this case – namely the uncertainty 
that ISDS introduces into policymaking for domestic actors. If even well developed 
bureaucracies such as Canada’s, which additionally has significant experience with NAFTA 
suits, cannot predict which policy measures may trigger an investor-state dispute, it is less likely 
that developing country policymakers, or those whose countries have faced fewer disputes, will 
be able to do so. While Canada can bear the costs of an arbitration proceeding and pay the final 
award if the tribunal rules against it, this type of uncertainty can be quite costly for poorer states.  
 This case also highlights the extent to which ISDS is driven by the investors themselves. 
As discussed in previous chapters, ISDS was originally meant to protect foreign investors 
investing in weak or unstable states in which domestic courts could not be relied upon to fairly 
adjudicate disputes with the host state. There are very few investment treaties which cover 
investment flows into developed states, and the assumption has generally been that extra 
protection for investors is not necessary in contexts in which the rule of law is stronger. As an 
overview of ISDS cases shows that most respondent states have been developing, middle income 
countries, the initial rationale for ISDS seems justified. However, NAFTA is an important 
exception, as it covers FDI flowing from developed home states to developed host states. 
Although, as mentioned above, Canadian officials assumed that if the investor decided to 
challenge the final ruling on the quarry they would do so through domestic courts, this proved 
not to be the case – instead Bilcon turned immediately to international investment arbitration 
under NAFTA, arguing that Canada had breached international law. Therefore, the Bilcon case 
demonstrates that when given the opportunity, investors will use ISDS to challenge host state 
140 
 
regulation both in developing and developed states – an important lesson in the face of the 
potential expansion of ISDS coverage through treaties such as CETA, TTIP and TPP. 
 Finally, the content of the measure challenged in this case speaks to the way in which 
ISDS may be used to limit the development of domestic legal norms (Johnson and Sachs, 2015).  
While for the investors, the JRP’s use of the concept “core community values”, and the general 
emphasis on the socio-economic impact of the project was an overreach, to others it may be a 
welcome addition to the factors on which an industrial project can be judged. Beyond the merits 
of this specific term, however, this case highlights the ways in which ISDS can be used to 
challenge stricter regulations or the raising of certain standards – whether in protection of the 
environment or other public goods (Johnson and Sachs, 2015). In the next chapter, I will discuss 
how this use of ISDS can pose a particular problem for middle income, developing states.  
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Chapter 7 Pacific Rim Cayman v. El Salvador 
 
This case study focuses on the investor-state dispute between the Republic of El Salvador and 
the Canadian gold mining company Pacific Rim. The company began exploration activities in El 
Salvador in the early 2000s, but after significant delays, was ultimately unable to obtain 
exploitation licences or the necessary environmental permit to carry out the project. The state 
measure at the heart of the dispute is the president of El Salvador’s declaration of a “de facto” 
ban on mining, which resulted in a decision to suspend the release of exploitation permits to a 
number of mining companies with exploration permits in the country. This measure was taken in 
the context of growing public opposition to mining in the lead up to a highly contested election, 
as well as a realization on the part of the Ministry of Environment that it did not have the 
technical capacity to assess and monitor the effects of mining on the country. Therefore, while El 
Salvador has been very open to foreign investment, and made efforts to attract FDI in the mining 
sector, this case suggests that under certain conditions public, and particularly electoral, pressure 
may induce an investment-friendly state to take anti-investor measures. However, it also 
underscores the relationship between state capacity and investor-state disputes. While it was not 
necessarily a lack of awareness on the part of relevant policymakers of their obligations under 
IIAs that contributed to the dispute, the lack of technical capacity in the area in which the 
investment took place that appears to have contributed to the decision to suspend mining permits 
in the country.  
 The dispute between Pacific Rim and El Salvador is in many ways a typical case, based 
on the large-N analyses presented in Chapters 2 and 5. As a middle income country with a 
presidential system of government, El Salvador is certainly represented in the categories of most 
frequent respondent states. Moreover as the dispute involves an extractive industry claimant, this 
case also illustrates why mining, oil and gas companies are so often embroiled in investor-state 
disputes discussed in Chapter 3 – namely the threat that the industry is perceived to pose to both 
the environment and traditional livelihoods by local communities.  
 Beyond the actors in the dispute, the case exemplifies the convergence of factors that 
may contribute to the concentration of these disputes in middle income countries. On the one 
hand, the lack of bureaucratic capacity in the Ministry of Environment led first to a long series of 
delays for the investor, and allegedly, the to the government’s decision to suspend mining 
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permits. However this case also suggests that countries which are in the process of defining their 
development priorities, as El Salvador was regarding the place of mining in its development 
strategy, may be particularly constrained by IIAs – a problem that may face middle income 
countries most acutely.  
7.1 Investment and Mining in El Salvador 
 
El Salvador is Central America’s smallest and most densely populated country, and, as a lower 
middle income country, suffers from high levels of poverty and inequality as well as water 
shortages and environmental degradation (UNDP, 2010). Following the 1989-1992 civil war, 
which pitted the conservative central government against left-wing guerrillas, El Salvador made 
significant attempts to liberalize its economy and attract foreign investment. These initiatives, 
spearheaded by the right-wing Allianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) party which ruled 
from 1989-2008, included the writing of a new Investment Law in 1999 which contains a 
provision for investment arbitration; the creation of the investment promotion agency, PROESA, 
in 2000; and the 2000 dollarization of the economy. Successive ARENA governments have 
signed 24 IIAs with developed and developing country partners and joined the US-Central 
American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2004. Both the 
Investment Law and CAFTA’s Chapter 10 provide significant investment protection, committing 
the government to extend the same rights to foreign investors that domestic investors enjoy; 
prohibiting expropriation without compensation; and providing recourse to international 
arbitration at the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). These 
efforts have been recognised on the international level. For example, in 2006 (during the time 
period of interest for this study), the World Bank’s Doing Business report ranked El Salvador 76 
out of 155 for ease of doing business – notably, ahead of its regional competitors Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic (World Bank, 2006). In 2007, the same 
publication noted that El Salvador was leading on pro-business reforms in Latin America (World 
Bank, 2007). 
 Despite these efforts to create a climate friendly to investment and a generally stable 
macroeconomic environment, during the last decade El Salvador has failed to attract significant 
FDI compared to its Central American neighbours (Zegarra, et al, 2007) In a survey of investor 
perceptions of El Salvador, 49% of investors cited the high crime rates related to a large gang 
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presence as the biggest impediment to investment,
41
 with fears of corruption and lack of policy 
stability following (Zegarra, et al, 2007). These sentiments were echoed in interviews I carried 
out with government officials in El Salvador, who recognise that the country has trouble “selling 
itself” internationally (Interview #7). This is due in part to its violent image and lack of policy 
stability; “almost always, when we are close to an election, policy uncertainty is the first 
[concern for investors], and when the government has already been in power one or two years, 
insecurity and crime take first place” (Interview #8). However, despite this policy instability, 
prior to the case discussed here, El Salvador had only faced one investor-state arbitration, in 
which the tribunal rejected jurisdiction over the claim.  
 As mentioned above, the conservative ARENA party has been in power for the majority 
of the post-civil war era, a time in which “pro-market elite coalitions were forceful, enjoying a 
broad electoral base” (Spalding, 2011, p. 2). The Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacíon 
Nacional (FMLN) has been the main opposition party since 2004, when it first participated in 
presidential elections. The FMLN’s origins date back to the civil war, during which it brought 
together a number of left-wing guerilla organisations to fight the central government. With the 
signing of the cease-fire in 1992, the guerillas demobilized and the organization was transformed 
into a political party. The FMLN has been the dominant party in the poorer provinces of Cabañas 
and Chalatenango which bore the brunt of government repression during the civil war (Wood, 
2003). However, in the 2009 presidential election, the FMLN’s center-left candidate Mauricio 
Funes (the first party leader without guerilla credentials) won with 51.3% of the votes (Azpuru, 
2010). Funes’ election marked the culmination of a shift to the left of the Salvadoran electorate, a 
country that has traditionally been ideologically to the right of many countries in Latin America. 
Votes for ARENA candidates have typically been motivated by concerns regarding security and 
crime, and the country’s relationship with the United States. However, Azpuru (2010) notes that 
voter self-placement has shifted leftwards in recent years, with voters placing economic and 
welfare concerns ahead of security. Nonetheless, Funes is not a leftist leader in the style of Hugo 
Chávez or Evo Morales – according to interviewees, both the Funes government and his FMLN 
successor President Salvador Sánchez Cerén, have continued to enact free market reforms 
                                                 
41
 A well-founded fear, as El Salvador has consistently had the first or second highest homicide rate in region, 
currently hovering around 70 homicides for every 100,000 persons.  
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including promoting a public-private partnership law which faced significant civil society 
criticism (Interview #9; Moreno, 2008).  
 One issue that has risen to prominence along with the shift leftward of the Salvadoran 
electorate is the role that mining should play in the country’s development. Although mining has 
a historical presence in El Salvador, it has never contributed substantially to the economy, and 
the few foreign mining companies operating in El Salvador pulled out during the civil war 
(Spalding, 2011).  However, mining became part of the ARENA government’s efforts to attract 
FDI in the 1990s, and in 1996 the government rewrote the Mining Law to lower royalties and 
streamline the process of applying for permits. By 2006, eight foreign gold mining companies 
were operating in some capacity in the country, primarily conducting exploration in the 
provinces of Cabañas and Chalatenango.  
 The presence of these foreign mining companies created concern for local communities 
and organisations, which eventually came together under the banner of the Mesa Nacional Frente 
a la Minería Metálica (National round table against metals mining) in 2005. Their resistance 
campaign, later joined by the Catholic Church, international and national NGOs, and Salvadoran 
universities has proven quite successful. In 2007, a public opinion poll taken by the Universidad 
Centroamericana in San Salvador recorded 62.5% of the population stating that they did not 
consider mining appropriate for El Salvador (Durán, 2007). As will be discussed in greater detail 
below, the national anti-mining mood has had a clear impact on the prospects of mining 
companies in the country, as political actors at the highest levels turned against mining. In 2008 
and 2009, two foreign mining companies, Pacific Rim Cayman and Commerce Group Ltd. sent 
Notices of Intent to Arbitrate to the government under CAFTA. The next section focuses on the 
case of Pacific Rim v. El Salvador, an ongoing arbitration case in which the company is making 
a claim of $301 million against the Salvadoran government.   
7.2 Timeline of the Dispute Between Pacific Rim and El Salvador 
 
Pacific Rim Mining Corp., originally headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, began exploration 
activities in the province of Cabañas, El Salvador in 2002, impressed by the country’s pro-
foreign investment and mining legal framework (Notice of Arbitration). During 2004-2005, the 
company began the process of obtaining an exploitation licence from the Ministry of Economy’s 
Bureau of Hydrocarbons and Mines. This process requires the submission of proof of legal 
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ownership of the land of the concession site, a feasibility study for the project, and an 
environmental approval from the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARN 
for its initials in Spanish). In order to obtain the environmental permit, a company must submit 
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) detailing the potential environmental impacts of the 
projects, and the steps that will be taken to remediate them. The final decision on the granting of 
the permit is made by the Minister of Economy (MINEC), who is required to make his or her 
decision based on “national interest, the financial and technical capacity of the applicant, and the 
characteristics of the proposed mining operation” (El Salvador’s Preliminary Objections, p. 35).  
 The process to obtain all required environmental permits and exploitation licences took 
several years and encountered many delays which the claimant attributed to the lack of expertise 
of the MARN and MINEC, given their limited experience with mining operations (Memorial on 
the Merits, 2014). In particular, one aspect of the process – proving that the company owned the 
land it planned to exploit – seems to have caused confusion for the company and within the 
various relevant ministries. Specifically, it was unclear whether the company must buy the land 
from local communities or merely obtain the licence from the state to exploit the subsoil. In 
correspondence between MINEC and the Secretary for Legislative and Legal Affairs in the 
Office of the President the Minister of Economy writes that Pacific Rim argued “they will be 
mining the subsoil and the subsoil belongs to the State; if they request permission from the 
landowners it would amount to saying that the owners of the surface land are owners of the 
subsoil” (Memorial on the Merits, p. 109). The Claimant notes that various government bodies 
did not share an opinion on this issue, and the Claimant actively suggested changes of the 
Mining Law to the government, arguing that the requirement to seek landowners’ permission to 
mine the subsoil was not consistent with the norms of ownership in the Salvadoran legal system 
(Memorial on the Merits). Throughout 2005 this issue remained unresolved.  
 Additionally in 2005, as required, Pacific Rim made its draft EIS available to the public 
in order to solicit feedback. However, as the document was largely in English, over a thousand 
pages long, and interested parties were prohibited from making copies in order to read it on their 
own (McKinley, 2009), the ability of locals to comment was fairly limited (Interview #12). In 
2006, the company submitted its final EIS, believing that they had submitted all relevant 
documentation and that their licence would be granted immanently (Shrake, 2010).  
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 Throughout 2006, against the background of the legal questions mentioned above, Pacific 
Rim continued exploration activities, as well as pursuing their environmental permit, which 
included addressing concerns raised in public consultations (Memorial on the Merits). 
 Between December 2006 until 2008, MARN and other government agencies ceased 
official communications with the company. During this time, the Ministry of Economy hired an 
outside expert, Dr. Maneul Vidal-Pulgar, the current environment minister of Peru, to assess the 
appropriateness of metallic mining for El Salvador, who concluded that “‘the Ministry of 
Environment is not equipped to effectively assume a strong environmental policy regarding 
mining activity’...due to lack of experience and expertise on the subject, lack of sufficient 
personnel, and an insufficient budget” (Counter Memorial on the Merits, p. 95). This is relatively 
unsurprising, given, as mentioned above, that mining was a relatively new industrial activity for 
El Salvador, and the Ministry of Environment itself was only nine years old. Dr. Pulgar further 
noted in his report that Salvadorans exhibited distrust of the Ministry of Environment’s 
capabilities to adequately assess the potential impacts of mining activity and expressed concern 
regarding water use and contamination, deforestation, and the ministry’s inexperience (Counter-
Memorial on the Merits). Furthermore, he found that the country lacked a “comprehensive 
vision” for mining development, a water policy to ensure universal access to water, and 
inadequate mechanisms for citizen participation in decision-making processes (Counter-
Memorial on the Merits). He concluded that if mining activity were to progress at this stage, it 
would result in growing social conflict. Instead, he suggested a Strategic Environmental 
Assessment be carried out to identify the potential environmental impacts mining would actually 
have in the country (Counter-Memorial on the Merits).  
 As a result of this report, the Minister of Environment at the time explained that the 
ministry would not authorize any project that posed an environmental harm, and specifically 
mentioned the ministry’s lack of capacity to regulate the mining industry. However, 
subsequently, the Minister publicly reversed his position, stating that El Salvador did not legally 
prohibit mining (Memorial on the Merits). In 2007, the new minister reiterated that the ministry 
would not grant permits to mining concessions until the study on the potential effects of mining 
was completed (Counter-Memorial on the Merits). Ultimately, this environmental assessment 
was not carried out by President Saca, but was begun in 2009 by the subsequent administration. 
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 During this period, local communities in Cabañas were expressing concern regarding the 
potential mining activity in their region to Oxfam America (Meija, 2006; Counter-Memorial on 
the Merits). This resulted in some violent encounters, including the murders of a number of anti-
mining activists, allegedly by pro-mining actors (Counter-Memorial on the Merits). It was also 
during this period that the aforementioned opinion poll on mining in El Salvador was carried out 
by the Universidad Centroamericana, which showed that the majority of Salvadorans were 
against mining activity in the country.  
 During 2007 and 2008, company representatives continued to meet unofficially with high 
level bureaucrats who assured them that the delays in granting their licence would be resolved 
(Shrake, 2010). During this period, public opposition to the project was mounting, with the 
Catholic Bishop’s Conference of El Salvador making a statement against mining (CEDES, 
2007). At this time, the company officially relocated its headquarters to Reno, Nevada.  
According to one interviewee, one of El Salvador’s lawyers on the case, in 2007 the company 
first threatened the government with arbitration, and shortly thereafter, El Salvador engaged the 
legal services of the Washington firm Dewey & LeBouef LLP (Interview #10).  
 In 2008, President Tony Saca held a press conference at which he stated his intention to 
revisit the legal framework of mining in the country (Notice of Arbitration). In its Notice of 
Arbitration, the company claims that, despite the delays in the process of granting a permit, it 
was not aware of a dispute with the government until Saca’s “de facto” ban on mining.42 In 
December 2008, Pacific Rim officially filed its Notice of Intent to Arbitrate.  
 During the election campaign of 2009, FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes expressed his 
opposition to mining, and in a public event with the Mesa, committed that no new mining 
permits would be granted were he to win the election (Interview #11). At this point, company 
representatives claim, they reached out to both President Saca and President-elect Funes to 
determine whether a negotiated solution could be reached (Shrake, 2010). However, a number of 
interviewees suggested that the company’s only interest was in the granting of the mining 
concession; they would not accept a negotiated monetary settlement (Interview #12; Interview 
#10).  
                                                 
42
 According to Luis Parada, this claim is disingenuous given the company’s 2007 arbitration threat, and the fact that 
he was approached to join their legal team at this time (Parada Witness Statement). Moreover, an insistence of 
ignorance of the dispute until 2008 was an attempt to allow the company to argue that its 2007 nationality change 
was not motivated by a desire for jurisdiction under CAFTA, which it did not have as a Canadian company.  
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 El Salvador’s “de facto” ban continues, and in 2012, the government officially suspended 
all administrative procedures related to mining (Cabezas, 2014). The creation of a committee to 
periodically review the technical capacity of El Salvador to play host to mining keeps the 
possibility for exploitation activities alive. A proposed ban on all mining activity has not been 
seriously discussed by the Legislative Assembly, despite pressure from the Mesa and support 
from some FMLN deputies (Interview #9).  
 In 2013, Pacific Rim was facing severe financial difficulties, and was purchased by the 
Canadian-Australian company OceanaGold Ltd. for $10.2 million, allowing it to continue the 
arbitration process against El Salvador.   
 
7.2.1 The Arbitration: Pacific Rim Cayman v. El Salvador  
 
Pacific Rim served El Salvador with a notice of arbitration in April, 2009, and the tribunal was 
constituted in September of that year. The arbitration is ongoing, with the most recent round of 
hearings ending in September 2014. A summary of the investor’s claims against El Salvador is 
presented in the table below. 
 
Table 7.1Arguments Pacific Rim Case 
Alleged Breach of CAFA/Domestic Investment 
Law 
Claimant’s Arguments  
10.3 National Treatment; 10.4 Most Favoured 
Nation Treatment; Art. 5 Equal Protection & Art. 6 
Non-discrimination  
Respondent treated the claimant in an arbitrary 
manner; there was no indication that the EIA was 
inadequate on technical grounds; other industries 
that raise similar environmental concerns extended 
more favourable treatment 
10.5 Minimum Standard of Treatment Despite the fact that the claimant has complied with 
all legal requirements to be granted exploration and 
exploitation licences, the Respondent refuses to 
allow mining activity that is permitted by its own 
legislation. 
CAFTA Art. 10.7 & Art. 8 Investment law 
Expropriation and Compensation  
The Respondent’s conduct has rendered the 
investment worthless and therefore constitutes an 
indirect and direct expropriation. 
 
Saca’s 2008 “de facto ban” on mining is at the heart of the investor’s case against El Salvador, as 
they claim that until that time, they were not aware of any dispute with the state. Indeed in the 
Claimant’s Memorial on the Merits, the investor’s legal team writes that until 2008, the investor 
149 
 
believed it would be granted an environmental permit; “then, with the announcement of the de 
facto ban on metallic mining in Mach 2008, the Executive Branch of the Salvadoran Government 
illegitimately swept aside the legal and regulatory regime upon which [the] Claimant had relied” 
(Claimant’s Memorial on the Merits, p. 2). The claimant argues that this ban on mining deprived 
the company of its assets, and had no legal justification. Therefore, while the claimant goes into 
great detail regarding the various administrative delays they faced in their attempts to secure 
environmental and exploitation permits, these are not the measures they challenge. Rather they 
discuss this lengthy administrative process in order to demonstrate that despite these delays, they 
were always assured by various officials that the government supported the project, and all 
required licences would eventually be granted (Memorial on the Merits). The claimants therefore 
attribute delays, until Saca’s 2008 announcement, neither to deficiencies in their own 
documentation submitted to the various ministries, legitimate environmental concerns, nor 
political opposition to the project. Rather, they underscore a lack of bureaucratic capacity due to 
the recent arrival of the mining industry in El Salvador.  
 On the other hand, El Salvador’s defence argues that there were a number of deficiencies 
with the company’s applications. First, the government contends that Pacific Rim never 
successfully completed the purchasing of the concession site from local owners, and was thus 
unable to provide proof of legal ownership of the entire site (Preliminary Objections). Moreover, 
the government argues that, instead of concentrating on meeting the requirements for the original 
concession site, including submitting a final feasibility study, the company continued to expand 
its exploration activities on land that it did not own. The government alleges that the company 
was at this point given opportunities to re-submit a feasibility study, but did not do so, and 
instead allowed its exploration licences for the land to which it had a title expire in 2005. The 
government further alleges that the company was unable to secure a “social licence to operate”, 
in large part by not adequately addressing the concerns of local communities, particularly 
regarding water usage. The defence argues that these environmental concerns were shared by the 
MARN; in particular, the government found deficiencies or lack of information regarding the 
company’s environmental management plan, proposed mitigation measures, cyanide transport, 
and a mine closure plan (Counter-Memorial on the Merits, 2014). Moreover, as discussed above, 
these specific concerns arose as the MARN was coming to terms with its lack of capacity to 
adequately monitor and regulate mining activity (Counter-Memorial on the Merits, 2014). 
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Therefore, the defence argues, “there was never, as the Claimant alleges, a ‘ban’ (denoting a 
permanent prohibition) on metallic mining. Rather…El Salvador made the reasonable decision to 
suspend the review of applications for environmental permits related to metallic mining” 
(Counter-Memorial on the Merits, 2014, p. 121). El Salvador argues that this policy shift was 
based on recognition of its lack of technical capacity to properly regulate the mining industry, 
and that this position is supported by the precautionary principle required by the Salvadoran 
Constitution (Johnson, 2014). Moreover, the amicus curiae brief submitted by the Center for 
International Environmental Law argues that “the facts underlying the [company’s] claim are 
deeply intertwined with the social and political change” related to democratization in El 
Salvador, that led to the emergence of “the grassroots, peaceful opposition to Pac Rim’s 
proposed mine” (Orellana, 2011, p. 5). However, El Salvador denies that Pacific Rim was unduly 
affected by this policy shift, given that they did not meet the requirements to be granted the 
necessary permits.  
 The arbitration process is ongoing, and thus it remains to be seen how the tribunal will 
treat these arguments.  
7.3 The Role of Domestic Interests and Institutions in the Pacific Rim v. El Salvador 
Case 
This section provides an analysis of the domestic interests that led a reversal of El Salvador’s 
position on mining, which in turn triggered the arbitration case.  
7.3.1 Domestic Interests: Small Scale Agriculture, Water Use and the Environment 
 
Domestic groups relevant to this case exist at the local and national level, and range from 
traditionally politically disadvantaged groups to some of the most influential actors in the 
country. Despite this heterogeneity, there was a high degree of coherence in the concerns that 
they shared. Arguably, this is what led to the successful mobilisation of a wide-spread anti-
mining movement in the country. 
 The groups with the most at stake in the conflict with Pacific Rim are the local 
communities which would be directly affected by mining operations, and it is indeed these 
communities which spearheaded the opposition. The communities, located in the province of 
Cabañas, make their living primarily from subsistence farming, and thus rely heavily on local 
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surface water for crops and livestock, as well as their own consumption. As mentioned above, El 
Salvador suffers from a lack of access to drinking water, with almost all surface water in the 
country severely contaminated, a particularly severe problem in rural areas (McKinley, 2009; 
Orellana, 2011). Mining is a highly resource-intensive activity, and uses significant amounts of 
water in its extraction processes, while contributing to the contamination of ground water 
through its use of chemicals such as cyanide and arsenic. According to Pacific Rim’s own EIS, 
the project would use 240,000 gallons (908,499 litres) of water per day – what the average 
Salvadoran family uses over a 20 year period (Wilson, 2010). Thus, the threat of water shortages, 
and further contamination of drinking water for both humans and animals was a significant 
concern for local communities. Moreover, despite being rural, the area in which the mine was to 
be located is quite densely populated (194 persons/km
2
), intensifying any adverse effects, and 
increasing the possibility of displacement (Orellana, 2011).  
 The potential benefits of the mining project did not outweigh the drawbacks for the 
community. In a news article, the mayor of San Isidro, the municipality closest to the mine site, 
expressed doubt as to whether the jobs that would be created by the project would be accessible 
to local community members; “[t]hey talk of 600 jobs, but we ask ourselves how many people 
from this area will really be able to work with the technology that they bring...Because if not, I 
doubt that 100 employees will be from this area”43 (Quezada, 2006). In fact, during arbitration, 
the company stated that 220 permanent jobs would be created (McCrum et al, 2014). However, 
in an interview, one of the leaders of the Mesa summed up the concerns of the local 
communities: “Definitely it isn’t the best solution to permit mining in the country – not 
environmentally, not politically, and even less economically. The companies take everything [out 
of the country], and leave problems, leave contamination” (Interview #11). This sentiment was 
echoed by an official from MARN, who stated that, “the Pacific Rim project obviously was 
going to generate revenue; however the environmental damages would not be covered by the 
project. Economically, it had utility for the communities in the area and for the country, but only 
in the short term” (Interview #13).  
 
                                                 
43
 Most news articles and all interviews have been translated from Spanish.  
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7.3.2 Organisation of the Anti-Mining Movement 
 
The anti-mining movement has been able to organize successfully, at the local, national and 
transnational levels, and involve important domestic political institutions. The primary actor in 
the opposition to mining in El Salvador has been the Mesa, which brought together numerous 
older community organisations under its banner, playing “a critical brokerage role, linking across 
community, environmental, human rights, activist research and religious organisations” 
(Spalding, 2011, p. 8). Although the communities were initially unsure of how to respond to the 
presence of the mining company, some groups made the decision to visit mining-affected 
communities in Honduras and Guatemala on a fact-finding mission.
44
 Alarmed at what they saw, 
they began to organise seriously, and the Mesa was convened in 2005 (Interview #11).  
 They fairly quickly founded a movement in which “everyone is involved... in the first 
place the affected communities, in almost all places where there is mining, the people are aware 
of the problems. In some places, especially Chalatenango, the mayors are involved. There, the 
community development organizations and the Church is involved at the national level, research 
institutions and universities are against mining” (Interview #11).  
 The spread of information regarding the environmental and human costs of mining has 
been an important strategy for the anti-mining movement, and the Mesa has emphasized the 
threat mining poses to the national water supply, as well as the lack of widespread economic 
growth associated with mining activity. At the national level, the Universidad Centroamericana 
held a “National Forum Against Mining” in 2006, and in 2007 carried out the aforementioned 
public opinion poll which indicated that a majority of the population of El Salvador was against 
mining activity in the country. A number of think tanks and research institutes have been 
involved in carrying out and disseminating studies on the impact of mining, and international 
NGOs such as Oxfam America have lobbied the government to adopt an anti-mining stance 
(Spalding, 2011). These NGOs have also hired outside experts – hydrologists, economists, 
environmental scientists and geologists from the United States and Switzerland – to produce 
reports and analyses of the company’s EIS. These experts have all been highly critical of the 
company’s environmental protection measures; for example, American hydrologist Robert 
                                                 
44
 Both  countries have considerably more experience with mining than El Salvador, hosting mines that are infamous 
for contributing to severe environmental contamination and human health problems, for example the San Martin 
mine in Valle de Siria in Honduras owned by GoldCorp, and the Marlin mine in Guatemala owned by Glamis Gold.  
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Moran points out in his report that the standards proposed by Pacific Rim for acceptable levels of 
cyanide in mine runoff fell short of American and Canadian standards (Spalding, 2011). 
 Domestic governmental institutions have also become involved with the anti-mining 
movement, including the office of the Ombudsman for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH, its 
acronym in Spanish), an institution created during the post-war peace process. The 
Ombudswoman for the Defense of the Environment (an office within the PDDH), has been 
involved with the work of the Mesa since 2005, and the PDDH’s official position on the issue is 
both against mining in El Salvador, and investment arbitration (Interview #14). The support of 
the Catholic Church has also contributed significantly to the movement’s success. As Spalding 
(2011) notes, Catholicism is the country’s dominant religion, and the Catholic Church enjoys 
high institutional trust scores among opinion poll respondents. Therefore, “the call by Salvadoran 
bishops for greater environmental protection, in keeping with pronouncements from other church 
authorities in Central America and beyond, presented the mining industry with serious 
challenge” (Spalding, 2011, p. 21).  
 Finally, on the political level, the FMLN’s strong support base in the provinces of 
Cabañas and Chalatenango – the regions affected by potential mining activity – have 
incentivized the party to adopt an anti-mining line, and a number of FMLN deputies were 
directly involved in the activities of the Mesa. On the other hand, many ARENA deputies, 
remain in favour of attracting mining to the country, according to an interviewee (Interview #9).  
 According to one interviewee, the mining movement has been successful despite the 
predisposition of the state to be friendly towards the industry; as he explains, “there is a law that 
permits mining, there are mining companies that want to exploit minerals, all the economic 
conditions exist for mining to take place. However the [anti-mining] stance of the communities 
and pressure from the people do not allow for it” (Interview #11).  
7.3.3 State Interests and Policy Decisions  
  
The Mesa and allied organisations were undoubtedly successful in placing mining on the 
national agenda. But how was the decision made to enact the “de facto” mining ban, and proceed 
to arbitration against Pacific Rim? What motivated a state, which had put significant efforts 
towards creating an investment friendly climate, to take anti-investor measures? Finally, what 
role did uncertainty, or lack of awareness regarding the IIA play in the decision-making process? 
154 
 
When government officials took these measures, did they anticipate that it would trigger an 
investor-state arbitration proceeding, or were they unaware of the possible consequences of these 
policy decisions?  
 The Mesa’s efforts to convince various important domestic institutions and the broader 
public that mining was not appropriate for El Salvador was well timed, given the shift in the 
nation’s political mood. As is discussed above, the traditionally right-leaning electorate was 
experiencing a shift to the left that coincided with the Mesa’s efforts. This put significant 
pressure on Tony Saca’s ARENA party in the lead-up to the elections in 2009, which likely 
contributed to his efforts to “publicly distance his administration from some traditional party 
positions … one area where this division can be seen is in his emerging position on the mining 
concessions which he began to question publicly in 2008” (Spalding, 2011, p. 29). Moreover, it 
is clear that Funes’ adoption of an anti-mining position was directly related to the FMLN’s 
traditional support base among the peasants of Cabañas and Chalatenango, where almost all 
mining activity in the country has been located. The role of electoral pressure in the decision to 
enact the “de facto” mining ban was emphasized by a number of interviewees who doubted the 
sincerity of Saca’s anti-mining position. As Saul Baños, the lawyer for the Mesa argued:  
I believe that they saw it as a benefit to their image. Above all, knowing the record of [President 
Saca], I can say that rather than good intentions, or an environmental concern, it was a political 
question. It’s not the same as if he had done it at the beginning of his mandate. And moreover, if 
it had been a genuine interest, he could have promoted a law that banned mining (Interview #12).  
 
President Saca’s announcement – as the measure ultimately contested by the investors – 
reinforces the findings presented in Chapter 5 regarding the role of presidents in investor-state 
disputes. As Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009) discuss, in relation specifically to Latin American 
presidents, when these actors are directly elected by the constituents, they may face greater 
incentives to act unilaterally pass decrees to appeal to the public. This tendency is exacerbated 
when presidents have a high degree of control over their ministries, and some independence from 
their party (Wiesehomeier and Benoit, 2009; Heffernan, 2005). This certainly appears to be the 
dynamic in this case – as Saca made this announcement in an electoral context in which mining 
had become a key issue, while others in his government and party held pro-mining and 
investment preferences.   
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 While the political utility of an anti-mining position in the lead up to the 2009 elections is 
clear, this does not negate the fact that the bureaucratic resistance to Pacific Rim’s project began 
several years earlier. It is important to note that mining was relatively new to El Salvador and, as 
both news articles and interviewees suggested, the government never had a clear policy towards 
the industry. For example, when asked why the government had changed its stance towards 
mining, one interviewee stated “I don’t think the government changed its position, rather El 
Salvador never had a clear position on [mining] or the environment. It’s a very controversial 
subject, and I think that the institutional [capacity] of the MARN was never very strong” 
(Interview #8). The amicus brief submitted by the Center for International and Environmental 
Law to the arbitration tribunal echoes this sentiment, arguing that the potential for IIAs to cause 
“regulatory chill” is exacerbated in developing countries where “rapid legislative development 
and implementation is needed rather than obstacles to the application of new laws” (Orellana, 
2011, p. 13). In the early 2000s, as Pacific Rim was in the midst of applying for exploitation 
permits, no studies had been carried out regarding the viability of mining in the country, and 
even then, observers were criticising the government for not having a clear position on mining 
(Pacas, 2007). It is possible that, prior to the opposition movement spearheaded by the Mesa, 
officials in El Salvador had never seriously considered the impact of mining on the country. 
When faced with the strong opposition to mining from the public, it had to develop a policy 
position in a fairly ad hoc manner. 
 Indeed, as this lack of serious consideration of the possibilities of mining implies, 
extractive industries never played a significant role in El Salvador’s economic development plan. 
As one government official outlined, El Salvador has identified a number of strategic sectors in 
which it endeavours to attract investment – textiles, confections, aeronautics, pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, and business services such as call centers. Mining has never been a priority for the 
government (Interview #15). An official from PROESA, El Salvador’s investment promotion 
agency, underlined this point: “PROESA doesn’t have a policy of promoting mining... it’s 
necessary to respect the will of the country that doesn’t want to attract investment in certain 
sectors” (Interview #7). Therefore, the lack of reliance on mining (compared to other countries in 
Latin America such as Peru and Guatemala which depend heavily on the sector and have not 
conceded to anti-mining movements) may have allowed El Salvador to be more receptive to anti-
investor public pressure in this case. This observation is strengthened by the insistence of several 
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interviewees from various government bodies, that El Salvador has only had disputes with 
investors in “difficult” strategic sectors such as mining and energy, not with companies in the 
areas El Salvador wishes to promote, such as manufacturing (Interview #7; Interview #15).  
 Finally, how did the “strategic setting,” in this case, a setting in which state policy 
options are constrained by the IIA, affect decision making regarding Pacific Rim? Was this 
dispute ultimately caused by cost-benefit calculations of policymakers or a lack of awareness of 
their obligations under CAFTA and the national Investment Law?  
 There was no consensus among interviewees regarding policymakers’ levels of 
awareness of IIAs and the possibility for investment arbitration before the government’s dispute 
with Pacific Rim and other mining companies. The ARENA government had no publicly known 
experience with investor-state disputes prior to 2009 (Interview #16). Moreover, a number of 
interviewees spoke negatively of the technical capacity of various government bodies. As one 
ex-government employee noted, “I think that the dispute resolution mechanisms are not well 
known. The majority of public officials don’t know them, nor are they aware of the content of 
the bilateral investment treaties we’ve signed” (Interview #8). Luis Parada, member of El 
Salvador’s legal team, is of the opinion that prior to the Pacific Rim case, “there were perhaps 
one or two officials in the [Ministry of Economy] who were aware of [IIAs] but they had no idea 
how it would work” (Interview #10). However, others argued that there were processes in place 
to ensure that new policies were in compliance with IIA obligations and, “in such a small 
country there is a great deal of central control, too much, and we have tried to sensitize 
government employees” to the obligations of investment treaties (Interview #7).  
 However, regardless of the levels of awareness among public officials regarding the 
provisions of CAFTA and the Investment Law before the advent of the Pacific Rim arbitration, 
witness statements from both the prosecution and the defense make it clear that the threat of 
arbitration was communicated to President Saca’s administration before the official Notification 
of Intent to Arbitrate was sent. Moreover, the president made public statements claiming that he 
would rather pay fines than allow the granting of mining permits (Gramont, 2009). Therefore, it 
is clear that the government of El Salvador did make conscious cost-benefit calculations in the 
face of opposing public and investor pressure, and chose to concede to the former.  
 Of course uncertainty continues to play a role, both for the government of El Salvador 
and my own investigation, as the outcome of the arbitration tribunal is unknown. It remains to be 
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seen whether the gamble of siding with the public over the foreign investor will pay off for El 
Salvador.  
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Like the Bilcon v. Canada case presented in the previous chapter, the anti-mining preferences of 
broad interest groups played a clear role in shifting the preferences of the government toward the 
industry. From the end of the civil war in the early 1990s, El Salvador’s conservative 
government had a very open policy toward investment, and made efforts to attract mining 
projects. Moreover, it appears that many government actors were initially quite supportive of 
Pacific Rim’s projects. However, faced with mounting public pressure against mining, in the lead 
up to a contested election, the government reversed its position. Indeed, it is clear that political 
considerations did play a role in state actors’ decisions regarding mining development in El 
Salvador, and the anti-mining movement should be given credit for drawing national attention to 
the issue. Even if the MARN and other government agencies had been debating the merits of 
mining for a few years, the timing of Saca’s announcement says much and suggests that his was 
not spurred primarily by environmental concerns. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, President Saca’s role in the dispute between Pacific Rim and El Salvador fleshes out the 
finding in the large-N study on the connection between presidential systems and investor-state 
disputes; executives that are able to act unilaterally, and face incentives (in this case electoral 
pressure) to enact policy reversal vis-à-vis an investment seem quite likely to do so. This further 
underscores the role of changing domestic preferences in contributing to investor-state disputes.  
 Unlike the case discussed in Chapter 6, however, state capacity appears to have also 
played a role in this dispute. As both the claimant and the state mention repeatedly, mining was 
new to El Salvador. The claimant uses this as an excuse for the many delays it faced in trying to 
obtain its environmental and exploitation licences, arguing this lack of capacity slowed down the 
process, but was not indicative of actual opposition to the project based on genuine 
environmental concerns on the part of policy-makers. Therefore, the claimant argues, these 
delays were not an expression of a purposive policy, but rather inhibited the government from 
fulfilling its stated policy (and legal obligations) of welcoming the investor’s project. The 
government does not deny that there was a lack of capacity, particularly within the MARN to 
deal with mining activity. However it argues that there was recognition of the deficiencies within 
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the bureaucracy, particularly regarding assessing and monitoring the environmental impact of 
mining in the country. Thus, they partially attribute these delays in the claimant’s attempts to 
obtain the required licences, as well as the eventual broad “policy shift” that places a moratorium 
on mining, to the judgement by the government that it did not at the time have the institutional 
capacity to regulate mining. Therefore, in this case, a lack of state capacity also contributed to 
the investor-state dispute in question. However, given the government’s aforementioned open 
stance toward mining, and the significant need for FDI in the country, it is likely that the public 
opposition played an important role in pointing out this lack of institutional capacity and the 
weaknesses in the country’s regulatory policies related to mining. In the absence of public 
opposition to mining, the government may not have felt the need to address these issues in the 
face of increased investment in the extractive sector.  
 Finally, interviewees suggested that Salvadoran officials did not have much awareness of 
CAFTA and the potential for investment arbitration prior to this case, especially in the MARN. 
Therefore, they likely did not consider CAFTA obligations during the processes to assess the 
project and decide whether or not to grant Pacific Rim the necessary licences. However, as El 
Salvador’s legal representation stated, the investor communicated to the executive at several 
points that it was considering investment arbitration. Luis Parada claims that arbitration was 
threatened as far back as 2007, and the investor states that they reached out to both the outgoing 
President Saca and incoming President Funes regarding the conflict. Indeed, President Saca 
himself announced that he would rather the government pay $90 million in arbitration than grant 
the concession (Memorial on the Merits, 2014). Therefore, whether the potential benefits were 
political support or environmental protection (or likely, a bit of both) the government of El 
Salvador clearly decided that these outweighed the potential costs posed by arbitration. 
However, despite the apparent victory of the anti-mining movement in altering the 
preferences of the Salvadoran government, mining still remains a possibility for El Salvador, as 
no legislation officially prohibiting it has been passed. Moreover, a committee has been 
established to periodically review the technical capacity of El Salvador to play host to mining 
keeps the possibility for exploitation activities alive. A proposed ban on all mining activity has 
not been seriously discussed by the Legislative Assembly, despite pressure from the Mesa and 
support from FMLN deputies (Interview #9).  
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This brings us to the wider relevance of this case – it highlights the potential effect that 
ISDS can have on the development of policy in issue areas adjacent to foreign investment. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the arbitration case between has played a role in stalling decision-
making regarding the status of mining in the country. This is in part due to the fear that passing 
legislation officially banning mining would provoke further arbitration cases. Over 25 mining 
companies have had concessions granted to them, and while the administrative processes 
regarding their permits are currently suspended, according to employees at Oxfam America, the 
fear of provoking further companies to sue the state has impeded the government from 
promoting a law to officially ban mining (Interview #17). This statement was echoed by Yanira 
Cortez, deputy attorney for the environment in the PDDH office in an interview with The 
Guardian: “There are so many permits on standby right now, so there is fear that these 
companies will follow the lead of Pacific Rim” (Provost, 2014). 
An interviewee also suggested that the state had analyzed the situation and decided that 
“in this moment we can’t pass a law [prohibiting mining] because it would be counter-productive 
in the case against Pac Rim” (Interview #14). Similarly, Luis Parada, El Salvador’s legal counsel 
stated, 
 
That there is no official position on mining is in part due to the arbitration. There are two bills 
currently before parliament, one is a moratorium and one is an outright ban that would prohibit 
metallic mining. The government has not taken action on either one, in part because they are 
waiting for the arbitration to be over (Interview #10).  
 
One reason for this may be that in the context of the arbitration, the defence’s argument relies 
primarily on proving that Pacific Rim 1) did not meet the technical requirements for an 
environmental permit to be granted, or complete its feasibility study; 2) failed to adequately 
address the concerns of the local communities as well as outside experts; and 3) did not complete 
the purchase of the land required for their operations (Counter-Memorial on the Merits, 2014). 
Moreover, El Salvador argues that numerous external experts advised the MARN to suspend 
mining activity, due to the ministry’s lack of technical capacity to ensure that it did not cause 
environmental damage, and that constitutionally, the government is required to adopt a 
precautionary principle towards protecting the environment and human health (Counter-
Memorial on the Merits, 2014). However, the MARN’s report on mining was only completed in 
2012, and as mentioned above, the proposed law which would at least make official the 
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moratorium on mining has not been passed by the legislature. Therefore, as mentioned above, the 
defense argues that  
El Salvador’s decisions regarding metallic mining in general and Pac Rim’s environmental permit 
specifically did not have any impact on Pac Rim…El Salvador’s policy decision did not affect 
any rights with regard to exploration licences because Pac Rim did not have a right to the 
exploration licenses for which it claims damages (Counter-Memorial on the Merits, 2014, p. 125). 
 
Thus, in the context of the arbitration case, El Salvador is attempting to underline the technical 
aspects of its decision-making regarding Pacific Rim’s application for an exploitation licence, 
rather than the political contestation which I have argued contributed first to President Saca’s 
decision to announce a de facto ban on mining; as well as to President Funes’ declaration that no 
mining would take place where he to be elected and his subsequent continuation of this ban. Of 
course, this does not discount the legitimate concerns that the MARN had about its own technical 
capacity to monitor the mining industry, or the faults in Pacific Rim’s application materials; I do 
not argue that these considerations played no role in the state’s decision-making. However, in 
front of the tribunal, the defence has made a concerted effort to deny the claimant’s position that 
the decision to withhold Pacific Rim’s licence to was a political one. If a law banning mining had 
been passed after the company had first threatened arbitration, this could undermine the state’s 
argument that it based its decision on technical criteria.  
 This emphasis on the technical aspect of decision-making is likely due to the lack of 
value arbitral tribunals have historically placed on a state’s political considerations – measures 
which are seen to be applied hastily due to political pressure are not considered legitimate under 
the IIA regime, and indeed the normative content of the IIAs and arbitral decisions privileges 
technical criteria over political considerations (Tucker, 2015; Yazbek, 2010). 
  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a country like El Salvador might enact a measure 
such as ban on mining, if any concessions had previously been granted, and not subsequently 
provoke investment arbitration. El Salvador certainly is not above reproach in the way it dealt 
with Pacific Rim, and it is not clear whether or not the key decision-makers held genuine 
reservations about the suitability of mining in El Salvador or were more concerned with 
maintaining political support. However, there do appear to be legitimate questions regarding the 
feasibility of mining in such a densely populated and water insecure country. In an era when 
citizens, non-state actors, and international organizations are increasingly concerned with 
environmentally sound and sustainable development, there may be increased calls to rethink the 
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promotion of industrial activity which can be particularly harmful to the environment – 
especially in countries such as El Salvador that do not have a well defined position on the 
industry, and are not overly dependent on it. Therefore, it may become politically as well as 
environmentally desirable not to grant licences to extractive projects, regardless of whether they 
technically meet the legal requirements already in place. Of course, while the passing of anti-
mining legislation is perhaps a more desirable approach as it could perhaps avoid charges of 
breach of National or Most Favoured Nation Treatment provisions, legislative measures may still 
be challenged as expropriations. Thus, the Pacific Rim v. El Salvador case demonstrates the 
ways in which ISDS may inhibit broader policy change.  
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Chapter 8 AES Summit Generation & Electrabel v. Hungary  
  
The case study presented in this chapter focuses on the disputes between Hungary and two 
foreign-owned electricity generators – AES Summit Generation and Electrabel. Both companies, 
along with a number of investors, signed long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with the 
Hungarian government in the early 1990s. These agreements provided investors with a 
guaranteed profit on electricity sold to the state-owned distributor, and were an important tool in 
the attraction of foreign investment into Hungary’s newly-privatized electricity sector after the 
end of communist rule. However, these agreements attracted criticism domestically as well as 
internationally. In Hungary, the PPAs were attacked by politicians for providing so-called 
“luxury” or “excess” profits for the foreign-owned generators. At the EU level, the PPAs raised 
concerns about illegal state aid and were eventually subject to an investigation by the European 
Commission (EC).
45
 These various pressures led first to changes to the agreements, and 
ultimately to their termination, which in turn provoked three known investment arbitration cases 
under the Energy Charter Treaty.
46
 
 Hungary prevailed in the two disputes discussed here, and notably, both arbitral tribunals 
viewed as legitimate the state’s political motivations for taking the contested measures. For 
example, the tribunal in the AES Summit case concluded that the government was “motivated 
principally by widespread concerns relating to reducing ...profits earned by generators and the 
burden on consumers,” and that this was is “a perfectly valid and rational policy objective for a 
government to address luxury profits” (AES Summit v. Hungary, 2010, p. 82).  The tribunal was 
less clear regarding importance to the interests of the state-owned electricity company Magyar 
Villamos Művek (MVM) in the policy making process regarding the administrative pricing. 
However, over the course of this research it emerged that the interests of MVM were central to 
both the reintroduction of the administrative pricing and the cancellation of the PPAs. Therefore, 
while on a rhetorical level the “mass interests” of Hungarian energy consumers were an 
important determinant of this investor-state dispute, the interests of a very powerful state actor 
were also deeply implicated in the decision-making.  
                                                 
45
 “Under Article 87(1) EC, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, 
in so far as its affects trade between EU Member States, be incompatible with the common market” (Amicus Brief, 
p. 5).  
46
 Very little information about the third, EDF v. Hungary has been made public. 
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 Of further interest is the impact of the EU accession process and EC investigation on the 
investor-state disputes discussed here. While the majority of the AES Tribunal did not accept 
that concerns regarding legality under EU law drove Hungary to reintroduce administrative 
pricing, the tribunal for the Electrabel case did accept that these concerns motivated the 
government to take the measures in question. This outcome is notable for two reasons. On the 
one hand, the clash between commitments enshrined in investor-state contracts and states’ 
commitments under EU law suggests the potential for conflict between different international 
legal regimes.
47
 Additionally, and more relevant to the central argument of this thesis, this case 
illustrates some of the reasons for which transition countries, in particular in Europe, may be 
more likely to be involved in disputes with investors. As will be discussed below, the Hungarian 
government signed the PPAs during a period in which the need for foreign investment was acute, 
and though they were successful in attracting investment, they did not align with the preferences 
of all the stakeholders involved, in particular given some long-lasting reticence regarding 
privatization of the electricity market. Furthermore, according to some interviewees, it was quite 
clear from early on that these agreements would need to be altered to comply with EU accession 
requirements, which indeed appeared to play a role in the change of preference toward the PPAs. 
 Over the past twenty-five years, Hungary, as a transition state, has experienced a very 
rapid evolution of policy regarding the free market and the market for energy in particular – first 
privatization and then liberalization of markets to comply with EU accession requirements. The 
interests of non- and sub-state actors have been affected, sometimes negatively, by these policy 
changes, and it is unsurprising that they have in turn pressured the government for more 
favourable policies. More generally, these policy changes are complex and different initiatives 
have at times had conflicting goals – for example, the commitment to maintain policy stability 
for investors, and the necessity of liberalizing the energy market to meet EU standards.  
Therefore, a lack of, or at least stretched institutional capacity may also play a supporting role in 
causing these disputes unclear rules may lead to inadvertent non-compliance (Chayes and 
Chayes, 1993). More generally, it is clear that some degree of policy instability is part and parcel 
of a transition to a free market, and as was discussed in earlier chapters, policy instability is in 
large part what determines political risk for investors. Therefore, the disputes discussed in this 
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 Indeed, legality of intra-EU BITs and the ECT is an ongoing point of contention amongst investors, EU member 
states and the EC. 
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chapter shed some light on the statistical results regarding transition countries’ propensity to be 
involved in investor-state disputes, and add further nuance to the interplay between political 
preferences and capacity and their role in causing investor-state disputes.  
8.1 IIAs and Investment in Hungary  
  
Following its first free elections in 1990, Hungary began the transition to a free market economy, 
which involved the privatisation of firms in a number of “strategic sectors” such as energy, 
telecommunications, and banking, much of which was accomplished through attracting foreign 
investment (Kalotay & Hunya, 2000).  The desire to attract FDI was not only ideological, but 
born of necessity: dated infrastructure and low levels of industrial capacity, debt servicing and 
budget deficits all increased the pressure to attract outside investment, particularly from Western 
Europe (Roaf, et al., 2014). Happily for the Hungarian architects of privatisation, the country has 
been one of the more successful post-communist European states in this regard, enjoying 
significant FDI inflows in the early years of privatization compared with its neighbours, in part 
due to reforms implemented before the transition period (Hooley et al., 1996; OECD, 2000a). 
Between 1990 and 2005, FDI stock as a percentage of GDP rose from 1.6 to almost 56 percent 
(UNCTAD, 2007b).  
 Hungary’s efforts to open its economy and attract FDI were supported not only by 
domestic legal reforms, but significant engagement on an international level. In 1991, Hungary 
signed the Europe Agreement with the EU which outlined the first steps toward EU accession. 
This agreement contained commitments to significantly liberalize trade and ensure domestic 
compatibility with EU standards in areas such as taxation, state aid, and sectoral policies (OECD, 
2000a). Additionally, during this period Hungary ratified many IIAs, signing many BITs in the 
mid- to late-1990s, as well as the Energy Charter Treaty, which will be discussed at greater 
length below. These agreements, which contained commitments to liberalize markets, placed 
significant pressure on the government – the Central and Eastern European states had far less 
time to come into compliance with EU policy and were expected to be far more open to EU 
involvement, given the lower capacity of their domestic institutions than Western European 
states had been (Drahokoupil, 2009) 
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8.1.1 Investment in the Energy Sector 
 
As mentioned above, the energy sector was largely privatized by the late 1990s. This involved 
the creation of a two-tier system, with the state-owned MVM retaining its coordinating and 
distributing role and remaining in state hands, and the privatization of a number of electricity 
generators. By 1998, 50 percent of the shares of the power generation companies were held by 
private parties. These generators, sold primarily to Western European investors, were in varying 
states of disrepair which contributed to the necessity of devising means to attract investment via 
the long-term PPAs (OECD, 2000b).  
 As a number of interviewees noted, the government initially had difficulty attracting 
investment in the energy sector; investors were wary of investing in out-of-date facilities with no 
guaranteed returns, and regulators faced challenges determining the appropriate price for 
electricity – which at the time “nobody really knew” (Interview #20) – to privatize, and 
following the advice of external consultants, the government offered investors the 25 year PPAs 
(Interview 20). The PPAs, signed between the MVM and the newly foreign-owned generators, 
committed the MVM to buying a fixed amount of electricity at a price determined by the 
Hungarian Energy Office (HEO), which would guarantee the investors a profit between eight and 
ten percent (Interview# 21). According to legislation adopted in 2000, the regulated prices were 
to remain in place until 31 December 2003, after which, in order to comply with EU 
requirements, the electricity prices were to be set by the generators (Interview #21). 
 The interests of energy consumers were of importance to policymakers during the 
privatisation period. During the communist era, energy prices were “far from cost-covering” and 
significantly lower for households than industrial consumers (OECD 2000b, p. 34). In the mid-
1990s, electricity prices rose approximately 25 percent, which was nonetheless less than the 
amount pushed for by foreign investors (Bakos, 2001). According to commitments made to the 
IMF and the World Bank, electricity prices in Hungary were required to cover costs by 1996, and 
1995 was the first year in which residential rates exceeded industrial rates (OECD, 2000b). 
However, a number of interviewees expressed the importance to the government of easing this 
transition for household consumers and thus some effort was made to keep household prices low 
(Interview #20; Interview #22). As will be discussed at greater length below, this created a 
situation in which the MVM was buying electricity from the privatized generators at a fixed 
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price under the PPAs, and selling it at a price low enough that consumers would not face a 
“shock”. When administrative pricing ended in 2003, MVM began selling this electricity at a 
loss. This constituted the basis for the EC state aid investigation and also, as we shall see, 
incentivized the MVM to renegotiate the PPAs. 
8.1.2 Hungary’s Experience with ISDS  
 
Hungary signed and ratified its first IIA in 1987 with Sweden and has signed 59 IIAs in total. 
Hungary experienced its first investor-state dispute in 2001, related to a claim brought by AES 
Summit generation, one of the investors discussed in this chapter. This dispute related to changes 
to AES Summit’s PPA and was settled out of arbitration. Subsequently, Hungary has faced at 
least thirteen claims in the energy and telecom sectors, as well as handful of other industries. The 
most common measures triggering disputes in Hungary are the cancellation of agreements or 
projects, and regulatory change.  
 
Figure 8.1Hungary Disputes by Industry 
 
As is common for Eastern European respondent states, all of the disputes faced by Hungary were 
brought by investors from Western Europe. Hungary is in fact one of the European transition 
states which has faced the greatest number of claims – only the Czech Republic and Ukraine 
have been involved in more (public) disputes with investors. At the time of the disputes 
discussed in this chapter, Hungary had faced three previous claims.  
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8.1.3 The Energy Charter Treaty  
The claims discussed in this chapter were brought under the Energy Charter Treaty, a 
multilateral agreement with a wide geographical coverage, including most of Western and 
Eastern Europe, as well as Central Asian states. The treaty was ratified by the original signatories 
in 1994 and came into effect in 1998. The ECT provides investment protection for firms 
investing in signatory countries, and provides for investor-state disputes settlement using the 
ICSID or UNCITRAL rules.  
 The ECT was initially proposed by the Dutch government to the Council of the European 
Communities in 1991, with the goal of creating a “European energy community [and] a secure a 
market economy approach for the reconstruction and restructuring in the energy sector in the 
former communist countries” (Kleinheisterkamp, 2012, p. 2). Thus, the treaty was meant to 
combine Western European interests in secure sources of energy, with Eastern European 
interests in attracting investment. As it takes its cue on liberalisation of energy markets from EU 
directives on EU energy law, “the ECT has served as a kind of ‘waiting room’ for subsequent EU 
membership preparation for the accession countries in Eastern Europe” (Konoplyanik & Wälde, 
2006, p. 528). 
 As with many investment agreements, the investment chapter of the ECT purports to aim 
to increase investment by decreasing investor risk. According to Konoplyanik and Wälde (2006), 
the investment chapter of the ECT was modeled after the provisions in NAFTA, and the US and 
UK model BITs. Like these treaties, the ECT prohibits expropriation without prompt and 
immediate compensation, and includes provisions guaranteeing MFN or national treatment, and 
the controversial FET. The treaty requires that signatories create “stable, equitable, favourable 
and transparent conditions for investors” and provide “constant protection and security” to 
investment. Additionally, the ECT requires signatories to respect all contractual agreements 
made with investors (Energy Charter Treaty). 
8.2 Timeline of Disputes between Hungary and Electrabel and AES Summit 
Generation  
 
Belgian company Electrabel S.A. and the British AES Summit Generation purchased majority 
shares in Hungarian electricity generation plants and signed long-term PPAs with the 
government in 1995 and 1996 respectively. AES Summit purchased a majority shareholding in 
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the company Tiszai Eromu Reszvenytarsasag (which became AES Tisza) which included a 
power station known as Tisza II and two power stations. AES’ investment was approximately 
US$130 million (AES Summit v. Hungary, 2010). Electrabel bought majority shares of the 
Dunamenti power plant, acquiring it from a different investor, in 2001. 
  As discussed above, these agreements committed MVM to buy electricity at a fixed price 
from the generators. Between 1997 and 2003 the prices at which the electricity were sold were 
determined by the Hungarian Energy Office, and issued in Price Decrees that covered four year 
cycles (Electrabel v. Hungary, 2012). 
 In 2001, AES Summit Generation initiated an arbitration proceeding against Hungary, 
which has not been made public. The case was settled, and the investor signed a new PPA with 
the government. Also in 2001, the Hungarian parliament passed new legislation to partially 
liberalize the electricity market, which went into effect in 2003. From this date on, the generators 
that had signed PPAs with the MVM were able to negotiate a yearly agreement on the electricity 
prices that the distributor would pay (Electrabel v. Hungary, 2012). The liberalization of the 
market created so-called “stranded costs” for the MVM; as customers were allowed to move 
from the public to the free market, the capacity which MVM was required to purchase from the 
generators exceeded the demand and MVM was therefore paying for electricity from the PPAs 
that it was no longer able to sell (Szorenyi, 2004). MVM sent invitations to renegotiate the PPAs 
in 2003, but was not successful in reaching a new agreement with either AES Summit or 
Electrabel.  
 In 2004, Hungary acceded to the EU and was therefore required to have full market 
pricing for electricity by 2007. In 2005, the EC began an investigation into whether MVM’s 
purchase requirements under these agreements constituted illegal state aid (EC, 2009). At the 
same time, a political debate arose in the Hungarian parliament regarding what were perceived, 
by some political actors, as unreasonably high profits of the electricity generators following the 
end of the administrative pricing regime in 2003 (AES Summit v. Hungary, 2010). In November 
of 2005, the Hungarian Energy Office sent a letter to the companies that had signed PPAs, in 
which it described the current rate of profit as “unjustifiably high” and suggested a limit of seven 
percent profit (AES award). Again, the government was unable to reach an agreement with the 
generators, and in 2006, reintroduced administrative pricing through the Price Decree (AES 
Summit v. Hungary, 2010). 
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 In 2007, the investor-state dispute between AES Summit Generation and Hungary was 
registered at ICSID, with AES in particular challenging the reintroduction of administrative 
pricing.  
 In 2008, the EC concluded its investigation, finding that the PPAs did constitute illegal 
state aid. Hungary did not contest this finding and in 2008, passed legislation to terminate the 
PPAs. Electrabel, subsequently turned to arbitration, also at ICSID, challenging both the Price 
Decrees and the PPA termination. 
8.2.1 The Arbitration Cases 
 
This section will focus mainly on the dispute between AES Summit Generation and Hungary, 
with some references to the Electrabel proceedings. As mentioned above, the AES Summit 
claims focused solely on the reintroduction of administrative pricing, while Electrabel also 
challenged the termination of the PPAs. In both cases, Hungary defended the measures taken 
with reference to the requirements of EU accession, and the EC petitioned to present amicus 
curiae briefs in both cases. However, only the tribunal in the Electrabel case accepted that this 
had in fact influenced the policy making process.  
8.2.1.1 AES Summit Generation v. Hungary  
 
 The ICSID tribunal for the arbitration between AES Summit Generation and Hungary 
was constituted on 21 November 2007. A summary of the investor’s arguments is displayed in 
the table below.  
Table 8.1Arguments and Rulings AES Summit Case 
Alleged Breach of the 
ECT  
Claimant’s Arguments Tribunal’s Ruling 
Fair and Equitable 
Treatment 
 
FET includes honouring contractual 
obligations, which Hungary failed 
to do.  This entails respecting 
legitimate expectations.  
Tribunal declined 
jurisdiction over 
contractual claims; found 
no breach of FET with 
regard to Hungary’s treaty 
obligations. 
 
Impairment of 
Investment by arbitrary 
and discriminatory 
measures  
Hungary’s  reintroduction of 
administrative pricing was 
arbitrary, non-transparent and 
discriminatory and only aimed at 
four generators 
Tribunal finds that the 
measure was not 
unreasonable in the face of 
concerns regarding the 
generator’s profit rates. 
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National /Most 
Favoured Nation 
Treatment 
 
Domestically owned power plants 
received more favourable treatment  
No breach of MFN/NT 
Constant Protection and 
Security 
The 2006 Price Decree breached 
Hungary’s obligation to provide 
legal security  
 
No Breach of obligation to 
provide constant protection 
and security.  
Expropriation Hungary expropriated revenues 
which AES was guaranteed under 
the PPA. 
No evidence of 
expropriation. 
 
According to AES Summit, Hungary breached its obligations to the investor under the ECT by 
reintroducing administrative pricing in 2006, by causing MVM to fail to fulfill its contractual 
obligations (AES Summit v. Hungary, 2010). Additionally, by changing the agreement which it 
had reached with AES in 2001 (following the aforementioned arbitration case), Hungary failed to 
act in accordance with the investor’s legitimate expectations, and uphold its commitment under 
the ECT to provide a stable policy environment (AES Summit v. Hungary, 2010). This policy 
measure was also taken in a non-transparent way, as Hungary allegedly provided no explanation 
for how it arrived at the price levels enacted in the 2006 Price Decree.  
 AES Summit further argued that Hungary’s decision to reintroduce administrative pricing 
was irrational and discriminatory. First, the claimant alleged, the government falsely portrayed 
this measure as being a response to EC concerns regarding the potential illegal state aid 
represented by the PPAs. However, AES Summit argued that the profits it was making under the 
free market pricing regime had no connection to the question of state aid. Additionally, the Price 
Decree of 2006 only affected four generators; domestically-owned power plants were not subject 
to the same pricing decrees; and one, the state-owned Paks nuclear plant, was allowed to increase 
prices during this period. Therefore, the claimants argued that the return to administrative pricing 
was discriminatory and enacted primarily due to the political debate regarding the so-called 
“luxury” or “extra profits”. 
 Finally, there was significant debate regarding the applicable law governing the dispute, 
and in particular, how the ECT interacted with EU law. The claimants argued that due to the 
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Vienna Convention’s edict that a “party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty” the potential breach of EU law could not be used 
to defend Hungary’s actions (AES Summit v. Hungary). 
 In response to these allegations, Hungary argued that the investor could not have had any 
legitimate expectations that administrative pricing would not be reintroduced, as the 2001 PPA 
signed by AES contained “no representations by MVM or anyone else that the pricing regime 
would never change again in the future”, and the PPA did not include a stabilization clause (AES 
Summit v. Hungary, p. 48). Additionally, Hungary denied that the new pricing scheme was 
decided upon in a non-transparent manner, and noted that the claimants were invited to comment 
on the new scheme. However, they further argued that the ECT does not “require states to 
comply with ideal notions of transparency, in which every single consideration in policy making 
is first publicly announced (AES Summit v. Hungary, p. 53). Finally, in arguing that the decision 
to reinstate administrative pricing was not arbitrary, Hungary emphasized the fact that “countries 
which are in the process of becoming members of the European Community are likely to have 
legislative changes” (AES Summit v. Hungary, p. 50). 
 In its defence, Hungary additionally emphasized the pressure it was under from EC to 
terminate the PPAs, or to at least “minimize the effects of what the EC considered to be unlawful 
state aid” (AES Summit v. Hungary, p. 50). It underlined that the government had tried to 
renegotiate the PPAs with the generators, and that AES had refused any renegotiation of the 
PPA. Therefore, “when the authorities were unable to renegotiate the PPAs, they took the next 
step, which was the least drastic of the alternatives available. They temporarily restored the 
system of price caps based on notions of reasonable return that had long been used in Hungary” 
(AES Summit v. Hungary, p.50). Additionally, Hungary argued that it had legitimate concerns 
regarding the high profit levels of the generators at the expense of consumers (AES Summit v. 
Hungary).  
 With regard to the claims of breach of MFN and NT, Hungary argued that the reason that 
the price decrees were only applied to four generators was that only these were identified as 
having overly high profits. The calculation of the reduction of profits was applied uniformly to 
all generators and therefore cannot be considered discriminatory. Additionally, Hungary denied 
that it had expropriated the claimant’s investments, as they continued to make a profit under the 
administrative pricing (AES Summit v. Hungary). 
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 Finally, with regard to the tension between EU law and the ECT, Hungary argued, 
unsurprisingly, that the ECT must be “read in light of one of its own objectives, which is to 
promote the European Union’s key energy objectives, market liberalization and free 
completion,” and therefore it cannot be read as divorced from EU competition law (AES Summit 
v. Hungary, p.33). This argument underscores Hungary’s claims to having acted in response to 
EC pressure to eliminate the state aid represented by the PPAs. 
 The tribunal ruled in Hungary’s favour on all claims of breach of the ECT. First, the 
tribunal found that Hungary had made no claims guaranteeing that administrative pricing would 
never be reinstated, and thus the claimant could have no legitimate expectations to that effect. 
While the enacting of the Price Decrees did not perfectly meet the ideals of transparency, it did 
not amount to a breach of the ECT as the tribunal did not interpret the FET as requiring 
“perfection” in state behaviour. Thus, the “the respondent’s process of introducing the Price 
Decrees, while sub-optional [sic], did not fall outside the acceptable range of legislative and 
regulatory behaviour” (AES Summit v. Hungary, p.69).  
 Of most interest is the tribunal’s conclusion regarding the investor’s claim of arbitrary 
and irrational policymaking. Like the claimant, the majority of the tribunal did not accept 
Hungary’s argument that it reintroduced administrative pricing in response to pressure from the 
EC. This is due in part to the fact that at the time the measure was taken, Hungary had not 
received the results of the EC’s investigation into the potential state aid, and therefore was under 
no obligation to act (AES Summit v. Hungary). Additionally, the tribunal was not convinced that 
the price cap would truly address concerns regarding state aid (AES Summit v. Hungary). Instead, 
the tribunal concluded that Hungary was motivated by the political debate surrounding the so-
called “luxury profits” of the generators. However, the tribunal found it nevertheless found that 
  
it is a perfectly valid and rational policy objective for a government to address luxury profits. And 
while such price regimes may not be seen as desirable in certain quarters, this does not mean that 
such a policy is irrational (AES Summit v. Hungary, p. 83). 
 
Hungary’s nominee to the tribunal, Dr. Brigitte Stern, dissented from the majority opinion 
regarding Hungary’s motivations. She concluded that it was clear to Hungary at the time that the 
PPAs were in contradiction to EU policies. Indeed, she cited, amongst other evidence, notes from 
a meeting with the EC in 2004, where “concerns were expressed by the Commission that the 
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stranded costs...constitute state aid to the generators, stating that ‘it must be ensured that none of 
the power plants reaches extra profits under the PPAs’” (AES Summit v. Hungary, p. 77).  
8.2.1.2 Electrabel v. Hungary  
 
The facts of the Electrabel case are quite similar to those of AES Summit. However, in addition 
to challenging the Price Decrees, the Belgian investor also challenged the termination of the 
PPAs. The tribunal – which also included Dr. Stern as Hungary’s nominee – came to similar 
conclusions regarding the motivations for the administrative pricing, also took more seriously the 
role of the EC’s state aid findings on Hungary’s decision-making.  
 Electrabel argued that the termination of the PPAs constituted a breach of the FET 
provision of the ECT, as it breached the investor’s legitimate expectations, and that in particular 
the government did not take “reasonable steps to protect Electrabel as an investor, by seeking an 
exemption from EU law in relation to the PPAs in Hungary’s EU Accession treaty (Electrabel v. 
Hungary, part VI-5). Electrabel further claimed that its investment was expropriated as they were 
not adequately compensated by the government following the PPA termination. 
 The tribunal ruled that Hungary did not expropriate, directly or indirectly, Electrabel’s 
investment. It further found that the termination of the PPAs did not breach the FET standard. In 
short, they found that Hungary was not responsible for the EC’s decision regarding the PPAs, 
and “where Hungary is required to act in compliance with a legally binding decision of an EU 
institution, recognized as such under the ECT, it cannot (by itself) entail international 
responsibility for Hungary… The Tribunal considers that it would be absurd if Hungary could be 
liable under the ECT for doing precisely that which it was ordered to do” (Electrabel v. Hungary, 
Part VI-22). 
 The tribunal differed from that of AES on the role of EC pressure in leading to the Price 
Decrees. Like AES, the tribunal found that the investor could have no reasonable expectations 
that administrative pricing would not be reintroduced. However, in the Electrabel case it 
underlined context of Hungary’s accession to the EU and the necessity of liberalizing the 
domestic electricity market (Electrabel v. Hungary 2012,).  
 Finally, like the AES tribunal, the Electrabel arbitrators accepted that Hungary had 
legitimate political motivations for enacting the Price Decrees. Indeed, as the arbitrators write in 
the final Award, “There is no doubt that by late 2005 and early 2006, there was political and 
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public controversy in Hungary over the perceived high level of profits… However, politics is 
what democratic governments necessarily address; and it is not, ipso facto, evidence of irrational 
or arbitrary conduct for a government to take into account political or even populist controversies 
in a democracy” (Electrabel v. Hungary 2012, Part VIII-page 7). 
8.3 The Role of Domestic Interests in Electrabel and AES Summit Generation v. 
Hungary  
 
In this section, I discuss three potential factors which contributed to the shift in Hungary’s 
preferences toward the PPAs. First in the run up to a highly contested election, the opposition 
party employed the idea of the “extra profits” of the foreign-owned generators in their campaign. 
They were able to do this successfully, a number of interviewees argued, given the long-standing 
ambivalence of the general population regarding privatization and foreign-owned companies, as 
well as the fear of raising end-user prices of electricity. This led parliament to adopt legislation 
to reintroduce administrative pricing, the measure challenged by AES Summit Generation and 
Electrabel. Second, and as importantly, following the partial liberalization of the electricity 
market in 2003, the MVM began to suffer losses under the PPAs. As will be discussed below, 
even after privatization the MVM was seen an important player within the Hungarian state 
apparatus and likely able to influence policy and the timing of the renegotiation of the PPAs in 
particular suggests MVM’s influence. Finally, internal documents and interviewees suggest that 
Hungarian state actors were aware of a possible conflict between the PPAs and EU accession 
requirements, and it is likely that this also contributed to the termination of these agreements.  
8.3.1 Political Parties and Energy Consumers  
 
Political parties, ostensibly representing the mass interests of energy consumers, were able to 
influence the short terms policies of the government toward foreign-owned electricity generators 
by means of a political contestation – specifically through electoral pressure in the lead-up to the 
2006 general elections.  
 As discussed above, both arbitral tribunals acknowledged that the “extra profits” of the 
foreign-owned electricity generators became the subject of an intense political debate. This is not 
surprising given that energy and electricity have been election issues since the end of 
communism, and that there had been a general unwillingness on the part of post-communist 
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governments to expose consumers to dramatic price increases (Interview #23). This fits into the 
more general pattern of political contestation in central Eastern European states; as Bohle and 
Greskovits (2010) note, in these countries “political contention has been closely...linked to the 
issue of social protection” (p. 454). Moreover, they note that in the post-communist era, there has 
been a steady alternation between left- and right-wing parties in power, and  
there has been no clear division of labour between the left and the right in the sense that the 
former has protected vulnerable social groups while the latter only the economy. Rather, all 
parties that hoped for mass popular support usually stressed the intrinsic relationships between 
economic and welfare protectionism... (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007, p. 545).  
From the end of the communist rule to the mid-2000s, Hungary’s political situation mirrored this 
description quite closely; from the mid-1990s on, elections were dominated by competition 
between the Socialist party and the conservative Fidesz, and until the general election in 2006, 
no incumbent had been granted as second term. Moreover, “economic populism” has dominated 
political competition, and even the right-wing Fidesz has focused on social protection (Deak, 
2013). 
 It was in this context that Fidesz, then the opposition party, instigated the debate on the 
electricity generators’ “extra profits.” This debate emerged in 2005 took place both in parliament 
and in the media, with “references in the press and elsewhere...made to generators’ profits as 
“extra”, “too high,” “huge” and “luxury.” The Hungarian public was described as “defenceless” 
against rising prices and it was said that such “luxury profits” must be “knocked down.” (AES 
Summit v. Hungary, p. 25) Following the advent of this debate, and in the lead-up to the election 
in April 2006, the Hungarian parliament passed legislation to enact the price decrees (which set a 
cap on electricity prices) in March 2006. 
 According to a number of interviewees, the “extra profits” discourse was first and 
foremost a political tool in a highly contested electoral race; “[Fidesz] made harsh attacks on the 
government, and it was just one tool to [do so]... the ‘extra profits’ served only political 
purposes” (Interview #24). Similarly, another interviewee explained that the idea of extra profits 
accruing to the generators was “part of a political argument... I didn’t see any detailed analysis of 
where this extra profit came from” (Interview #20). However, the argument served the interests 
of both Fidesz and MVM; according to Peter Mihalyi, “Fidesz and [party leader Viktor] Orban 
invented this term extra profit, [which] was supported by the MVM leadership at the time... what 
Fidesz was saying [about the extra profits] was essentially correct and very much supported by 
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the MVM” (Interview #23). Indeed, given the ideological linkages between upper-level 
management of the MVM and the Fidesz party suggested by a number of interviewees (see 
below), it is not surprising that these actors would pursue common interests.
48
  
 However, the measures challenged by the investors were in fact taken by the Socialist 
government both before and after they won the election. Indeed, it appears that the incumbent 
government adopted the same discourse toward the generators at the time, perhaps in part 
because “it was a way for the government to distinguish themselves from the governments of the 
mid-1990s who had sold everything” (Interview #25). It was public pressure, according to 
another interviewee, that led the government to adopt these measures as it was “perhaps the only 
possible way for this government not to lose face, when they had repeated the extra profit, they 
had to show something to the public” (Interview #20). Indeed, concerns regarding keeping 
energy prices low for households appear to have spanned the political spectrum, and had been a 
longstanding election issue. More broadly, the discourse of “extra profits” resonated with a 
public that opinion polls show did not support foreign ownership of large companies, and was 
skeptical about capitalism in general (Deak, 2013). Thus an attack on the profits made by these 
firms “absolutely resonated with voters” (Interview #23).  
 However, in its defence, Hungary took pains to emphasize the technical rather than 
political reasons for which it reinstated administrative pricing, including as an attempt to meet 
EU requirements (Interview #26). Specifically, Hungary argued that as the generators refused to 
renegotiate the PPAs, the short-term reintroduction of administrative pricing was the “next best 
thing” to minimize the state aid to the generators. Furthermore, it is clear that the interests of the 
state-owned MVM played an important role in the overall treatment of the investors who had 
signed PPAs. In the following two sections, I discuss the evidence that pressure from both the 
MVM and the EC led to the eventual cancellation of the PPAs. 
8.3.2 MVM and Electricity Market Reform  
 
The preferences of the state-owned electricity company toward the PPAs shifted, as over time 
some of these agreements became disadvantageous for the MVM, and the interests of the MVM 
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 Indeed, since Fidesz has been in power since 2010, the government has taken a similar attitude toward a broader 
foreign investors, increasing state control of various industries including electricity and gas (Deak, 2013). 
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can be connected to both the measures challenged by the claimants discussed in this chapter – the 
ultimate cancellation of the PPAs and the interim reintroduction of administrative pricing.  
 After the Second World War, Hungary nationalized its electricity supply, and the 
Hungarian Electricity Board, the MVM, was formed in 1963 (OECD, 2000b). The MVM was 
corporatized in 1991 after the fall of the communist regime and retained its central position in the 
Hungarian electricity supply system. At this time, the MVM was divided into two tiers, the first 
of which was responsible for the overall management and coordination of the electricity system, 
while the second was further divided into fifteen energy generation and network companies 
which became independent corporations which were nearly all privatized by 1997 (OECD, 
2000b).   
 The MVM was facing competing pressures at this stage. On the one hand, it was 
necessary to secure investment in the energy sector, which was, according to one interviewee, a 
former senior analyst at the Hungarian Energy Office, “not in a very good state” (Interview #24). 
In fact, during the first phase of privatization, the government was largely unsuccessful at 
attracting foreign investors, who “sent back the signal that without...a pricing regime, nobody 
will buy this” (Interview #20). This problem was solved by the implementation of the PPAs, 
which were “an absolutely clear requirement for the investors”; while they committed the 
investors to upgrading the power generation infrastructure, they provided a guaranteed profit, 
and therefore no risk, to the investors (Interview #24). At the same time, they allowed the 
government to maintain lower end user prices:  
Because the MVM was a state-owned company and could incur some losses, it was able to buy 
electricity at relatively high prices from the generators, and sell it at a lower price – the MVM 
was the actor that served this policy objective, the first one to make the deal attractive to 
investors, and on the other side guaranteed a low price for customers. (Interview #24) 
 During this period, the MVM was not a proponent of further liberalization (Interviews 
#20, 21, 23, 24). Indeed, a number of interviewees suggested that the management of MVM 
continued to have a strong culture of centralized planning and saw itself as quite independent 
from the state. According to Peter Mihalyi, a former deputy secretary of state for the Ministry of 
Finance, many of the MVM bureaucrats had “studied in the Soviet Union...they didn’t have any 
background in the Anglo-Saxon economic way of thinking, and ... also were fervent right wing 
nationalists” (Interview #23). Similarly, another interviewee described the MVM as having “a 
very different attitude than any other private company,” and recalled a meeting at which “at one 
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point, when I referred to the Hungarian government and the interests of the state, they said ‘We 
are the state.’ It was a different attitude” (Interview #24). 
 The shifting interests of the MVM partially explain the timing of the cancellation of the 
PPAs. Given the aforementioned attitude of the MVM’s managers, it is not surprising that the 
MVM initially tried to impede the process of further liberalization of the electricity market, 
including dragging its feet regarding the renegotiation of the PPAs. As more than one 
interviewee noted, it had been clear for some time within the Hungarian bureaucracy that, due to 
the impending EU accession, the PPAs would eventually have to be renegotiated or cancelled 
(Interviews #24, 25). Indeed, a 2006 presentation from the Hungarian Energy Office includes a 
reference to a 2002 piece of legislation containing the rules for the renegotiation of the PPAs, 
and concludes that “it would be necessary to renegotiate the PPAs... but this is not in the interest 
of the MVM” (Document #18). Indeed, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, “the MVM was 
not incentivized to make this hard decision,” and despite being pressured by the government to 
renegotiate with the foreign-owned generators, they did not do so (Interview #24).  
 EU accession required the end of the regulated pricing, and the market was significantly 
liberalized in 2003. This changed the situation of the MVM vis-à-vis PPAs; as mentioned above, 
when customers were able to move to the free electricity market, MVM had an oversupply of 
electricity generated by companies covered by the PPAs. It was able to sell this excess supply to 
electricity traders, but at a significantly lower price then what it had originally paid (Interview 
#24). It was at this point, according to energy researcher Eva Voszka, the MVM understood that, 
in the long-term, the dual market was worse for it than full liberalization would be (Interview 
#21). This led to a shift in attitude of the MVM both toward the pricing scheme and the PPAs 
more generally, and the demands of the impending EU accession, and the investigation into state 
aid in particular, allowed the MVM to put pressure on the generators; in this way “this EU 
investigation was very good for MVM, it was a tool so MVM could refer to this process and say 
‘I have to do this, I don’t want to, but you see there is this investigation’ (Interview #24). 
Tellingly, although the PPAs were officially cancelled in 2008, many agreements were 
subsequently renegotiated with the same generation companies on very similar terms. Those that 
were not – including with AES Summit and Electrabel – were those that had been the least 
profitable for MVM (Interview #24).   
 As discussed above, the reintroduction of the administrative pricing, which introduced 
179 
 
price caps, was due in large part to a political debate that emerged in the lead-up to the 2006 
election. However, it was also clearly in the short term interest of MVM, as it was suffering 
significant losses since the end of the administrative pricing and the move to the dual market. In 
the next section, I will discuss the parallel EU pressure to renegotiate the PPAs. 
8.3.3 State Interests and EU Accession  
 
In its defence in both cases, Hungary argued that pressure from the EC investigation into whether 
the PPAs represented illegal state aid was behind the decisions to both temporarily reintroduce 
administrative pricing and ultimately cancel the agreements altogether.  
 There is evidence that policymakers were aware of the eventual necessity of terminating 
the PPAs, both from general policies regarding state aid related to EU accession, and more 
specifically, from meetings between European and Hungarian officials. In its amicus brief to the 
AES Summit tribunal, the EC noted that the issue arose prior to accession in 2004, as the Europe 
Agreement, signed between the European Community and Hungary in 1993, “contained rules on 
State aids very similar to those applicable under the EC treaty” (EC, 2009, p. 5). The 2004 Act of 
Accession contains similar provisions prohibiting state aid (EC, 2009). In 2001, the EC adopted 
an official methodology for analysing state aid via stranded costs in the electricity sector, and 
based on this, in 2005, launched an official investigation into Hungary’s PPAs.  
 Of course, the existence of official policies does not necessarily entail that Hungarian 
officials would be aware of how these applied to the PPAs. However, the EC states that its 
concerns regarding the PPAs were communicated to Hungary at the outset of the investigation in 
2005. Additionally, several interviewees note that it had been clear for quite some time that the 
PPAs would conflict with EU accession requirements. As one interviewee claimed, “because of 
the EU accession, years ago we had already started planning how to deal with the PPAs” 
(Interview #25) a process which another interviewee said began in the 2000s, at which time it 
was “known that these agreements can be a problem and an obstacle to liberalization” (Interview 
#24). In particular, the HEO seems to have been the most willing of government actors to 
renegotiate or cancel the PPAs; as its aforementioned presentation concluded in 2006, the PPAs 
did appear to constitute state aid, and thus “it would be necessary to renegotiate or cease the 
PPAs” (Document #18). 
180 
 
Moreover, Hungarian officials communicated these concerns to the generators; one interviewee 
explained, 
we believed that sooner or later the MVM would sell some of the assets and we would renegotiate 
some of these PPAs and after that, there would be a competitive market... you can’t join the 
European market when that contract exists, so we proposed several arguments, why it’s useful to 
shorten or renegotiate the PPA. I personally invited AES for this discussion. They hired one of 
the best British advisers... the answer was no, forget it, we signed an agreement, and we calculate 
our future profits from this formula. (Interview #20) 
  
However, this interviewee further noted that the ultimate decision to renegotiate the PPAs did 
not lie with the HEO but with the government, and “we could not convince the government to be 
brave enough to cancel the PPAs.” It appears, therefore, that while the MVM’s interests were 
still served by the PPAs, and the EC ruling on the state aid was still pending, the government was 
not motivated to cancel the PPAs outright. This was confirmed by Balázs Felsmann a former 
State Secretary for Energy, who explained that “at the end, the Hungarian authorities were not 
ready to [terminate] these PPAs in general and the EU had to take a resolution on that, and 
effectively the EU regulation stopped the potential usage of the PPAs” (Interview #26).  
 Some of this reticence to renegotiate or terminate the contracts may have also been due to 
the resistance put up by the generators themselves. As was noted both by interviewees and in 
Hungary’s defence before the arbitral tribunals, government officials had several times attempted 
to renegotiate the PPAs with these firms. However, according to one interviewee, “it was clear 
that some of them accepted the renegotiation and from the beginning it was clear some of them 
would go to court, we didn’t know what kind, but it was clear that they would challenge the 
decision” (Interview #20). Another interviewee expected that these conflicts would culminate in 
arbitration because “sometimes you realize there is no room for [compromise], because here they 
wanted for an additional ten years all of the potential profits and we thought no you made 
enough profit compared to the privatization deals. We were very far from each other” (Interview 
#26). This sentiment was echoed by one of Hungary’s legal team who noted that “we were more 
or less aware of the possibility [of arbitration]. It didn’t come as a complete surprise” (Interview 
#27).  
 Therefore, it seems that policymakers, particularly in the Hungarian Energy Office, were 
aware that EU accession would entail the eventual renegotiation or cancellation of the PPAs. 
However, these actors alone did not have the influence to force the issue, particularly when the 
MVM’s interests were still served by the PPAs. However, the changing structure of the energy 
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market, itself a result of the EU accession process, altered the MVM’s view of the PPAs, and this 
coincided with more direct pressure, in the form of the state aid investigation, to cancel the 
agreements. As noted above, the Hungarian government defended the reintroduction of 
administrative pricing as a way to lessen the effect of the state aid in the face of its failure to 
renegotiate the contracts. As this measure was also taken in the midst of the political debate on 
“extra profits” it is more difficult to tease out the most important causal factor in that policy-
making decision. However, with regard to the cancellation of the PPAs, it appears that a happy 
convergence of the interests of the MVM and the government, due to its EU accession 
requirements, led to the cancellation of these agreements.  
8.4 Conclusion  
The conflicts between Electrabel and AES Summit Generation and Hungary were the result of 
the confluence of a number of factors. As discussed in the previous two chapters, in the Bilcon 
and Pacific Rim cases, the governments took measures as a direct response to public pressure – 
in both cases, as a reaction to the threat of mining activity on local livelihoods and environment. 
In the disputes between Hungary and the foreign-electricity generators discussed in this chapter, 
the link to mass interests is less direct, and the “special interests” of the state-owned electricity 
generator, as well external demands from the EC, also appear to have had an influence on state 
decision-making regarding the PPAs. 
 However, the arbitral tribunals in both the AES and Electrabel cases highlighted the 
importance of mass interests in the governments’ decision to reintroduce administrative pricing. 
While the claimants in both cases accused Hungary of taking this measure for purely political 
reasons, thus representing it as “irrational” policymaking, the arbitrators legitimized the idea that 
governments could in fact make political decisions regarding investments, and that this was in 
itself not a breach of commitments under the ECT – an unusual finding for arbitral tribunals, that 
in particular stands in contrast to the conclusion of the tribunal in the Bilcon case (see Chapter 
6). A closer examination of the role of political interests complicates the picture, slightly. While 
the debate over the generators’ alleged “extra profits” was indeed highly political, it appears to 
some extent to have been manufactured by the opposition party in the run up to a national 
election as a tool to criticise the incumbent government. However, it is clear that, as energy is a 
perennial election issue in Hungary, and there exists widespread ambivalence toward foreign 
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ownership of large companies and the free market in general, this was fertile ground for the 
opposition party from which to generate public engagement in the issue.  
 At least as important as the public interest in the generators’ extra profits, however, were 
the interests of the state-owned electricity company, the MVM. As the broader policy 
environment underwent significant changes between the late 1990s and early 2000s, MVM’s 
interests with respect to the PPAs shifted. The PPAs served as a bulwark against further 
liberalization of the market, thus the conservative MVM was not incentivized to renegotiate or 
cancel them, despite some awareness of possible conflicts between the PPAs and EU accession 
requirements. However, as the market liberalization continued apace, the PPAs locked the MVM 
into a situation in which it was suffering significant losses via the stranded costs. Thus, both the 
reintroduction of administrative pricing, which put a limit on the amount the MVM would pay to 
the foreign-owned generators, and the eventual early termination of the PPAs, were clearly in the 
interest of the state-owned company. The degree to which the MVM influenced Fidesz in its 
“extra profit” discourse is difficult to ascertain, although ideological affinities between the party 
and upper management of the MVM suggest this is certainly a possibility. Much clearer, 
however, are the links between the MVM’s eventual shift in attitude toward the PPAs in general, 
and their termination (and subsequent renegotiation). This shift in preferences was due to 
changing market conditions, and therefore ultimately cannot be separated from the effects of EU 
accession. 
 Therefore, the disputes between the electricity generators and Hungary cannot be seen as 
disconnected from the more general process of EU accession. Indirectly, the demands from the 
EU to liberalize the energy market changed the conditions under which MVM was operating, 
and shifted its preferences toward the PPAs, which provided extra motivation for the government 
to push for their termination. More specifically, the EC investigation into the PPAs as illegal 
state aid put direct pressure on the government to terminate these agreements, and it did so 
following the EC’s ruling in 2008.  
 Indeed, it seems that this is a clear case of admittedly very broad political and economic 
policy changes instigating a shift in state preferences toward the foreign investors, with the 
shifting interests of the MVM in particular acting as a kind of “intervening variable”, leading the 
government to ultimately take the measures challenged by the investors.  As discussed above, the 
relevant policymakers were aware of the possibility of arbitration (and indeed had been taken to 
183 
 
arbitration by AES Summit in 2001), and thus this seems to be another case in which the 
“preferences” argument clearly wins out over the “capacity argument.”  
 However, in an indirect way, state capacity to manage the electricity sector plays a role, 
at least in the antecedents of the case. As discussed above, due to the demands of the transition 
from the planned to the free market, Hungary was forced to offer the long-term PPAs to the 
investors in order to attract FDI. This placed MVM in a situation that would become 
disadvantageous as the electricity market was further liberalized. More generally, as is probably 
true of any transition country, Hungarian administrators were faced with a difficult tasks “not 
only... of breaking up an incumbent monopoly power company but with adapting its whole 
economy to the rules of the market – and with the task of learning what this involved as the 
country went through the process” (OECD 2000 p. 19). In this way, the disputes between 
Hungary and the electricity generators may fit into a broader pattern of disputes between 
investors and transition country governments, and explain why these are so common. Indeed, 
transition countries are likely to experience issues related to the capacity of the state to manage 
newly privatized and liberalized markets and industries, as well as those related to the 
preferences of key actors – whether of voters who have a distrust of the free market, or of 
industrial actors loathe to relinquish control of key sectors. 
 Ultimately, however, these cases can be summed up in the succinct words of one 
interviewee as a shift in state preferences toward the investors:  
in your story, the government is breaching contracts, but they can say, Us? No. It’s the European 
Union. We are doing the right thing. And not without some justification. It was by and large true. 
In period A, we made an agreement because it was in the interest of the country and in period B 
we break this agreement because it’s in the interest of our country. And that’s it. (Interview #23)  
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
 
This project has focused on the relationship between domestic actors and institutions and 
investor-state disputes, in order to better understand for what policy objectives, and at whose 
behest, states are willing to risk the costs of arbitration. Underlying this question are potentially 
competing explanations about why states may violate agreements, which focus domestic level 
variables. On the one hand, investor-state disputes may be the result of weak domestic 
institutions that fail to maintain the conditions required by an IIA, as suggested by the 
managerial approach to compliance. On the other, these conflicts may develop when non- or sub-
state actors induce a shift in state preferences toward FDI (often in a specific sector, or even 
individual projects), as suggested by the enforcement approach to compliance. In both cases, the 
role of domestic institutions in causing or preventing investor-state disputes is central to the 
explanation, but the causal relationship is different.  
 What is the relevance of this approach? First, this research sheds light on the functioning 
of the international investment protection regime by highlighting the conflicts of interest which 
provoke investor-state disputes. Moreover, as stated in the introduction, if we accept that ISDS 
has the potential to impose significant costs on states, it is important when either justifying or 
criticising the regime to have an understanding of at whose behest states are incurring these 
costs. Indeed, an additional goal of this research was to engage with some of the same questions 
raised by work on the impact of ISDS on domestic policy space, while avoiding the pitfalls of 
asking the regulatory chill question – in short, having to prove that the state did not take a 
measure out of fear of arbitration. However, like this project, the regulatory chill hypothesis is 
concerned with the content of the measures that may be thwarted by the threat of investment 
arbitration; if state actors are dissuaded from expropriating investments for private gain or 
harassing foreign investors, few observers would likely be concerned about regulatory chill. 
Similarly, if this project uncovered that the majority of the measures challenged in arbitration 
were targeting investors for individual or narrow interest group gain, there would be little 
grounds for concern. However, I found that investor-state disputes which culminate in arbitration 
often touch on issues of public rather than private interest, both because of the industries in 
which they are concentrated and the types of measures which trigger them. Moreover, investor-
state disputes have the potential to affect a wide array of stakeholders who, as can be seen in the 
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proceeding chapters, are themselves at times advocating for the measures challenged by 
investors.  
 As will be discussed below, this project contributes to the discussion on investor-state 
arbitration and IIAs in a number of ways. First, as it is based on an original dataset of investor-
state disputes, coded for the domestic institutions involved and the measures taken which 
triggered the dispute, it contributes empirical data to an aspect of investor-state disputes that has 
to date received little attention. In addition, the case studies, based on a political economy 
analytical framework, highlight the domestic interests and preferences at stake in investor-state 
disputes. Given that these case studies are representative of broader “types”, it may be possible 
to generalize from these findings. Finally, as will be discussed in the concluding section of this 
chapter, the findings have implications for the potential reform of the ISDS system, as 
understanding the general causes of disputes can suggest means of either avoiding disputes or 
improving existing dispute resolution mechanisms. 
9.1 Summary of Results  
 
The investigation was conducted in three stages. First, almost 600 investor-state arbitration cases 
were coded on various dimensions. These included the income level of the respondent state; the 
industry of the investor; the domestic institution that took the disputed measure; and the type of 
measure taken. This allowed me to identify some broad patterns in investor-state disputes, and 
contributed to the development of hypotheses that were tested statistically. The development of 
these hypotheses further depended on a reading of literature relevant to investor-state arbitration. 
This included an approach to compliance with international agreements that takes into account 
the impact of domestic non-state actors on foreign policy, as well as a more targeted reading of 
work on investors-state relations. The latter focused primarily on studies of the determinants of 
expropriation and political risk, as these are evidently phenomena closely related to the causes of 
investor-state disputes that lead to arbitration. Finally, in order to provide micro-level detail on 
some of the relationships uncovered in both large-N studies, I chose three case studies of 
investor-state disputes in Canada, El Salvador and Hungary. The questions posed to these cases 
concerned the domestic interests behind the policies that were challenged by investors; how 
these domestic interests managed to shift state preferences toward the investment; and the 
awareness of state decision-makers of the possibilities of investment arbitration. 
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  As discussed in the introduction, while I do not use a comparative approach, each of 
these case studies encompasses a number of features that make them, if not typical, important 
“types” according to the statistical results. For example, as a member of NAFTA, Canada is one 
of the few developed states that has had significant experience as a host state to investment 
covered by an IIA. Therefore, Canada can serve as an example for other developed states that 
may, if the TTIP and TPP agreements are ratified, soon be host to investment covered by an IIA. 
In many ways El Salvador, as a middle income presidential system is a typical case. 
Additionally, the dispute discussed in Chapter 7 is centered on extractive operations, which as 
we have seen, is one of the industries most frequently involved in investor-state arbitration. 
Finally, the state measure which triggered the dispute is the refusal to grant (or revocation of, 
according to the claimants) a mining permit, the measure most often challenged by investors. 
Therefore, this case provides more micro-level detail on many of the relationships expressed in 
the statistical analysis. Finally, the Hungarian case, in opposition to the two previous, 
demonstrates the role that powerful domestic sub-state actors can have in fomenting a dispute 
with a foreign investor. However, beyond this, it underscores a number of issues facing post-
communist states in managing foreign investment (particularly in sectors such as electricity 
which affect many stakeholders), which can explain the concentration of arbitration cases in 
these countries.  
 As noted in the introduction, a wide array of state policies and measures are challenged 
by investors via arbitration. This makes it difficult to develop a causal narrative that fits all 
investor-state disputes – for instance it is difficult to explain an arbitration case that challenges 
unfulfilled contractual obligations in the same way as one that follows the imposition of new 
environmental regulations. However, what is common to almost all investor-state disputes is a 
shift in policy related to an investment, which is therefore taken as the dependent variable in this 
study. This shift may be explained, as suggested above, either by an inadvertent failure of the 
state to maintain the policy framework, or by a shift in preferences related to an investment, 
which leads to a purposive change of policy. Inherent to this decision-making process is 
therefore an awareness of the possibilities of arbitration – if the relevant state actors are not 
aware of the risk of arbitration then the former explanation (based on the managerial approach to 
compliance) is more convincing than the latter. However, this project found more evidence for 
the latter explanation.  
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 Indeed, these disputes do not appear to arise from failures of technical capacity, as much 
as the very political nature of the issues and policies at stake. The first hint that this is the case 
comes from the industries in which investor-state arbitration cases are concentrated. As can be 
seen in Chapter 2, almost 40 percent of known investor-state disputes are related to investments 
in extractives (oil, gas and mining) or energy generation. As discussed throughout the project, 
these industries directly affect a much wider range of stakeholders than, for example, 
manufacturing operations, and groups such as energy consumers or communities affected by 
extractive projects have mobilized to pressure the state to take measures which trigger 
investment arbitration. Moreover, while overall the majority of measures in question are 
administrative, the single domestic institution that is most often involved in investor-state 
disputes is the legislature, clearly a body meant to respond to some extent to the public interest. 
However, this should not imply that administrative measures are taken in an environment free 
from external pressure. Indeed, as both the Canadian and El Salvadoran case studies 
demonstrate, there can be a clear link between voter or citizen pressure and administrative 
decisions which in turn provoke an investor to turn to arbitration. 
 The results of the statistical analyses also strongly suggest that an explanation for 
investor-state disputes which relies on overt changes in state preference toward an investment are 
more convincing than arguments that rely on a lack of bureaucratic or technical capacity of host 
states. Indeed, while the majority of respondent states are middle income countries, which could 
suggest a link between disputes and lower levels of bureaucratic effectiveness, “exposure” to 
arbitration, measured by ratified IIAs and FDI stock, may account for this pattern. Indeed, much 
of the concentration of disputes in these countries has much to do with their status as traditional 
host states of FDI that is covered by an IIA. The likelihood of developed signatories to NAFTA 
to be taken to arbitration indicates that, when high income countries are hosts to FDI covered by 
an IIA, they will also take measures that are subsequently challenged by investors. Moreover, 
other variables related to capacity, such as government effectiveness, GDP per capita, and GDP 
growth do not have consistently significant relationships with the dependent variable. On the 
other hand, variables related to changing preferences/domestic interest groups have a more 
consistent and expected relationship with the DV. These included variables that, I argue, indicate 
domestic institutions responsive to the changing preferences of domestic actors (presidential 
system, polity score; veto players); those that indicate time bound events signifying a change in 
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preferences (elections); and factors related to the type of state and investment which may 
increase negative domestic perceptions of FDI (transition country, extractives). 
 The case studies further highlighted relationships between changing domestic preferences 
toward FDI (in general or with respect to specific investment projects) and the measures 
challenged in arbitration. This was the case in both the developed and developing country case 
studies. For example, the case of Bilcon v. Canada demonstrated that broad interest groups – in 
this case local communities and local and national environmental groups – can affect state policy 
toward investors. The case of Pacific Rim v. El Salvador was strikingly similar to the Canadian 
case in some key ways, despite the very different setting. Similar domestic interest groups 
managed to shift state preferences toward the mining project, although in this case their efforts 
resulted in a de facto change of national policy, rather than, in as in the Canadian case, a single 
decision to reject a project. Finally, the Hungarian case focuses on the role of two different types 
of non-state actor pressure on shifting state preferences toward an investment. In this case, the 
powerful, narrower interests of the state-owned electricity company motivated the state’s change 
in policy, although on a rhetorical level, the state-owned electricity company MVM and its allies 
in the Fidesz party leveraged mass interests (this time, energy consumers) to pressure the 
government to reintroduce administrative pricing. However, the changing market conditions 
which were themselves the cause of MVM’s change in preference toward the investor were the 
result of EU accession requirements. Therefore, this final case study demonstrates how much 
broader shifts in policy, in this case the evolution of Hungary toward a free-market economy, can 
also play a role in changing conditions for investors which they challenge via arbitration. 
Additionally, this case highlights the potential for conflicting international regimes – in this case 
the EU and the ECT’s conflicting priorities regarding the electricity market in Hungary. In all 
cases, key decision-makers expressed an awareness of the possibility of ISDS, at the very least 
because they were threatened with arbitration by the investor in advance of the actual registering 
of the case, and therefore, lack of awareness of IIAs can also not be seen as a sufficient 
explanation for investor-state disputes.  
 However, it cannot be claimed that capacity, broadly defined, does not play any role in 
investor-state disputes. In each case study, the theme of a lack of capacity indirectly contributed 
to the eventual dispute. In Canada, it was the inability of bureaucrats, despite consultation with 
in-house counsel in the lead-up to the final decision on the quarry, to predict that the investor 
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would turn to arbitration following the decision to reject the project. In El Salvador, the 
relationship was even less direct, as an eventual recognition that the relevant ministries did not 
have the capacity to regulate the mining industry contributed to their decision-making regarding 
issuing new permits. However, it must be added that this was not related to the actual regulation 
of the investment, nor would it have likely been enough impetus to cancel the project in the 
absence of public pressure. Finally in Hungary, the necessity of attracting investment in the 
1990s, and the weak bargaining position of the state vis-à-vis potential investors, led to the 
formation of long-term agreements which at least some observers recognized early on would 
have to be terminated in order to comply with EU regulations. Therefore, in all these cases, some 
degree of bureaucratic weakness or lack of state capacity did contribute to the dispute, but it 
cannot be seen as the primary cause. 
 Finally, the role of exposure to the investment protection regime must itself be noted. As 
mentioned above, the distribution of investment arbitration cases by respondent state has much to 
do with investment flows and the division of signatories into host and home states. As the rather 
special case of NAFTA shows, when traditional home states are also host to investment covered 
by an IIA, they will be sued by investors. Moreover, in both the Canadian and Hungarian cases, 
interviewees noted the options other than arbitration that investors had available to them. In 
Canada, Bilcon could have gone through Canadian courts to repeal the decision of the JRP, while 
in Hungary, many other investors successfully renegotiated their PPAs with the government. 
Therefore, investor motivation to use ISDS also undoubtedly contributes to the rate of investor-
state arbitration cases. However, just as the existence of prisons does not cause individuals to 
commit crimes, the mere existence of ISDS does not cause a shift in state preferences toward a 
specific investment. Therefore, while exposure to opportunities to be sued is an important 
necessary condition for ISDS to take place, it cannot be understood on its own as a cause of these 
disputes.  
 Ultimately therefore, this project finds more evidence for the underlying causes of 
investor-state disputes based on the logic of the enforcement approach to compliance. This may 
not be surprising when the chain of events which leads to arbitration is properly understood. As 
was discussed in the chapter on El Salvador (and as work on regulatory chill hypothesis 
suggests), investors may unofficially threaten states with arbitration before officially registering 
the case at an arbitral forum. Additionally, most official arbitral processes include a “cooling off” 
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stage, during which the investor and state can negotiate and avoid arbitration. Therefore, states 
which may have inadvertently provoked an investor to turn to arbitration have ample opportunity 
to reverse the measures in question if their actual preferences toward the investment have not 
changed. It is therefore logical that states which do decide to follow through with the arbitration 
process are defending a policy objective, whether this is at the behest of narrow or broader 
interest groups.  
 This last point introduces certain normative judgements into the analysis, and it is beyond 
the scope of this project to determine the extent to which the state measures in question are taken 
in the “public interest” or for private gain. Indeed, even the case studies presented here, which all 
touch on public policy issues, can be explained in relation to the interests of narrow interest 
groups (and indeed, this is how the claimants in these cases present their arguments). The El 
Salvadoran case has the clearest links to mass interest groups, although the electoral interests of 
President Saca were clearly tied to his decision to refuse to grant Pacific Rim license to operate. 
In the Canadian case, the investor accused local politicians of catering to the interests of local 
anti-American groups opposed to development in their “backyards” to cement their own electoral 
futures. Finally, the Hungarian dispute has the most obvious connection to narrow interests – in 
this case those of the MVM. Indeed, in all three cases, electoral pressure directly or indirectly 
played a part in state-decision-making, as did, in the former two, genuine environmental 
concerns. The assessment of politicians’ and policy-makers’ choices in balancing the competing 
domestic and investor interests therefore rests not only on legal, but also on normative 
judgements.  
  Ultimately, the conclusion reached here is that, beyond the fact that the challenged 
measures represent shifts in preference toward (an) investment, rather than as inadvertent failures 
to comply with IIA obligations, the actors affected and the content of the measures suggest that 
these disputes are highly political, and may represent instances in which the preferences of 
domestic and transnational actors are irreconcilable.  
9.2 Theoretical Significance  
 
This project draws on a number of strands of literature that pertain to investor-state relations and 
state compliance with international agreements, and can therefore contribute to furthering 
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theoretical discussion in these areas. More generally, this project also speaks to the role of 
domestic institutions in furthering or resisting economic globalization.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, beyond the competing enforcement and managerial 
approaches, much work has been devoted to explaining the role of domestic institutions in 
compliance, and – although this may not always be related to an international agreement – 
expropriation. How do these two bodies of work relate to each other, and this project? 
 As I conclude above, this project finds more evidence for the enforcement approach to 
compliance – that state compliance with international agreements is based on cost-benefit 
calculations – rather than the managerial approach which focuses on the capacity of domestic 
institutions. This suggests that there are multiple possible sources of (non)compliance can be 
found at the domestic level, but that these will more likely take the form of interest groups, and 
institutions responsive to their preferences rather than merely weak domestic bureaucracies. It is 
thus pressure from these sources that state decision-makers will factor into their cost-benefit 
calculations when contemplating pursuing policy goals which may conflict with investors’ 
interests.  
 Much of the literature that focuses on the role played by domestic institutions in 
democracies with regards to both treaty compliance and preventing expropriation comes to 
similar conclusions; in short that democracies (and the attendant veto players) are positively 
correlated with respect for international agreements, property rights, and lower rates of 
expropriation (Simmons, 2010; Milner, Mansfield and Rosendorff, 2002; Jensen, 2002; Gaubatz, 
1996; North and Weingast, 1989). Although not always explicitly based on different theories of 
compliance, these findings correspond with the logic of the enforcement approach, as these 
authors often reference audience (electoral) costs with forcing governments to comply – the 
underlying assumption being that democratic domestic audiences will be in favour with 
compliance with previous commitments made by the states, and thus hold state actors 
accountable.  
  This project problematizes those conclusions when it comes to respecting IIAs, echoing 
the findings of skeptics such as Tomz (2002) who questions the assumption that democratic 
audiences will always be in favour of international treaty compliance. Indeed, the results of the 
large-N analysis show that both democracy level and the incidence of elections are correlated 
positively with the likelihood of an investor-state dispute, suggesting a role for electoral pressure 
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in the relevant state decision making processes. The case studies, particularly the examination of 
the dispute between El Salvador and Pacific Rim, further highlight this connection. This in turn 
suggests that democratic domestic institutions will not always favour further globalization and 
liberalization when it comes to FDI. This point is further underscored by the recent debates, 
primarily in industrialized democracies, regarding the TTIP agreement currently negotiated 
between the EU and United States; in particular, the European Commission’s public consultation 
on the agreement, which elicited feedback showing significant public concern regarding the 
impact of these agreements on domestic policy space. As will be discussed briefly below, this 
has led the EC to take a cautionary stance on the agreement, and in particular, ISDS (European 
Commission, 2015). 
  The connection between democratic institutions and investor-state arbitration may be 
due in part to the dependent variable itself – the very wide array of measures challenged by 
investors in arbitration. It also echoes the conclusions of earlier work such as that of Kobrin 
(1979), who noted that political risk often results from the “regular functioning of the political 
process” (p. 84). If this is the case, what does it mean that “the regular functioning of the 
political process” is seen by foreign investors as detrimental to their interests, and can be 
subsequently challenged by them in front of international tribunals? At the very least, it arguably 
has already led to some pushback against the regime, and calls for reform. As Simmons (2013) 
has noted, there is an increasing number of democratic states seeking to overturn arbitral rulings 
that have gone against them, which suggests that “if the investment regime cannot accommodate 
the legitimate policy space of democratic governments... it may prove quite brittle indeed” (p. 
40).  
9.3 Reform of the Investment Protection Regime  
 
As discussed in the introduction, IIAs and the ISDS system have come under increasing criticism 
in recent years as the rate of new disputes has risen, developed states have found themselves as 
respondents in arbitration, and investors are increasingly seen to be challenging host country 
regulatory activities (Karl, 2013; UNCTAD, 2013a). This has led to the assessment that the 
investment protection regime is undergoing a “legitimacy crisis,” a perception reinforced by the 
withdrawal of a number of states from the ICSID Convention (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela); 
the withdrawal of states from their IIAs (Ecuador, Venezuela, South Africa, Czech Republic, 
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Indonesia); and the denouncement of ISDS by traditional home states such as Australia and 
Germany (Schill, 2015). This in turn has triggered a number of states and international 
institutions to propose (and in some cases begin to implement) systemic reform. As laid out by 
UNCTAD (2013), these paths to reform include clarifying and/or altering substantive provisions 
in IIAs; promoting alternative mechanisms of dispute settlement and conflict prevention; 
introducing an appeals process; and the creation of a standing investment court.  
 Perhaps the easiest reform to implement would be the promotion of conflict avoidance 
and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This would include non-binding arbitration 
focused primarily on finding a solution to the conflict rather than determining the legality of a 
state measure (UNCTAD, 2013). These efforts could also be accompanied by the creation of 
domestic institutions which would screen government measures for their potential to trigger an 
investor-state dispute and implement “investor care” conflict management systems which would 
monitor investor-state relationships for early warning signs of conflict. One such institution, 
already mentioned in this thesis, is Peru’s Investor-State Dispute Management System. However, 
these initiatives can only “reduce the number of fully-fledged legal disputes” but do not tackle 
the greater questions of the legitimacy of the regime (UNCTAD, 2013, p. 5). 
 As Karl (2013) notes, some states have already begun to reform their own IIAs, 
particularly by rewording provisions to ensure that these treaties do not infringe on their right to 
regulate, by clarifying the meaning of provisions, introducing exception clauses (related to 
industries or types of claims), and limiting access to ISDS. For example, the US 2012 Model BIT 
has clarified the meaning of indirect expropriation “to exclude regulatory measures enacted in 
the exercise of the government’s police powers” (Perera & Demeter, 2013). However, as these 
authors note, “international law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and definitive fashion 
precisely what regulations are considered “permissible” and “commonly accepted” as falling 
within the police or regulatory power of states, and thus, non-compensable” (Perera & Demeter 
p. 86). Therefore, the impact of changing or clarifying treaty provisions depends also on their 
interpretation by arbitral tribunals – an issue clearly exemplified by both the diverging rulings of 
the AES and Electrabel tribunals, and the very different findings on the acceptability of political 
measures by the tribunals in the Hungarian and Canadian cases (see Chapters 6 and 8).  
 Given the latitude that tribunals have to interpret treaty provisions, many observers have 
instead (or in addition) called for the creation of an appellate court, which could review and 
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correct erroneous arbitral decisions. According to UNCTAD (2013), if “constituted of permanent 
members, appointed by States from a pool of the most reputable jurists, an appeals facility has a 
potential to become an authoritative body capable of delivering consistent – and balanced – 
opinions, which would rectify some of the legitimacy concerns about the current ISDS regime” 
(p. 8). Schill (2015) echoes this sentiment, claiming that an appellate mechanism would increase 
the democratic legitimacy of the international investment regime, particularly if its judges are 
“appointed by participating states in democratic processes, which are modeled, for instance, on 
how judges of other international courts are selected” (p. 8). However, he also notes that an 
appellate court could create further legitimacy problems, as permanent institutions may be more 
likely to increase their jurisprudential powers than the ad hoc system currently in place (a 
concern which relates to the creation of a standing court as well). Moreover, while the creation of 
an appellate mechanism would be a positive step overall, it could also serve to increase the costs 
of arbitral proceedings, another criticism directed at ISDS. 
 Finally, the most radical reform to the investment protection regime would be the 
creation of a standing court, like the WTO, to settle investment disputes. This court would, like a 
potential appellate mechanism, consist of judges appointed or elected by states, to sit on a 
permanent basis, and potentially allow the participation of a third party as amicus curiae. Most 
obviously, this would decrease the perception of conflicts of interest inherent in the current 
system, in which many individual investment lawyers are appointed by parties to the dispute, and 
often sit as both judges and lawyers. According to UNCTAD, the establishment of a court would 
“go a long way to ensure the legitimacy and transparency of the system, facilitate consistency 
and curacy of decisions and ensure independence and impartiality of adjudicators” (p. 9). On the 
other hand, as UNCTAD notes, this would also be the most difficult reform to implement. 
However, there appears to be some momentum in this direction, as in the final months of 2015, 
the European Commission published its proposal for the creation of a standing court to be 
included in the TTIP agreement being negotiated with the United States. In addition, in 
December 2015, the Commission announced the conclusion of negotiations on an EU-Vietnam 
free trade agreement that includes a “permanent investment dispute resolution system” and an 
appellate mechanism (Titi, 2016). 
 These pathways to reform echo the different assumptions made by the approaches to 
treaty compliance employed throughout this project. In particular, those reforms that attempt to 
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decrease the incidence of investor-state disputes – such as alternative dispute resolution and 
conflict avoidance mechanisms – align with the suggestions made by the managerial approach to 
increase compliance. For example, a mechanism to review state measures for potential conflict 
with IIAs could help states to avoid disputes arising from lack of bureaucratic capacity (although 
the poorest states probably do not have the “in-house” expertise to monitor policy-making with 
an eye toward investment protection commitments).  
 However, as the case studies presented here demonstrate, the role of lack of capacity in 
investor-state disputes is more nuanced than a mere lack of understanding of the regime 
(although to be sure this is not unimportant). In addition to an awareness of the provisions of 
IIAs, a better understanding of the preferences of potential stakeholders of an investment project, 
including non-state actors, could help avoid clashes between investors, and sub- and non-state 
actors. In particular, consultation with these stakeholders in the pre-investment phase, especially 
for projects in the extractive industries, could significantly reduce conflict as both governments 
and investors become aware of potential opposition to a project.
49
 This in turn could reduce the 
incidence of measures regarding the cancelation or revocation of licences and permits, which 
trigger investor-state disputes most often.  
 However, for consultation to be effective, governments must be willing, at the outset, to 
refuse an investment or ask an investor to modify plans in the face of domestic actor concerns, 
which may not be likely, particularly when the bargaining power between the two parties is 
unequal, as was the case, for example, in Hungary’s efforts to attract FDI in the early 1990s. 
Moreover, while consultation and mediation may avoid full-fledged investor-state disputes in 
some cases, in others, such as in El Salvador v. Pacific Rim, the interests of the various 
stakeholders are irreconcilable. In this case, the solutions to treaty compliance which center on 
increasing capacity will be of little use. Instead, reform of the international investment protection 
regime must focus on promoting both IIAs and ISDS which can better balance the interests of 
investors, states and non-state actors  
 
                                                 
49
 Moreover, the importance of consultation with affected communities is already widely recognized by numerous 
international organizations and standards such as FPIC and ILO Convention 169, and UNCTAD’s new standards on 
investment and sustainable development. 
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Appendix I: Qualitative Coding  
 
1. Respondent States Included in Database  
1. Afghanistan 
2. Albania 
3. Algeria 
4. Angola 
5. Argentina 
6. Armenia  
7. Australia 
8. Austria 
9. Azerbaijan  
10. Bahrain  
11. Bangladesh 
12. Barbados 
13. Belarus 
14. Belgium  
15. Belize 
16. Benin 
17. Bolivia 
18. Bosnia 
19. Botswana 
20. Bulgaria 
21. Burkina Faso  
22. Burundi 
23. Cambodia 
24. Cameroon 
25. Canada 
26. Chile 
27. Costa Rica 
28. Croatia 
29. Cyprus 
30. Czech Republic  
31. Denmark  
32. Djibouti 
33. Dominica 
34. Dominican Republic 
35. DRC 
36. Ecuador 
37. Egypt 
38. El Salvador  
39. Equatorial Guinea 
40. Eritrea 
41. Estonia 
42. Ethiopia 
43. Finland 
44. France 
45. Gabon  
46. Gambia 
47. Georgia 
48. Germany 
49. Ghana 
50. Greece 
51. Guatemala 
52. Guinea 
53. Guyana 
54. Haiti 
55. Honduras 
56. Hungary 
57. Iceland 
58. India 
59. Indonesia 
60. Iran 
61. Ireland 
62. Israel 
63. Italy 
64. Jamaica 
65. Japan 
66. Jordan 
67. Kazakhstan 
68. Kenya 
69. Korea 
70. Kuwait 
71. Kyrgyz Republic 
72. Laos 
73. Latvia 
74. Lebanon 
75. Libya 
76. Lithuania 
77. Macedonia 
78. Madagascar 
79. Malaysia 
80. Mali 
81. Mauritania 
82. Mauritius 
83. Mexico 
84. Moldova 
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85. Mongolia 
86. Morocco 
87. Mozambique 
88. Myanmar 
89. Namibia 
90. Nepal 
91. Netherlands 
92. New Zealand 
93. Nicaragua 
94. Nigeria 
95. Norway 
96. Oman 
97. Pakistan 
98. Panama 
99. Papua New Guinea  
100. Paraguay 
101. Peru 
102. Philippines 
103. Poland 
104. Portugal 
105. Qatar 
106. Romania 
107. Russia 
108. Rwanda 
109. Saudi Arabia 
110. Senegal 
111. Serbia 
112. Sierra Leone 
113. Singapore 
114. Slovak Republic  
115. Slovenia 
116. South Africa 
117. South Sudan 
118. Spain 
119. Sri Lanka 
120. Sudan 
121. Suriname 
122. Swaziland 
123. Sweden 
124. Syria 
125. Tajikistan 
126. Tanzania 
127. Thailand 
128. Trinidad 
129. Tunisia 
130. Turkey 
131. Turkmenistan 
132. Uganda 
133. Ukraine 
134. United Arab Emirates 
135. United Kingdom 
136. United States 
137. Uruguay  
138. Uzbekistan  
139. Venezuela 
140. Vietnam 
141. Yemen 
142. Zambia 
143. Zimbabwe 
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2. Coding Scheme – Measures 
Code Definition  
Legislative A measure is coded as legislative if it is a law passed by an elected 
body – parliament, legislature etc, at either the national or 
subnational level. Usually found in the “Facts” section of an arbitral 
award.  
Administrative A measure is coded as administrative if it is taken by the executive, 
ministries, or other government agencies (including SOEs), without 
the passing of a law. This includes contractual issues, permitting 
procedures, and other processes involved in the functioning of these 
bodies. 
Judicial A measure is coded as judicial if it is the decision of a domestic 
court.  
Not Applicable A measure is coded as NA if the claimant identifies as lack of 
government action as being at issue – for example a failure to protect 
an investment from terrorism. 
Unknown A measure is coded as UK if its source cannot be determined.  
 
General  Measure applies to entire population or entire industry. 
Specific Measure applies to specific investor or smaller group of investors. 
Cancellation of 
licence/permit/contract 
State cancels an agreement with an investor 
Refusal to grant 
licence/permit/contract 
State refused to grant permission for a project (generally takes place 
after certain administrative steps have already been taken by the 
investor). 
Regulatory Change Generally applies population or industry-wide; examples include: 
ban of specific activity or substance; change to regulatoryE 
framework governing a specific industry. Examples include 
withdrawal of subsidies, imposition of plain packaging for cigarettes, 
change in tariff scheme, minimum wage. 
Unfulfilled contractual/payment 
obligations 
State allegedly fails to pay for services rendered or fulfill other 
contractual requirements 
Existing  legislation An investor challenges a law already in force, rather than reacting to 
a change in law. Examples include Canada Health act, and Black 
Economic Empowerment provisions. 
Failure to protect investment State fails to protect investment, including against terrorist attacks; 
protestors; squatters, etc. 
Currency measures Currency devaluations or controls; includes measures taken during 
the Argentine financial crisis 
Failure to Enforce Previous 
Award/Settlement 
State fails to respect conditions of previous award, either 
domestically or from previous arbitral proceeding.  
Trade Controls Import and export duties, quotas, etc.  
Price Controls Imposition of new tariffs for utilities 
Interference with investment Alleged harassment by government officials 
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Appendix II: Statistics 
 
1.  Descriptive Statistics (Population) 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Treaty 3077 22.28209     23.29669 1 155 
NAFTA 3083 0.0194616      0.138163 0 1 
FDI Stock 2749 1.87e+08     5.29e+09 -4.15e+10 1.33e+11 
GDP per 
Capita 
2884 9220.157 13771.36 102.666 110697 
GDP Growth 2997 3.975114 6.330416 -62.07651 149.971 
Govt Effect 3038 0.037413     1.474134. -3.4536 4.815308 
Political Stab 3038 -0.1585554     1.399086 -5.468624 3.330409 
Polity 2816 3.356889 6.773796 -10 10 
Veto Player 2844 0.4257029      0.319778 0 0.89432 
Transition 3038 0.186831 0.389839 0 1 
Left 2937 0.3023493 0.459354 0 1 
Crisis 2742 0.2381473 0.4260274 0 1 
Leader Trans 2285 0.1684902     0.3743829 0 1 
 
2. Descriptive Statistics (Case Studies) 
Canada 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Treaty 24 21.08333 9.33398 4 33 
NAFTA 24 0.8333333 0.3806935   0 1 
FDI Stock 23 285723 183551.9    106867.8 636972.5 
GDP per Capita 23 29838.15 11415 19390.49 52218.99 
GDP Growth 24 2.266645 1.921533 -2.711471 5.123122 
Govt Effect 24 2.054875 1.933825 0 4.026222 
Political Stab 24 1.088267 1.035518 0 2.31787 
Polity 23 10 0 10 10 
Veto Player 23 0.8536841 0 .0082252 0.8391481 0.86288 
Transition 24 0 0 0 0 
Left 23 0.5652174     0.5068698 0 1 
Crisis 23 0.1304348 0.3443502 0 1 
Leader Trans 19 0.2105263 0 .4188539 0 1 
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El Salvador 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Treaty 22 13.77273     8.274642           1 21 
NAFTA 22 0 0 0 0 
FDI Stock 21 3489.628     2943.765      252.61      8634.9 
GDP per Capita 21 2481.577     823.1513    1080.485    3789.568 
GDP Growth 22 3.066214     2.368849   -3.133046    7.543337 
Govt Effect 22 -.352011     .4476864   -1.447845    .0109695 
Political Stab 22 -.0034733     .2398967   -.6059355    .5318343 
Polity 21 7.190476     4023739 7 8 
Veto Player 21 .1981051     .0215152     .160008     .220011 
Transition 22 0 0 0 0 
Left 21 .1428571     .3585686           0 1 
Crisis 21 .2380952     .4364358           0 1 
Leader Trans 17 .1764706     .3929526           0 1 
 
Hungary  
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Treaty 24 43.66667     15.03522          13 58 
NAFTA 24 0 0 0 0 
FDI Stock 23 43655.14     36579.71    569.5688    103556.5 
GDP per Capita 23 7743.598     4172.572    3186.444    15364.68 
GDP Growth 22 1.744911     2.834522    -6.55103    4.789353 
Govt Effect 24 .9119483     .8722133           0 2.040474 
Political Stab 24 .9447674     .9283171           0 2.34937 
Polity 24 10 0 10 10 
Veto Player 23 .7462342     .0212059       .6667    .7653642 
Transition 24 1 0 1 1 
Left 23 .7391304     .4489778           0 1 
Crisis 23 .6521739     .4869848           0 1 
Leader Trans 19 .2631579     .4524139           0 1 
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3. Alternative Models  
Exposure (Panel NBREG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) 
VARIABLES totcase totcase totcase totcase 
Lagged DV 1.437*** 1.482*** 1.367*** 1.343*** 
 (0.0643) (0.0631) (0.0674) (0.0563) 
Treaties 1.027***   1.018*** 
 (0.00264)   (0.00484) 
FDI Stock  1.213***  0.954 
  (0.0315)  (0.0344) 
Time   1.356*** 1.264*** 
   (0.0757) (0.0757) 
Time
2 
  0.993*** 0.995** 
   (0.00185) (0.00194) 
Constant 0.0799*** 0.0272*** 0.00834*** 0.0140*** 
 (0.0107) (0.00710) (0.00339) (0.00694) 
     
Observations 2,935 2,620 2,937 2,620 
Number of iso3n 143 136 144 136 
seEform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Exposure No Lagged DV (Panel Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) 
VARIABLES case case case case 
     
Treaties 1.030***   1.019*** 
 (0.00481)   (0.00580) 
FDI Stock  1.243***  0.955 
  (0.0702)  (0.0400) 
Time   1.432*** 1.300*** 
   (0.0861) (0.0850) 
Time
2 
  0.992*** 0.994*** 
   (0.00196) (0.00212) 
Constant 0.0714*** 0.0204*** 0.00488*** 0.0100*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.00214) (0.00526) 
     
Observations 2,935 2,620 3,083 2,620 
Number of iso3n 143 136 144 136 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Capacity (Panel NBREG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES totcase totcase totcase totcase totcase totcase 
       
Lagged DV 1.358*** 1.403*** 1.380*** 1.368*** 1.366*** 1.188*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0591) (0.0559) (0.0490) (0.0574) (0.0673) 
FDI Stock 1.006 1.085** 1.036 1.028 1.016 1.060 
 (0.0368) (0.0450) (0.0451) (0.0372) (0.0376) (0.0412) 
Treaties 1.024*** 1.027*** 1.024*** 1.029*** 1.027*** 1.019*** 
 (0.00453) (0.00448) (0.00426) (0.00401) (0.00418) (0.00424) 
NAFTA 4.546*** 7.768*** 4.308*** 7.797*** 5.710*** 4.558*** 
 (1.615) (2.311) (1.025) (1.894) (1.403) (1.709) 
Cumulative Case 1.007     1.213*** 
 (0.0470)     (0.0432) 
Cumulative Case
2 
1.001     0.996*** 
 (0.000762)     (0.000902) 
GDP/Capita  1.000    1.000 
  (2.63e-05)    (2.21e-05) 
GDP/Capita
2 
 1.000    1.000 
  (5.59e-10)    (3.94e-10) 
Crisis   0.830   1.075 
   (0.160)   (0.208) 
Corruption    0.750***  0.854** 
    (0.0437)  (0.0577) 
Political Stability     0.817*** 0.992 
     (0.0459) (0.0692) 
Constant 0.0747*** 0.0455*** 0.0637*** 0.0499*** 0.0593*** 0.0432*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0143) (0.0212) (0.0143) (0.0170) (0.0122) 
       
Observations 2,620 2,577 2,612 2,620 2,620 2,574 
Number of iso3n 136 133 133 136 136 132 
seEform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Capacity No DV (Panel Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES case case case case case case case 
        
FDI Stock 0.975 1.108 1.054 1.014 1.031 1.021 1.077 
 (0.0339) (0.0736) (0.0672) (0.0552) (0.0500) (0.0514) (0.0610) 
Treaties 1.020*** 1.032*** 1.025*** 1.027*** 1.031*** 1.028*** 1.022*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00721) (0.00571) (0.00572) (0.00583) (0.00570) (0.00640) 
NAFTA 7.023*** 24.19*** 11.00*** 12.71*** 19.21*** 13.92*** 13.35*** 
 (2.161) (11.14) (3.811) (4.173) (7.442) (4.944) (6.181) 
Cumulative Case 1.268***      1.237*** 
 (0.0543)      (0.0562) 
Cumulative Case
2 
0.995***      0.995*** 
 (0.00109)      (0.00101) 
GDP/ Capita  1.000*     1.000 
  (2.90e-05)     (2.64e-05) 
GDP/Capita
2 
 1.000     1 
  (5.43e-10)     (4.77e-10) 
Crisis   0.727*    0.950 
   (0.119)    (0.182) 
GDP Growth    1.010   1.009 
    (0.0116)   (0.0109) 
Corruption     0.786***  0.865* 
     (0.0462)  (0.0707) 
Political Stability      0.866** 1.083 
      (0.0504) (0.0881) 
Constant 0.0741*** 0.0355*** 0.0497*** 0.0580*** 0.0445*** 0.0520*** 0.0393*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0186) (0.0250) (0.0245) (0.0172) (0.0205) (0.0161) 
        
Observations 2,620 2,577 2,612 2,567 2,620 2,620 2,534 
Number of iso3n 136 133 133 135 136 136 131 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Preferences (Panel NBREG) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES totcase totcase totcase totcase totcase totcase totcase totcase totcase 
Lagged DV 1.409*** 1.412*** 1.428*** 1.396*** 1.407*** 1.318*** 1.311*** 1.303*** 1.299*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0624) (0.0583) (0.0582) (0.0549) (0.0463) (0.0814) (0.0526) (0.0753) 
Treaties 1.028*** 1.029*** 1.030*** 1.025*** 1.028*** 1.036*** 1.031*** 1.036*** 1.030*** 
 (0.00391) (0.00401) (0.00394) (0.00415) (0.00383) (0.00459) (0.00453) (0.00575) (0.00502) 
FDI Stock 0.968 0.972 0.966 0.991 0.969 0.937* 0.958 0.991 1.012 
 (0.0374) (0.0393) (0.0376) (0.0387) (0.0377) (0.0361) (0.0382) (0.0393) (0.0417) 
Extractives 1.024*** 1.022*** 1.020*** 1.023*** 1.023*** 1.030*** 1.026*** 1.023*** 1.018*** 
 (0.00478) (0.00458) (0.00504) (0.00481) (0.00476) (0.00715) (0.00657) (0.00709) (0.00632) 
NAFTA 5.442*** 6.061*** 4.949*** 5.873*** 5.366*** 8.688*** 7.184*** 7.633*** 6.557*** 
 (1.056) (1.194) (1.534) (1.234) (1.074) (2.680) (1.709) (2.233) (2.074) 
Polity 1.034 1.073*** 1.051** 1.030 1.031 1.052*** 1.043** 1.096*** 1.091*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0230) (0.0209) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0204) (0.0185) (0.0336) (0.0279) 
Veto Players  0.322***      0.393* 0.356** 
  (0.120)      (0.192) (0.165) 
President   2.171***     2.400*** 2.575*** 
   (0.498)     (0.802) (0.852) 
Transition    1.749***    1.787*** 2.137*** 
    (0.368)    (0.398) (0.473) 
Left      1.195   0.811 1.044 
     (0.202)   (0.136) (0.164) 
Leader Trans 
(lead) 
     1.519**  1.606**  
      (0.279)  (0.311)  
Leader Trans 
(lag) 
      1.323  1.301 
       (0.266)  (0.260) 
Constant 0.0670*** 0.0901*** 0.0374*** 0.0510*** 0.0633*** 0.0491*** 0.0546*** 0.0219*** 0.0216*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0269) (0.0134) (0.0170) (0.0191) (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0105) (0.0110) 
          
Observations 2,537 2,527 2,537 2,537 2,537 1,774 2,023 1,766 2,015 
Number of 
iso3n 
132 132 132 132 132 129 129 129 129 
seEform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Preferences No DV (Panel Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES case case case case case case case case case 
          
Treaties 1.030*** 1.031*** 1.033*** 1.027*** 1.030*** 1.037*** 1.032*** 1.033*** 1.037*** 
 (0.00536) (0.00547) (0.00504) (0.00546) (0.00537) (0.00675) (0.00681) (0.00515) (0.00672) 
FDI Stock 0.969 0.973 0.972 1.002 0.973 0.936 0.969 0.984 1.043 
 (0.0504) (0.0526) (0.0494) (0.0517) (0.0506) (0.0605) (0.0628) (0.0456) (0.0621) 
Extractives 1.028*** 1.027*** 1.025*** 1.029*** 1.028*** 1.034*** 1.028*** 1.024*** 1.026*** 
 (0.00639) (0.00631) (0.00642) (0.00647) (0.00630) (0.00906) (0.00849) (0.00626) (0.00764) 
NAFTA 14.47*** 15.29*** 12.71*** 16.72*** 13.69*** 19.85*** 17.10*** 21.18*** 20.77*** 
 (4.257) (4.648) (6.442) (5.115) (3.967) (6.460) (4.931) (7.665) (8.374) 
Polity 1.043* 1.068*** 1.063*** 1.038* 1.038* 1.055** 1.043* 1.056** 1.079** 
 (0.0227) (0.0245) (0.0231) (0.0225) (0.0229) (0.0251) (0.0238) (0.0231) (0.0332) 
Veto Player  0.491       0.997 
  (0.214)       (0.537) 
President   2.467***      2.288** 
   (0.652)      (0.744) 
Transition    2.648***     2.187*** 
    (0.647)     (0.555) 
Left     1.321    0.972 
     (0.236)    (0.209) 
Leader trans 
(lead) 
     1.558** 
(0.351) 
  1.667** 
(0.399) 
          
Leader trans 
(lag) 
      1.005 
(0.187) 
  
          
Corruption        0.773*** 0.743*** 
        (0.0422) (0.0550) 
Constant 0.0536*** 0.0648*** 0.0269*** 0.0333*** 0.0483*** 0.0443*** 0.0473*** 0.0395*** 0.00785*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0267) (0.0129) (0.0142) (0.0196) (0.0217) (0.0224) (0.0144) (0.00514) 
          
Observations 2,537 2,527 2,537 2,537 2,537 1,774 2,023 2,537 1,766 
Number of 
iso3n 
132 132 132 132 132 129 129 132 129 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Full Model (Panel Logit) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES case 
  
Lagged DV 2.049** 
 (0.610) 
Time 1.278* 
 (0.188) 
Time
2 
0.995 
 (0.00596) 
FDI Stock 1.189** 
 (0.105) 
Treaties 1.018** 
 (0.00699) 
NAFTA 21.50*** 
 (11.59) 
Extractives 1.019*** 
 (0.00692) 
Polity 1.039 
 (0.0313) 
Veto Players 2.482* 
 (1.262) 
President 1.773* 
 (0.523) 
Transition 2.281*** 
 (0.558) 
Left  0.923 
 (0.196) 
Leader trans (lead) 1.730** 
 (0.445) 
Corruption 0.872 
 (0.194) 
GDP/Capita 1.000** 
 (4.57e-05) 
GDP/Capita
2 
1.000 
 (9.82e-10) 
Crisis 1.342 
 (0.259) 
Political Stability 0.912 
 (0.0765) 
Constant 0.000519*** 
 (0.000596) 
  
Observations 1,750 
Number of iso3n 127 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Full Model (Panel NBREG) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES totcase 
  
Lagged DV 1.226*** 
 (0.0505) 
Polity 1.054* 
 (0.0315) 
Veto Players 1.497 
 (0.723) 
President 1.787** 
 (0.528) 
Transition 1.557** 
 (0.323) 
Left 0.839 
 (0.153) 
Leader trans (lead) 1.574** 
 (0.296) 
Corruption 0.907 
 (0.144) 
FDI Stock 1.093* 
 (0.0572) 
Extractives 1.017*** 
 (0.00629) 
Treaties 1.026*** 
 (0.00695) 
Time 1.333** 
 (0.179) 
Time
2 
0.993 
 (0.00533) 
GDP/Capita 1.000* 
 (3.81e-05) 
GDP/Capita
2 
1 
 (8.43e-10) 
Crisis 1.359 
 (0.261) 
Govt Effect 1.169 
 (0.185) 
Political Stability 0.897 
 (0.0680) 
NAFTA 15.43*** 
 (5.665) 
Constant 0.00109*** 
 (0.00105) 
  
Observations 1,750 
Number of iso3n 127 
Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4. Additional Marginal Effects Graphs  
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Appendix III: Case Studies  
 
1. List of Interviews 
Case Interview # Interviewee Date 
Canada 1 Anonymous Federal Official April 11, 2014 
2 Anonymous Provincial Official May 29, 2014 
3 Interview with JRP Member (by phone) May 30, 2014 
4 Anonymous Federal Official (by phone) June 2, 2014 
5 Howard Mann, former NAFTA negotiator 
and defence lawyer for Canada, current 
legal counsel at IISD  
April 5, 2014 
6 Robert Taylor (Background only) April 6, 2014 
El Salvador 7 Anonymous Official, PROESA August 7, 2014 
8 Marjorie Trigueros, FUSADES July 22, 2014 
9 Edgardo Mira, CEICOM July 9, 2014 
10 Luis Parada, Foley Hoag (by phone) September 15, 2014 
11 Rodolfo Calles, Mesa July 14, 2014 
12 Saul Baños, Mesa August 13, 2014 
13 Anonymous Official, MARN  August 6, 2014 
14 Anonymous Official PDDH July 23, 2014 
15 Anonymous Official July 8, 2014 
16 Anonymous Official August 12, 2014 
17 Anonymous Oxfam employee August 12, 2014 
18 Anonymous (background only)  
19 Anonymous (background only)  
Hungary 20 Anonymous official, ERRA April 15, 2015 
21 Anonymous April 17, 2015 
22 Eva Voszka, Pezugykutato May 10, 2015 
23 Peter Mihalyi May 15, 2015 
24 Anonymous April 11, 2015 
25 Anonymous May 5, 2015 
26 Felsmann Balasz May 10, 2015 
27 Anonymous April 9, 2015 
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2. List of Documents  
 
Case Doc # Description Source 
Canada 1 Correspondence between Paul Buxton, 
Project Manager for Bilcon and the DFO 
(April 14, 2003) 
Whites Point Quarry and Marine 
Terminal Project – Project File 
CEAA 
http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?la
ng=En&n=B4777C6B-1  
2 Letter from the World Wildlife 
Foundation to Steve Chapman, CEAA 
(September 16, 2003 
3 Sierra Club of Canada comments on the 
draft guidelines for the EIS 
4 Letter from DFO to Steve Chapman, 
CEAA (January 21, 2005) 
5 Letter from the West Nova Fishermen’s 
Coalition to the DFO (March 21, 2003) 
6 Letter from Walker Fisheries to the DFO 
(March 17, 2003) 
7 Letter from the Bay of Fundy Inshore 
Fishermen’s Association to Minister 
Thibault (DFO) (March 21, 2003) 
8 Letter from the Partnership for 
Sustainable Development of the Digby 
Neck and Islands Society to the DFO 
(March 17, 2003) 
9 Letter from Brier Island Whale and 
Seabird Cruises Ltd. to the Joint Review 
Panel (January 18, 2005) 
10 Letter from local fisherman to DFO 
(March 18, 2003) 
11 Presentation by Helen Whidden to the 
Joint Review Panel, (June 23, 2007) 
12 Letter from Eva Holzwarth as part of the 
Public Hearings conducted by the Joint 
Review Panel (June 7, 2007)  
Whites Point Quarry and Marine 
Terminal Project – Public Hearings 
CEAA 
http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?la
ng=En&n=39C62F9F-1  
13 Letter from Michaele Kustudic as part of 
the Public Hearings conducted by the 
Joint Review Panel (n.d.) 
14 Submission from the Partnership for 
Sustainable Development of the Digby 
Neck and Islands Society to the Joint 
Review Panel (June 25, 2007) 
15 Agreement concerning the establishment 
of a Joint Review Panel for the Whites 
Point Quarry and Marine Terminal 
Project between the Minister of 
Environment Canada and The Minister of 
Environment and Labour Nova Scotia 
(November 11, 2004) 
Whites Point Quarry and Marine 
Terminal Project – Project File 
CEAA 
http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?la
ng=En&n=B4777C6B-1 
16 Correspondence between Mr. Thibault 
and the Federal Ministry of the 
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Environment (June 26, 2006) 
17 Correspondence between Rachel 
McCormick (DFAIT) and Debra Myles 
(CEAA) (n.d.) 
Hungary 18 Power point presentation “Long-term 
PPAs in Hungary” (Hungarian Energy 
Office, 2006) 
Interviewee # 21 
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Appendix IV: Publications  
 
Refereed Journals 
 
The Role of Investor-State Arbitration on Domestic Mining Conflicts, Global Environmental 
Politics [forthcoming 2016 Global Environmental Politics]. 
 
Book Chapters 
 
What, Where, When and Why? Patterns in Investor-State Disputes in B. Ilge &   K. Singh (eds) 
Rethinking Investment Treaties: Critical Issues and Policy Choice  (Madhyam). [Forthcoming  
2016] 
 
 (2015) Domestic demands and international agreements: What causes investor-state disputes? in 
S Lalani & R. Polanco (eds) The Role of the State in Investor-State  Arbitration (Martinus 
Nijhoff/Brill).  
 
Other Publications 
 
(2014) Risky Business or Risky Politics: What explains investor-state disputes? Investment 
Treaty News Quarterly. 
 
